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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the history of economic thought the development of the
theory of consumer demand is associated largely with neo-
classical thought. It is not that the consumer aspect was
neglected by the early classicists, but rather that It was
relegated to the background, to such an extent that it became
almost insignificant in their account of things. Cost and labor
value theories were stressed and worked out in numerous direc-
tions. But these involved great difficulties, many of which
could not be solved. A new approach seemed necessary, and
fortunately it was afforded by the utility theory. The intro-
duction of the utility approach was of some aid in the old
problems, but It probably raised more new problems than it
solved old. However this may be, there were certain advantages
to it. Theoretically It served to broaden the economic per-
spective. Cost of production, whether in terms of labor value
or money value, was no longer the determining element in value.
And today in spite of the limitations to the theory of con-
sumer behavior, it is at last recognized that value Is not a
one-sided phenomenon. As Marshall put it, it is a "scissors,”
1
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2with the blades of production and consumption both vital to the
whole process.
The decisive factor in the neoclassical broadening of the
economic perspective lies in the use of the utility concept.
Utility, as first introduced, was essentially introspective.
But in the course of its development it has been gradually
purged of those inherent connotations, largely introspective,
which were objectionable. The psychological, ethical, and
hedonistic aspects of the concept were over a period of time
done away with. The remaining concept has thus become a far
more acceptable doctrine from a theoretical point of view, but
from a practical point of view it is not a more useful one.
The concept originally stressed the utilitarian and
hedonistic aspects. It depended chiefly on introspective
magnitudes. But little by little there arose a skepticism
about the measurement of utility introspectively. It became
apparent that this precluded the existence of a standard unit.
Also along with this it was recognized that the absolute
V
measurement of utility was not an essential prerequisite to
a theory of consumer's behavior. What was needed was merely
a system of assumed preferences involving measurement of
"more or less" but not "how much." This manifested itself in
the development of the indifference analysis; indeed, the in-
difference analysis is considered by some as one of the
turning points in the development of the theory of consumer
-.
-
-
•
' .
*•
/
o.
•
3behavior
.
The chief purpose of this paper is to recount the de-
velopment of indifference analysis and to evaluate it theo-
retically in the light of the present state of the theory of
consumer behavior. It should be understood clearly beforehand
that the indifference curve is merely a geometric device which
serves as an analytical tool and that from the use of this
tool no unusual practical results have resulted. For the per-
son who is seeking purely practical results this paper is of
little value. From a theoretical point of view, however, I
feel something has been added. If Indifference analysis did
nothing more than limit the concept of utility, it would have
served its purpose, but It has done more than that. It has
set up new limitative hypotheses from which a system of reason-
ing has been built. It has limited the type of empirical data
to be taken into consideration. And, as a result of this,
there has been a broadening, however small, of insight into
the relationships on the demand side of the economic equation.
Ordinarily there would be little need for a paper of this
sort. Various aspects of the subject are covered in numerous
modern texts and it would therefore seem that the development
material was readily available. Unfortunately this is not
the case. The early work appears mostly In academic journals.
Some of it has been done in foreign tongues and has not been
translated into the English. Generally speaking, the material
. i-
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4is accessible only with great difficulty and in discontinuous
form. Consequently it is not as well known as it should be
and its influence has not been widespread. In the following
pages, therefore, I shall attempt to set out a concise picture
of the development of this aspect of demand theory. More than
that, I shall attempt to evaluate it as a tool, for, as such,
its popularity has reached the point where an inquiry of this
type is necessary even if we should end by completely denying
its usefulness.
The development of the indifference curve was the outgrowth
of pioneer thought in the theory of consumer behavior. This
thought has extended in two directions. Primarily it embraced
the logical establishment of individual and group demand curves.
But along with this, it has included a specific problem inci-
dental to these curves, the problem of related goods. Unfor-
tunately in the developmental phase these areas of thought have
been treated together and as a result there has been much un-
necessary confusion. Furthermore the treatment of the specific
problem has attracted attention far out of proportion to what
It deserves. The reason for this probably lies In the nature
of the device itself and the suggestive possibilities which
It infers. However, the two problems are definitely related;
yet also in a narrow sense they can be separated. Our task
Is to present them in their related sense and also to separate
them. To this end I shall treat the development somewhat
.•
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5differently from that which for the most part actually took
place. The first half of this paper will treat the device in
its broad aspects. It will include the establishment of the
indifference curve and its use in the theoretical construction
of individual and group demand curves. In the latter half
the problem of related goods shall be presented. This will
involve repeated reference to material covered in the first
half, but for the sake of clarity the reader is asked to make
this reference. It is hoped that two complete pictures and
their points of similarity and separation will thereby be
attained.
Throughout the paper there will be found from time to
time the resort to mathematical terminology. This I have at-
tempted to keep to a minimum for two reasons. First while I
possess a sufficient knowledge of mathematics to follow with
some labor the mathematical reasoning, I do not dare use my
mathematics as a tool of thought. Secondly, while I recognize
mathematics as a great aid in economic reasoning, I feel that
there is something to be gained by translating the mathematics
back into literary thought. This is often overlooked by
mathematical economists and as a result much of their work
has become a riddle to all except a very few. This is in a
large measure unnecessary. Whatever can be said mathematically
can be stated in ordinary language and it Is quite probable
that many of the ambiguities which enter through the use of
-.
'
6mathematics may be eliminated by resorting back to simple
terms. One should be a check on the other. However this may
be, the subject matter has been worked up by its originators
mathematically and therefore some reference to mathematic
concepts cannot be avoided.
One further point before we proceed. The indifference
curve has already been referred to as a geometric device.
The geometric implications are important, but this is of
interest to us only in so far as it bears economically on
the theory of consumer behavior. This limitation is neces-
sary, for the device has been used in other aspects of eco-
nomic thought. Under the name of iso-product curves the same
device has been used on the productive side of the economic
equation. Indeed some of the early work in this field was
done by the same men who worked on the problems of demand.
As economists they recognized that there was an application
and they attempted to work this out. For our purposes, how-
ever, the term indifference curve will refer to the device
as used on the subjective side and we shall accordingly limit
our discussion to that end.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Edgeworth
There Is no single formula which can adequately describe
the forces which operate in the development of economic tech-
nique. It is customary, however, to ascribe exclusive impor-
tance to the work of individual men. To the extent that much
of this work displays keen brilliancy, it is not to be under-
stressed, yet at the sarnie time care should be taken lest it
be overstressed. It is well known today that no great mechani-
cal achievement is the result of a single invention, but rather
the accomplishment of a group of inventors.
1
Ideas accumulate;
inventions are put together, the final results depend on the
previous cumulative groundwork. A very similar pattern of
forces can be said to operate in the development of economic
technique. Therefore while we give credit where it is due,
while we recognize the brilliant mind, it is more important
to stress the making and remaking of the original ideas, which
have been the groundwork of the final achievement.
1
P. A. Usher, Industrial History of England (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), p. 251.
7
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8Indifference analysis is one of the tools in economic
technique. In a sense it is a mechanical achievement, which
has opened up new vistas in the field of economic analysis.
In its infancy, it was an insignificant device used to clarify
the difficulties of a particular problem, but it has been so
worked and reworked that today the final tool is very far re-
moved from the original.
F. Y. Edgeworth is usually referred to as the ’’inventor"
of the indifference tool. We first find the notion in his
Mathematical Psychics . ^ Here the problem is to determine the
extent of indeterminatenes3 in the case of a contract between
two people where no competition prevails. Edgeworth treats
the problem mathematically and it is quite possible that the
idea of the indifference curve came from the mathematical
treatment. For our immediate purpose, however, we shall dis-
pense with the mathematics since explanation can be made other-
wise. In setting up his problem Edgeworth falls back on the
work of Jevons . The cardinal thought of Jevons ' theory is
that value in exchange corresponds to the utility of the least
useful portion of the commodity. When exchange takes place,
the price must be such as to equate the "final utilities" of
the exchangers. To illustrate this Jevons worked up his now
^F. Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics (London: C. Keegan
Paul and Company, 1881). See discussion pp. 18-21.
-.
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9famous equation of exchange.^" But Jevons’ problem was not
that of Edgeworth, for he assumed that competition prevails.
His formula of exchange applies not to hare individuals, hut
2
to those clothed with the properties of a market. Edgeworth
starts from Jevons’ formula, hut he changes the hypothesis so
that the problem considered is that of pure barter between two
individuals. He then proceeds to show that in such a case a
contract without competition is indeterminate. Where perfect
competition prevails the contract is perfectly determinate.
As competition becomes more or less perfect, the contract be-
comes more or less indeterminate.
To illustrate this he sets up his indifference curves.
In Diagram 1, X denotes the amount of one good given up by A
and received by B; Y denotes the amount of another good given
by B and received by A. The curve OR is an indifference curve
for Y. It is the locus of all points which give to Y the same
satisfaction. Similarly OS is the indifference curve of X.
Now the line of force indicating the direction X or Y will
care to move, will be perpendicular to the indifference curve.
(Edgeworth calls these lines of preference.) The process of
exchange will continue so long as the gain in satisfaction of
^W. S. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy (London and
New York: Macmillan and Company^ 1871 ) , p. 101.
2Edgeworth, ojd. clt
.
,
p. 31, footnote 1.
5Ibld
.
.
p. 22.
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Y both A and B is positive.
This condition holds true for
any combination up to the
line RS which is designated
as the contract curve. Be-
yond the contract curve satis-
faction will decrease. Barter
therefore can take place only
on the contract curve RS, but
DIAGRAM 1 at what point the bartering
will come to a stop cannot be predicted. The position of
equilibrium may be described as indeterminate, 1 and the essen-
tial condition of this indeterminateness is the absence of
competition.
This whole idea may appear clearer If we translate it
into terms of the indifference systems as they are generally
used. In Diagram 2 the indifference curves of A are repre-
sented by the curves I
& ,
II
a ,
III a , those of individual
B represented by 1^, 11^, III^* are drawn with reference
to axis O’X’ and O’Y’ which have been rotated 180 degrees.
The location of each axis is determined by the fact that 0A
and OB are the total amounts of the two commodities which the
^See discussion in P. Y. Edgeworth, Papers Relating to
Political Economy (London: Macmillan and Company, 1925, pub-
lished on behalf of the Royal Economic Society), Vol. II,
pp. 315-319.
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individuals together possess.
Now if A possesses OC of Y
and CD of X he will not ex-
change on a curve lower than
I
&
. Similarly B will not ex-
change on a curve lower than
I, . But if we assume that the
D
curves indicate degrees of
utility, 1 then exchange will
take place where the marginal
utilities are equal ( Jevons
above) or where the indifference curves meet at M, Q, R, N.
MN represents all possible positions of equilibrium. Every
point on the curve represents a final position equilibrium,
where the marginal utilities being equal it is possible for a
contract to take place. The position of the ultimate contract
will be nearer to M if B is the more resourceful bargainer and
nearer to N if A is the more resourceful. It is shown, there-
fore, that the essential condition of the indeterminateness
does not depend on the equating of final utilities. This is
1The early analysis was based on the utility concept and
we resort to it here to elucidate this point. This discussion
is based on that of George J. Stigler, in his Theory of Price
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1946), pp. 79-81. Here Stigler
discusses the question without reference to the utility con-
cept. He merely assumes an ordinal preference field, which
is the generally accepted method today.
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merely incidental. '-The important factor is whether or not
competition is present, for with the increase of the number
of bargainers, the length of the contract curve decreases
until with many it reduces to a single point.
This was the problem which Edgeworth attacked and in which
he made the first use of the indifference curve. However, it
should be noted that while he did an excellent job, his work
was not entirely original; that is in so far as it is supposed
to be the first to make use of the indifference device. The
original idea was borrowed from Marshall and applied by Edge-
worth.
Marshall developed the device to simplify the intricacies
of foreign trade. He was interested in showing the gains re-
sulting from foreign trade and also the tendency for it to
gravitate towards a stable equilibrium, but he had to do away
with changing monetary standards. He therefore translated this
trade into terms of goods only and constructed a curve showing
the amount of one good a country is willing to exchange for a
given amount of another.
1
For example in Diagram 5, OE is
drawn such that country A is willing to give PN of cloth in
return for PM of linen. The curve actually equates the "na-
tional" utilities of PN cloth with PM linen as long as point P
''Alfred Marshall, The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade
(privately circulated, 1879; reprint London School of Eco-
nomics, 1930), p. 7.
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lies on curve OE and is on, in
our sense, an indifference curve.
Marshall of course did not think
of it in just this manner. He
was interested in showing the
tendency for stable equilibrium
1
at point A and also the different
shapes which the curves might
possibly take under given condi-
tions. For his purpose the de-
2
vice was perfect.
Edgeworth in his work borrowed this device, but in so do-
ing he changed it about almost entirely. He applied it to the
problem of exchange, particularly to the subjective utility
analysis of value, and more important, he developed the proper
mathematical basis and gave the curve the name by which we now
know it. Whereas Marshall made no further use of the device,
Edgeworth also used it in the fields of foreign trade and
taxation. Therefore, while it may not be right to attribute
complete originality to Edgeworth, he certainly should be
recognized for his originality of application and development.
1Ibid.
,
p. 20.
pSee Edmund Whittaker, A History of Economic Ideas (Hew
York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1940T, pp. 448-449, for a
discussion of Marshall's use of this device.
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In connection with Marshall’s construction above, it is
interesting to note Edgeworth’s application in the same field.
The work of Marshall was taken up and developed in Germany by
Messrs. Auspitz and Lieben who by using Marshall's device were
able to show the results of gains and losses in foreign trade
and particularly the effect of import taxes."1" Edgeworth added
an interesting refinement. He set up his international utility
curves or curves of indifference, and then allowed for supply
and demand curves, showing that equilibrium would be obtained
where the supply and demand curves, at the point of intersec-
tion, meet the contract curve. This would correspond to the
dotted lines in Diagram 1. What is important in this discus-
sion is that Edgeworth calls attention to the fact that this
is a device similar to his preference curves previously de-
veloped. Also not to be overlooked is the fact that Edgeworth
g
refers to these curves as ’’utility curves."
Fisher
At about the same time Edgeworth was doing his work in
England, an American, Irving Fisher, was working along the
same lines. Fisher's work is contained in his Mathematical
Investigations in The Theory of Value and Prices which was
1
See R. Auspitz and R. Lieben, Untersuchungen uber die
Theorle der Prelses (Leipzig: Von Dunker and Humblot, 1950 )
.
Also Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy
,
op .
cit
.
,
Vol. II, pp. 291-296
.
^Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy
,
op .
cit
. p. 293
.
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.
**
'
-
15
presented as a part of his doctoral requirements. Unfortunately
the first part of the work utilizes by way of illustration
several intricate mechanical devices so that it becomes unne-
cessarily complicated and loses much of its value. The second
part of the work contains the discussion on related goods to
which Fisher turned after he developed the indifference system;
indeed, the discovery of this device allowed Fisher to take up
that problem.
There has been some question as to whether the device was
first developed by Edgeworth or Fisher. From Fisher's intro-
duction it is evident that both came upon it simultaneously,
each independent of the work of the other. Fisher says,"*"
Three days after part II was finished I received
and saw for the first time Prof. Edgeworth's "Mathe-
matical Psychics." I was much Interested to find a
resemblance between his surface on page 21 and the
total utility surfaces described by me.
It is evident, then, that each worked independently, yet as we
proceed it will become apparent that in Fisher's work the in-
difference device was very much more developed so that he was
able to use it for problems which Edgeworth's development did
not allow.
Both Edgeworth and Fisher were to a large extent dependent
on the work of Auspitz and Lieben in Germany. Fisher in his
^Irving Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in The Theory
of Value and Prices (New Haven: Connecticut Academy of Arts
and Sciences
,
1892-1895), Vol. 9, p. 4.
*•
-
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1 mpreface acknowledges their influence. The work of these
latter two covered a period of ten years during which time
several chapters were published previous to the main work.
The ingenuity of these men is indeed admirable. It is in-
credible how close they came to developing the indifference
device. Yet one is dismayed that after coming so close they
did not take the final jump.
The problem they attacked was the old problem of value.
They sought to examine the factors determining price and to
show the relationships between price itself and the factors
determining it. One of these factors, of course, was utility,
and to show the relationship between utility and price, they
set up a utility curve which theoretically resembles an indif-
ference curve. This curve arises convex from the origin and
finally drops below the X axis. In describing the utility
which this curve portrays they say.
The utility is measured by the greatest effort or
the greatest sum of money which the consumer can expend
for this commodity without disadvantage; the consumer
will seek no advantage in this expenditure so that he
is entirely indifferent ( glelchgiltig) whether or not
he buys that quantity of consumable good.
2
Here is perhaps the first suggestion of the idea of in-
difference as applied to utility, but it is still not indif-
ference in the current use of the concept. The curve is
^Ibid.
,
p . 3
.
^Auspitz and Lieben, ojd. clt .
, pp. 8-9.
,
..
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essentially a utility curve very similar to Marshall's curve.
At each point on the curve a certain utility is derived from
a quantitative expenditure, and if the individual attains that
utility from the given expenditure, then he is indifferent as
to whether he buys the quantity of the given good, or a quan-
tity of some other good which yields a similar utility. The
germ of the indifference concept is here, but it is still in
very rough form.
In their method Auspitz and Lieben are very helpful; in-
deed it appears that they pave the way. Their real contribu-
tion lies in the use of the three dimensional coordinate system.
After examining the different variable factors which go to make
up price, and the many possibilities of variation, they attempt
to bring these together, through the use of the spatial coordi-
nate system. They establish what is called a satisfaction
surface ( Befriedigungsflache )
.
1 This surface appears in Dia-
2
gram 4
.
The X axis represents quantity of the given good. Y
represents consumer expenditure, and Z utility. The surface
then indicates the total satisfaction of a given good in rela-
tion to all possible prices and quantities of that good. But
it is assumed that the price of all other goods, B....N, are
'‘Ibid
. ,
Anhang II, pp. 484-512.
2Ibid.
,
p. 500. To simplify I have shown only one-half
of their surface.
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given and do not vary.
What they actually
establish, then, is a
/ total utility surface
for a single good.
This is very similar
to the total utility
surface which is used
by Fisher which shall
be examined below.
However, as will be
seen, Fisher’s deriva-
DIAGRAM 4 tion of the surface i
slightly different.
The method which they now pursue is that of projecting
onto this surface planes parallel to each axis so that the
contours of the surface become visible. Fisher uses a similar
procedure, but he goes even further by projecting the contours
onto the zero plane ,thereby doing away entirely with the third
dimension. Auspitz and Lieben did not make this final step,
but there is no question that as far as they did go, they
exerted a strong influence on Fisher's treatment.
The development of the satisfaction surface was a great
forward stride, but there was still lacking in the reasoning
of Auspitz and Lieben that extra twist which would have pro-
duced the indifference curve. This was somewhat made up in
.
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Edgeworth’s development and was clearly seen by Fisher. In
their entire discussion Auspitz and Lieben considered only
the relationship between the utility of one good and other
factors; that is, they considered utility as the function of
one good only. Edgeworth, too, considered utility as the
function of one good, but he was able to develop the contract
curve because he considered the problem of trade between two
people, i.e., barter. If we refer to Diagram 1 we can now
see that in essence Edgeworth's indifference curves are the
projection from two separate utility surfaces; the contract
curve is formed by the meeting of the highest points on each
surface. This is particularly well brought out by Stigler if
we now reflect on the manner in which he inverted the axes to
clarify this.'
1
’ The work of Edgeworth, then, may be considered
as in between that of Auspitz and Lieben, and Fisher. To the
extent that he considered the problem of barter, he was able
to develop the indifference device, but the fact that he con-
sidered utility as the function of one good only limited the
use of the device.^
•^Stigler took this technique from Pareto. See V. Pareto,
Manuel d 'Economle Politique (Paris: 1909), p. 191.
O
It will be noticed that Edgeworth's indifference curve
proceeds from the origin out. The reason for this is precisely
the fact that he considered utility as the function of one
good only. Fisher considered it as the function of two goods
and therefore his curves take the customary shape.

20
Fisher makes the application which the others failed to
make. He considers two commodities A and B consumed by one
individual. He then directs his individual to alter consump-
tion combination by arranging the quantities of the two selected
commodities in all possible ways without changing the quanti-
ties of all other commodities C, D, E, etc. The marginal
utility of each then will vary not only in relation to its own
quantity, but also in relation to the quantity of the other.
Now if we allow OX to represent the quantities of B and OY
the quantities of A, than any point P on Diagram 5 will repre-
sent a possible combination consumed by the individual. By
varying P, all possible com-
binations can be indicated.
Now if we consider our axis
in three dimensions by erect-
ing a perpendicular at P, the
length of which represents the
marginal utility for A, that
is the degree of utility of a
small addition of A, B remain-
ing the same, and if we allow
P to take all possible positions, then the extremity of this
perpendicular will generate a surface indicating the marginal
utility for A. Similarly by holding A the same, and erecting
another perpendicular, we will get another surface indicating
Y
DIAGRAM 5

21
the marginal utility of B. Now mathematically marginal utility
can be derived from total utility so that if we consider the
two surfaces as derived from a third surface, we get at P a
perpendicular which indicates the total utility of both A and
B in combination and which forms a total utility surface.
This surface because of the three dimensions will be convex,
like a hill, rising to a maximum point. On this surface the
slope of the plane parallel to A and tangent to the surface
will give the marginal utility of A. Similarly the slope of
the plane parallel to B and tangent to the surface gives the
marginal utility of B. Thus the total utility surface provides
the way of uniting in thought the two marginal utilities.^
If we now follow the method indicated by Auspitz and Lieben
and cut the total utility surface by a plane parallel to the
XY axis we get on this plane a curve which may be properly
called an indifference curve. It is the locus of points repre-
senting all the possible combinations of A and B which have a
given utility. Between the base and the tip, innumerable
planes may be used to cut the surface. Each one, then, gen-
erates an indifference curve. If these are all projected on
to the plane at the zero level we get a series of concentric
1 t*i ,We can see the relation between Fisher's total utility
surface and that of Auspitz and Lieben if at point P we erect
a perpendicular which moves parallel to A. B then will be
held constant and the surface thus described will be the total
utility surface for A, the surface described by Auspitz and
Lieben. See Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in The Theory
of Value and Prices
,
op . clt
.
,
p. 69.
'
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curves vanishing at M, the point of maximum utility. It has
been assumed here that the surface has only one maximum, i.e.,
one peak. There of course may be several and these may lie
anywhere within the XY axis. The Important feature, however.
Is that at the zero level the absolute height of the primitive
surface becomes of no consequence.
Referring to Diagram 5, let us now assume that the indi-
vidual has an income of $25 per year to be spent on the two
goods. If the price of A is 50 cents and B 25 cents, then
the two simplest methods of spending the $25 are to spend it
all on A or all on B; that is, to buy either 50 units of A or
100 units of B. If we mark off these quantities on the corre-
sponding axis and connect the two points, then the line in be-
tween will indicate all possible consumption combinations of
A and B which can be purchased at the given prices for the
$25. Fisher calls this line AB, "the partial income line."
The individual now must move along this line in a manner such
that he can select that combination which is possible at his
Income and also which will yield the maximum total utility.
This will occur at point I where the partial income line is
tangent to an indifference curve. At any other point on the
line the individual can attain greater utility by selecting
a combination closer to I, but at I the Individual gets the
greatest utility for the given expenditure. We may say then
that at I, while prices and quantities of other articles
.. > £ ' Cl.:. _ .. _
.
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remain the same, the individual is in equilibrium with respect
to A and B.
The development of the indifference system by Fisher as
described above produced a very important tool. Until this
point utility had to be considered as the standard of measure-
ment; that is, the utility of a commodity was the function of
that quantity alone. But at this point he was able to con-
sider the utility of one good as dependent on the quantity of
another (the problem of related goods which we shall discuss
later), and finally he was able to do away with utility almost
1
entirely. As we saw above the individual always gravitates
towards equilibrium at point I. In so far as he seeks this
equilibrium position he tries to seek the highest indifference
curve. Fisher thought of the movement from one curve to another
as the resultant of two forces, this resultant always being
gperpendicular to the indifference curve. Thus, if lines of
force are set up perpendicular to the indifference curves,
then it is the direction of lines which determine equilibrium.
"It makes absolutely no difference . . . .what the length of the
arrow Is at one point compared with another"; that is, it
^1 say almost entirely because of the fact that in his
discussion of related goods Fisher still held to the utility
concept. He defines competing goods in terms of marginal
utilities
.
2Fisher, 0£. cit . , p. 74.
^Ibid
.
.
p. 88.
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makes no difference what is the height of the primitive surface
as long as we know that at the zero level one curve is greater
than another and that the individual must travel in the direc-
tion of the increase. Fisher concludes then, "Thus we may dis-
pense with the total utility density and conceive the economic
world to he filled merely with lines of force or 'maximum di-
„1
rections .
'
It should now be apparent what the development of the in-
difference device has done for Fisher. Through it he has been
able to rework the concept of utility and to discard from it
<
•
the hedonistic subjective elements. His purpose has been to
objectivize it as far as possible and to a very great extent
this has been done. In determining the objective facts of
price, certain attributes of utility can now be disposed of.
For example, it is no longer essential that one man’s utility
be compared with another nor is it essential for the marginal
utility of various consumption combinations to be compared.
And most important of all, the whole concept of total utility
2
can be done away with. Under Fisher’s system we are interested
only in the maximum directions indicated by the quantitative
1
Ibid.
2Fisher expresses this by saying in mathematical terms
that even if marginal utilities for the same individual can
be compared at one consumption combination to another, the
total utility might not be Integrable and if it were there
would be no need to determine the constant of integration.
'-
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factors and. we can dispense with those hedonistic elements
which are so objectionable.
Pareto
In our investigation so far we have traced the indif-
ference device from its inception, through Edgeworth and
Fisher. But this is only one of two directions In which the
development took place. The other direction is to be traced
through Edgeworth, Pareto and the Lausanne school, to Hicks.
This latter course is by far the more well known, not so much
for its originality in development, but rather for its special-
ization in the problem of related goods. However, the work of
Pareto, the chief member of the Lausanne school, did produce
some important developmental aspects and it is these to which
we now turn.
We have seen how Fisher was determined to objectivize
the theory of value. This was in effect one of the prime
purposes of Pareto. In his earlier work, Cours d 'Economle
Politique
,
he constructs a theory of value entirely subjective,
based on the notion of pleasure.'*' In the Manue 1 d ^conomle
Politique
,
a later work, he proceeds in the opposite vein.
Subjective notions of pleasure he now says are not needed to
2
erect a theory of economic equilibrium. It is possible to
1
V. Pareto, Cours d ' Economle Politique (F. Rouge, Editor;
Lausanne: 1896), Vol. I, pp. 3-6.
2V. Pareto, Manue 1 d’Economie Politique (translated from
the Italian by Alfred Bonnet, V. Giard, and E. Briere; Paris:
1909), p. 160.
,-
.
.
~
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start from a point of departure, quantitative and objective.
The very fact that we can objectively determine quantities of
goods which are consumed together is sufficient to establish a
system of economic equilibrium. These objective quantities
are what Pareto calls les combinations indlfferentes . When
an individual hesitates between two different combinations
offered to him, this shows objectively that the two combina-
tions are of the same importance to him. Thus what Pareto has
done is to build his system on the assumption of lines of in -
difference . Starting thus with objective hypotheses, as he
did, it should be possible to build a purely objective theory.
Pareto’s analysis is somewhat similar to that of Fisher
except that it is in terms of tastes and obstacles. His indif-
ference curves are derived from a total utility surface, which
he calls "la colline," the hill. In climbing the hill the
individual follows "le sentier," the path, or in Fisher’s
terms, the partial income line, until he reaches the highest
point possible, that is, the point of greatest total utility.
At this point where the path is tangent to the indifference
curve the individual will be at equilibrium, but this is an
equilibrium with respect to tastes only. On the other side
are to be considered the obstacles which the individual will
meet. These are represented by a "colline des profits,"
similar to the utility surface. On this surface the producer
will pursue that path which will maximize his profit, but the
''
:
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surface will also show that area in which the producer operate
at a loss.^ From this surface it is likewise possible to de-
rive indifference curves (or as they are otherwise called, iso
product lines) for the producer, and to show the point of
equilibrium for the producer--with respect to obstacles.
Now to compare the equilibria, that is, to show equilib-
rium with respect to tastes and obstacles, Pareto develops a
new curve. Referring to the indifference map (Diagram 6), we
note that there will be several
paths which are tangent to indif
ference curves. If we join the
points of tangency we get curve
AB which joins each point of
equilibrium with respect to
tastes. Pareto calls this the
DIAGRAM 6 * "line of exchanges . There
will be a similar line for producers which he calls the "line
3
of greatest profit. If these lines are superimposed on the
same coordinate system, then when many producers contract with
^A justified criticism at this point is that by explain-
ing the indifference curves of the producer in terms of profit
and loss, Pareto Is using the notion of value to explain
value. On this point see G. PIrou, Theories de L 1 Equilibrium
(Paris: F. Lovitan and Cie, 1938), pp. 424-425.
p
^Pareto, Manuel d ’Economle Politique
.
op . clt
.
,
p. 184.
3Ibid.
,
p. 187.
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many consumers, the point of equilibrium will be given by the
intersection of the line of exchanges and the line of greatest
profit.^" Translating this we can say that this will be a point
of stable equilibrium, for movement away from this point in any
direction will immediately set up forces moving back to the
original point. 2
We can now see the originality in the work of Pareto.
This lies essentially in his attempt to objectivize the theory
of value. To be sure his indifference curves are taken from a
total utility surface, but if they are taken as a hypothesis,
then it becomes possible to reason objectively. Pareto
hypothecates the indifference curves. He assumes that price
remains the same. Then by establishing the lines of exchange
and greatest profit, he is able to indicate the point of stable
equilibrium without bringing in any subjective factors. As he
himself says in a footnote, "I consider the indifference curves
as given and I deduce from them all that is necessary for the
/ / .,4
theory of equilibrium without having recourse to ophelimite.
1Ibid
.
,
p. 190.
^Ibld
.
.
p. 155. There will be of course different points
of equilibrium, depending on the given conditions. For example,
many individuals may be dealing with one producer or vice versa,
or two isolated individuals may deal with each other. Pareto
treats these different points of equilibrium. However, while
they are of interest, they add nothing to the total development
of the indifference tool.
^It is interesting to note Pareto's use of the indifference
device in the subjective analysis. See Cours d ' Economle Poll -
tique
,
op . clt
.
,
footnote, p. 35.
^Pareto, Manuel d 'Economle Politique
,
op . clt .
,
p. 169.
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To the extent that Pareto did this, his theory was objective.
However, it is to be noted that while his intentions were
good, he did not carry out completely what he hoped to do.
In so far as he developed the point of stable equilibrium,
his argument remains objective. However, in analyzing tastes,
he ran into the problem of related goods and in applying the
indifference curves to this problem he was forced to fall
back on the ophelimite concept, so that actually his argument
is not as thoroughly objective as he presents it. However,
the use of indifference curves as an assumption was a step
forward and it paved the way for further development.
To Pareto this work was very important because it al-
lowed an integration of the work of many of the theorists pre-
ceding him. The chief problem until now had been the determina-
tion of price or value in exchange, but his work changed this,
because price and value now became part of the whole phenomenon
of equilibrium. It was no longer a question of cause and ef-
fect relationship, one set of conditions being the sole cause
for a given effect, but rather a question of balancing given
conditions which are themselves interrelated. This was the
result of what he called scientific economics (which made use
of mathematics) as opposed to the previous purely literary
economics. It made a change in the basic problem of economics
because it now stressed equilibrium economics as a special
aspect of value economics. Indeed that entity which the
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literary economists called value does not exist by itself.
As he says.
If that vague and indeterminate thing which the
literary economists call value has any relation with
prices, it can be said that it depends on all circum-
stances, none excepted, which influence the determina-
tion of economic equilibrium.
This change in the problem also helps us to better understand
the work of previous economists and to put each in its proper
place. Thus those who have regarded utility as the sole de-
termining factor of value have considered only one side, that
of tastes. In this class he places his predecessor at Lausanne,
M. Walras, who, although he used the mathematical method and
thereby laid the foundation of the work of Pareto, was not
able to resist the pressure of general opinion which consid-
ered the causal determination of value, and thereby established
2
utility as the sole determining cause of value. Also in this
class there would be considered G-ossen, Jevons
,
and the Austrian
school who stressed marginal utility. On the other side are
to be considered those who stressed the obstacles. For exam-
ple, Adam Smith and his cost of production theory; particularly
Ricardo and Marx who established labor as the determining fac-
tor in value. All these theories today are not very useful to
scientific economics because their approach is inadequate.
1
Ibid.
,
p. 245.
2
M. Walras, Elements d
1
Economle Pure (Lausanne: 1900).
' *
. .
*
;
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Today only those which consider economic equilibrium and how
it is born in the "opposition of tastes and obstacles" have
any permanent theoretical value.
We have seen above how Fisher also tried to objectivize
the theory of value and how he finally resolved economic moti-
vation into lines of force. In many respects his results are
similar to those of Pareto, but when we remember that his as-
sumptions were framed on the basis of the utility idea, we see
how much more developed is the work of Pareto. To be sure the
technique of Fisher exerted a great influence on Pareto.
Pareto acknowledges this indirectly. 1 But what has made the
work of Pareto so much more important is that he has reoriented
this technique within the framework of new definitions and has
then proceeded to expand it to new heights. This is particu-
larly true with respect to the development of the line of ex-
changes. The latter is a natural outgrowth of the work of
Fisher, which as we shall see will be further expanded into a
highly useful tool. From the point of view of mathematical
technique it is one of the important achievements of Pareto
and within the framework of his new definition it enabled
him to work out his system of equilibrium.
"Pareto, Manuel d 'Economle Politique
.
op . cit
.
,
pp . 157,
159.
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Marshall’s Consumer Demand
Just previous to the above development the theory of con-
sumer demand had been worked out on a different basis by
Alfred Marshall, an Englishman. It will be instructive now
to digress for the moment to compare Marshall’s treatment
with what we have so far traced, for his work is recognized
as classic.
Marshall treated the theory of demand from a purely sub-
jective point of view. Utility is measurable. It is a func-
1
tion of the quantity of the good possessed. If a consumer
with a given money income confronts a market for consumer
goods, the prices of which are predetermined, then the ques-
tion to be answered is how will he divide his expenditures
among the different goods. Marshall assumes that goods will
be available in sufficiently small quantities and that the
individual acts as the rational man; that is, he will spend
his money so as to receive the maximum amount of possible
utility. Now, if utility is a function of quantity, then
the more of a given good an individual possesses, the less
will be the utility per additional unit (the law of diminish-
ing marginal utility) and the actual amount purchased will be
determined by the utility of the last unit. Translating in
^A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: The
Macmillan Company, 1922)
,
Ch. 3, Book II, p. 93.
.-
'
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terms of demand price, we may say, the larger the amount of a
good that a person has, the less will be the price (purchasing
power of money and also income being given) which he will pay
for a little more of that good. Since each unit of expenditure
will be spent so as to buy the greatest increment of utility,
it must follow that when an individual faces a market of
several commodities, the marginal units of each commodity pur-
chased must yield the same marginal utility, or, expressing
this in another manner, the marginal utilities of the various
commodities purchased must be proportional to their prices.
Marshall's theory thus proceeds from the notion of maxi-
mizing total utility, the law of diminishing marginal utility,
to the conclusion that the marginal utilities of various com-
modities will be proportional to their prices. This conclu-
sion was by no means new. It had been pointed out by Jevons
and also by the Austrian school. Both Fisher and Pareto were
able to bring it out. But Marshall's explanation was simple
and pointed; indeed his entire theory of demand was so much
so that it became classic and went unquestioned for many
years, even after the work of Pareto.
The work of Pareto in its preliminary phases is somewhat
similar to that of Marshall. Pareto recognized the validity
of the law of diminishing marginal utility on the basis of
the utility concept, and he had somehow to achieve the results
of this law without its actual use. This was accomplished by
«w
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the use of the indifference map and the "sentiers . " If we
reflect on his equilibrium of tastes we find that the individual
is at equilibrium only where the path is tangent to an indif-
ference curve. It is at this point only that utility will be
maximized for if he goes in either direction beyond this point,
the consumer will arrive at a lower Indifference curve. If
we consider the path as the price line, which it essentially
Is, since its position and slope is determined by the given
prices, then the point of tangency is the expression, in terms
of indifference curves, of the proportionality between marginal
utilities and prices. What Pareto actually did was to trans-
late Marshall's theory of marginal utility into terms of indif-
ference curves.
But in the process of translation Pareto accomplished
something unusual, for he was able to arrive at the same re-
sult without the original subjective data. Marshall's theory
implies the use of a utility surface in order to determine the
quantities of goods an individual will buy at the various
prices. Pareto's assumes only that the indifference map is
known. 1'his of course does away with a great deal of informa-
tion conveyed by the utility surface, but it is the type of
information which is objectionable. Whereas Marshall would
say I choose A In preference to B because it has greater
utility and I am therefore willing to pay more for it, Pareto
would say, after observing that I choose A in preference to
'•
.
/
-
•
55
B, this shows that A is the more useful of the two. One is
based on utility. ^he other is based on the observation of
choice and deduces utility from this observation."*" Pareto’s
approach thus does away with any subjective information. It
tells us that one combination is preferred to another, but it
does not say by how much. It does not involve measurement.
The difference in assumption between Pareto and Marshall
is in a sense the difference between Pareto and Fisher. One
is subjective, the other objective. But there is a further
difference. Marshall considered only the utility of one good.
Pareto and Fisher considered the utility of two goods. It is
for thi3 reason that Pareto's work went further than Marshall,
for having considered one good in relation to another it be-
came necessary to examine the different relationships; that
is, it became necessary to treat the problem of related goods.
Both Pareto and Fisher go into this. Marshall's work is
singularly lacking in this respect.
The Indeterminateness of the Utility Function
We have seen how Pareto reasoned on the basis of the as-
sumed indifference map. One of the chief factors which
shunted him in this direction was the point, also made by
Fisher, that the directions of indifference may not be
^M. Murray In Lepons d ' Economle Politique (translated
from Italian by Pierre Boven; Paris: Payot and Company,
1920), supports Pareto in this respect, p. 113.
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1
integrable. Pareto took up this idea and from it he pro-
ceeded to show that even if it were possible to deduce a
utility function from the directions of indifference, the
utility function itself would be largely indeterminate.
This proposition is stated in the text of the Manue 1 d ’Econo -
mi e Politique and supplemented in the appendix by a mathe-
2
matical proof. We shall set it out in words.
The propositions that the directions of indifference are
not integrable, or that the utility function is indeterminate,
are derived from the application of the calculus to economic
reasoning. The meaning is not too difficult. If we assume
a utility surface so that we know how much utility is derived
from given quantities of goods in combination, then it is
possible to derive from this a scale of preferences; that is,
of any two combinations we can say whether the individual
will prefer one to the other or whether he will be indifferent
to either. This scale of preferences may be Indicated by the
indifference map. This was precisely the method used by
Fisher when he derived his indifference curves from his total
utility surface. Pareto also shows this when he proceeds
from the hill to the indifference level. We see then that
It is possible to go from the utility function (the total
^See footnote 2, page 24.
2Pareto, Manue 1 d'Economle Politique
,
op . clt
.
,
p. 159;
Appendix, pp. 540-547.
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utility surface is the utility function expressed mathemati-
cally) to the scale of preferences, but is it possible to
proceed in the opposite direction? Given the scale of prefer-
ences, is it possible to derive the total utility surface?
The answer is negative, because a given utility surface
is not the only surface from which the same scale of prefer-
ences may be derived. It is possible that a utility surface
be twice the height of a given surface. Projecting the points
of like utility on the second surface onto the base, will give
the same scale of preferences, but the utility will be twice
as great. In proceeding from the total utility surface to
the preference scale, the index of utility is lost. One can-
not then proceed in the opposite direction, because innumera-
ble indices could be used. Mathematically we may say that the
function with which we started is not the only one which will
determine a given preference scale.
^
Fortunately, though very much energy has been spent on
this point from the point of view of mathematical curiosity,
2
it is not of very great importance. Whether or not one can
^Mathematically the utility function may be differentiated
so that it is possible to obtain the function of the indiffer-
ence curve, but the function of the indifference curve is not
integrable . It is not only that there is no constant of inte-
gration, but also that the utility function itself is inde-
terminate. See N. Georgescu-Roegen, "Pure Theory of Consumer’s
Behavior," Quarterly Journal of Economics
.
Vol. L, No. 4, Aug-
ust, 1936; Section V, also by the same author, "A Proposition
of Pareto," Quarterly Journal of Economics
.
Vol. XLIX, No. 4,
August, 1935.
^See article by Oscar Lange
,
"The Determinateness of the
Utility Function," Review of Economic Studies
.
Vol. I, No. 3,
June, 1934. Also R. Frisch, ’ySur un probi erne d' economic pure,"
Norsk Matematlsk Forenlngs Skrlfter t sere 1, Nr. 16, for pro-
posed methods to erect a determinate utility function.
1
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go from the preference function to the utility surface matters
not as long as the essential condition that the individual will
prefer a higher utility level to a lower one is preserved. For
example, successive positions might be numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
or 1, 3, 5, 7, or A, B, C, D, etc. --any increasing series that
one may choose.
1
As long as the series is increasing and the
individual seeks the highest possible level, then the indiffer-
ence map will be useful and Pareto's discovery is a great one.
Utility as a Standard of Measurement
In discussing the equilibrium of tastes and obstacles
Pareto achieved a high degree of objectivity. By using the
indifference scale as a given hypothesis, he erected a theory
of equilibrium essentially independent of the utility concept.
But the independence is not as complete as one would like.
In his discussion of tastes he again falls back on the old
concept. Here he considered the problem of the consumption of
2 m
one good in relation to others. This involved a subjective
valuation or more precisely a comparison of utilities of dif-
ferent goods for the same person. What he intended to do was
'*'An excellent discussion on the indeterminateness of the
utility function is to be found in the article by J. R. Hicks,
"A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value," Economica
,
Febru-
ary, 1934, pp. 52-55.
o
It is not intended here to go into Pareto's discussion
of related goods. This will be discussed below. However we
shall go Into the assumptions he uses to see how they bear on
the measurability of utility.
.• d
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to set up this comparison as an objective index of human
choice. Utility would still be a function of quantity only,
and after observation of the fluctuation in quantities ex-
changed, the data so attained was to be used objectively to
explain tastes. The theory was aimed at establishing the re-
sults of human choice in terms of quantities exchanged and
the ratios of such quantities (prices).
For this purpose Pareto made two basic assumptions.
1
He assumed first that though utility is not measurable, the
individual is capable of knowing whether the utility derived
from one combination of goods equals, is greater, or is less
than that of another. In terms of choice the individual knows
whether or not he prefers one combination to another or is
indifferent as to the choice of either. The second assumption
is that the individual knows whether the change in utility due
to transition from one combination to another is equal to,
greater, or less than the change from this latter combination
to a third. Under the first assumption utility is an index
only, as we have explained above, and the theory remains ob-
jective. The second assumption, however, while an outgrowth
of the first, is no longer purely objective, because it in-
volves a type of empirical observation which is largely impos-
sible. Such results cannot be had from observation only.
^Pareto, Manuel d 'Economle Politique
.
op . cit
.
,
pp. 264-
265.
'. C- -
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They rely on psychological introspection and therefore fall
outside the realm of objective human choice.
This is further brought out in the actual argument. So
long as he discusses total ophelimite and its use as an index
he remains under the first assumption. But when he finds it
necessary to discuss elementary ophelimite
/
(marginal utility)
and its index, he falls under the second assumption. This is
particularly true with regard to his definitions of complemen-
tary and competitive goods. These he defines in terms of the
variations in the ratios of the marginal utilities of the goods
1
involved. While it is possible to observe whether one combi-
nation is preferred to another, it is quite a different thing
to observe the changes from one transition to another, and what
is more--to assume that they can be taken as an objective index
of human choice. Let us assume for example three combinations,
1, 2, 3, with the utility of 3 greater than that of 2, and 2
greater than that of 1 . If our theory is to make any sense
under the first basic assumption, the individual must always
choose 3 in preference to 1 or 2 regardless of what his gain
is from 1 to 2 or 2 to 3. In terms of acts of choice it is
meaningless to say that he prefers the transition from 2 to 3
in preference to that of 1 to 2, for he will always choose 2
to 3 even if the gain in utility is less than the gain from
1
Ibld.
,
pp. 251-252; pp. 265-268.
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the transition from 1 to 2. In order to compare the gains
then, the individual must fall back on psychological intro-
spection so that the second underlying basic assumption is not
capable of expression objectively in terms of acts of choice.'1'
If this assumption is used together with the first one then it
must follow that utility is measurable.
But if utility is measurable and a theory is built upon
that measurability, then it cannot be an objective theory.
The only way to keep it objective is to state it in terms of
the first assumption only. Chapter 3 of the Manue 1 d ’Economic
Politique is for the most part stated in such terms, but Chap-
ter 4 makes use of the marginal utility concept and the law of
diminishing marginal utility. The discussion of related goods
in particular is framed on fluctuations of ,iophelimite/ elemen-
taire." Pareto's theory then to be objective would have to be
restated in terms of the first assumption only, which would do
away with the measurability of utility.
That utility is immeasurable seems not to have been recog-
nized by Pareto for he always speaks of it quantitatively. At
any rate, if he did recognize it, he did not restate his theory
^Lange, "The Determinateness of the Utility Function," op .
clt
.
.
pp. 222-223. Lange shows that by starting with an arbi-
trary measure of utility and a fixed unit of transition it be-
comes possible to state how many times one combination is pre-
ferred to another. On the indifference map this would mean
that the indices take on the meaning of by how much one curve
is greater than another. This is not a measurement of total
utility but It shows how the second assumption lends Itself to
partial measurement.
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minus the quantitative aspects. 1 Hicks suggests that he did
not recognize this until the late stages of his work in eco-
nomics and he therefore continued to use the concepts derived
from earlier ideas. Furthermore when he did recognize it, he
2
did not take the trouble to rework his earlier conclusions.
It would seem then that if Pareto did recognize this, he
missed a great opportunity. However, this opportunity was
finally taken up by Dr. Hicks and Mr. Allen. The work of
these two culminated in the volume, Value and Capital
,
by
Hicks, which remains today the latest constructive work on the
subject. This is in the beginning a restatement of Pareto
without the quantitative aspects and it allows for some quite
remarkable developments.
T /
Another work of Pareto appeared in 1911, "Economic
Mathematique
,
M Encyclopedle des Sciences Mathe'matlques t Vol.
I, in which he restates the argument of the Manuel d* Economic
Politique with minor change.
p
J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital (London: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1939), p. 19.
.'
.
.
CHAPTER III
FINAL ABANDONMENT OF THE UTILITY CONCEPT
Pre -Hicksian Development
Hicks was one of the few people to see the possibilities
inherent in the great discovery of Pareto, and to take advan-
tage of the new directions which Pareto’s theory offered.
Once he decided to do away with quantitative utility, his
task was laid out. He had to review the theory of Pareto,
adjust and reconstruct the basic concepts tainted in any man-
ner with quantitative utilitarianism and then work out the
results, regardless of where they led. His burden was eased
to some extent by the work of W. E. Johnson and more directly
by the work of R. 0. D. Allen. Johnson’s work apparently did
not spring from Pareto, but was rather an outgrowth of Edge-
worth. He proceeded from Edgeworth's discussion of barter
between two individuals. Here as we said previously, the
constant utility curves are constructed so that the coordi-
nates of any point represent two variable quantities, one of
which is acquired and the other is sacrificed for the former.
The acquisition yields utility, the sacrifice disutility;
the net utility thus increases with the decrease of sacrifice
45
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or the increase of acquisition. The position of equilibrium
is still relatively indeterminate. Johnson then proceeded to
alter Edgeworth’s curves by turning them upside down. In ef-
fect he transforms Edgeworth’s curves into the customary indif-
ference curves as we know them. He was thereby enabled to deal
with those cases in which two quantities contribute positively
to the resulting utility and also by analogy to the case where
numerous variables contribute to utility. More important, how-
ever, is the fact that he was able to treat the case where the
income of the consumer was fixed. It will be remembered that
this was also treated by Fisher, but Johnson’s work in this
respect is much advanced over that of Fisher and is particular-
ly to be noted because it had a great influence on Hicks,
especially in the latter's development of the income and sub-
stitution effects. The technique used will not be discussed
at this point, but we shall point out the influence of Johnson
when we discuss these effects below.
Johnson’s work was taken up by Allen and it served to
2
direct Hicks ’ interest to the problem. There followed a
period of close collaboration between Allen and Hicks, the
-MlV. E. Johnson, ’’Pure Theory of Utility Curves,” Economic
Journal
,
December, 1913, p. 484.
p
R. G. D. Allen's first work appears in "Nachfragefunc-
tionen fur Giiter mit korrelierten Nutzen,” Zeltschrlf t fur
Natlonalokomie
,
March, 1934. Also ”A Comparison between Dif-
ferent Definitions of Complementary and Competitive Goods,”
Econometrlca
,
April, 1934.
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results of which appear in "A Reconsideration of the Theory of
Value,” Economica
,
1934. This collaboration covered a period
of almost five years and was so close that it has been com-
pletely impossible to separate the contributions of each. It
finally culminated in the volume, Value and Capital
,
by Hicks,
in which he restates this earlier work and then proceeds on
2
his own to develop from it a theory of dynamics.
An interesting feature of this entire development is the
fact that it was completely anticipated by a Russian economist,
E. Slutsky of the University of Charkov. Subsequent to the
publication of their findings in Economica, Allen and Hicks
came across the work of Slutsky which had been published in
3
,Italian in 1915. Slutsky set out essentially the same materi-
al, but his work is highly mathematical and contains very little
discussion about the significance of the theory. It is for
these reasons, and also probably because the work was published
in Italian at a time when Italian economists paid little atten-
tion to the problem, that his work remained unnoticed for so
^R. G. D. Allen and J. R. Hicks, ”A Reconsideration of the
Theory of Value,” Economica
.
February and May, 1934. The first
part by Hicks sets out the new theory in words; the second part
by Allen discusses It mathematically.
2
Hicks, Value and Capital
,
op . clt .
*z
E. Slutsky, ”Sulla teoria del bilancio del consumatore ,
”
Glornale degll Economlstl
,
July, 1915. See also R. G. D. Allen,
’’Professor Slutsky’s Theory of Consumer's Choice,” Review of
Economic Studies
,
February, 1934.
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long and had to be rediscovered. Nevertheless it is apparent
now that Slutsky saw the shortcomings of Pareto and set out
in the new directions indicated. The following paragraphs
will be devoted to the territory opened up by Slutsky and so
ably developed by Allen and Hicks.
The New Concepts
The new theory of Allen and Hicks involved a thorough
purge of the utility theory. All concepts tainted by quanti-
tative utility were discarded and replaced where needed by new
ones without the objectionable implications.
1. The first concept to go was the concept of marginal
utility, for if total utility quantitatively defies defini-
tion, then so does marginal utility; and it is significant
that the new theory of value to be constructed does not re-
quire a precise definition of marginal utility. It will still
be possible under the new system to give meaning to the ratio
of two marginal utilities when quantities of each commodity
are given. This is represented by the slope of the indiffer-
ence curve. However, this is merely of passing interest and
independent of the new concept. If marginal utility is done
away with, what then is needed in its place? Some concept
which will enable us to compare adjacent combinations of
equivalent value. (We still do not say what or how much is
this value.) Hicks calls this the "Marginal Rate of
.V
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Substitution. " The marginal rate of substitution of X for Y
is the quantity of y which would just compensate the consumer
for the loss of a marginal unit of x or the quantity of x
which would just compensate the consumer for the loss of a
marginal unit of y.^ If the consumer is moving down the curve
and does not get the proper amount of x, he will be worse off
than before the substitution took place. If he is moving up
the curve and does not get the proper amount of y, then he
will also be worse off. It should be seen that this is merely
a rate of substitution which enables us to express that quan-
tity which will leave the consumer, after substitution, exactly
as well off as before. The essential character of the concept
is one of substitution. It is entirely independent of any
quantitative measure of utility.
If an individual is to be at equilibrium with respect to
a given system of prices, his marginal rate of substitution
between any two goods must equal the ratio of their prices,
There is a change in definition between the article in
Economica and the text of Value and Capital . The above defini-
tion is that given in Value and Capital . Tn Economica the
definition embraces a different point of view"! The amount of
y necessary to offset the loss of a marginal unit of x is de-
fined as the marginal rate of substitution of Y for X. At
first glance it appears that the reason for the change lies
in the footnote on page 20 of Value and Capital where Hicks
explains why he went from increasing to decreasing marginal
rate of substitution. On reflection, however, it can be seen
that it is possible even on the basis of the definition of
the marginal rate of substitution of Y for X to have a de-
creasing rate. The real reason for the change is merely that
Hicks wanted to make his terminology similar to that of
Marshall
.
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otherwise there would be an advantage in substituting some
quantity of one for an equal value (at the market rate) of
the other. This is the form in which we now write the equilib-
rium condition of the market. (Diagram 7)
y y
It will help to examine this in simple mathematical terms.
The marginal rate of substitution between X and Y may be desig-
nated as S . It is the ratio of the increments at point P,
xy
Is:*
1 From the theory of limits it follows that the ratio of
<1 x
increments at point P is measured by the slope of the tangent
line at that point, that is
S = slope of line AB which - tan Q - OB
xy
OA
The equation of a straight line which cuts OX at A and OY
^It should be noted that 4y is positive and 4x is nega-
tive. To avoid confusion the ratio is defined as so it
is always positive. <Jx
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at B is
x + Z = 1 U)
A B
If we let R = total income, p = the price of x and p = thex y
price of y, then by adding the quantities of each multiplied
by their price we obtain the equation for all possible combina-
tions of expenditure with an income of R.
xp + yp = R (2)
x y
Since A and B are points on this line, where the consumer
spends all his income on either x or y (i.e., where x and y
respectively equal 0) and since A = R and B = R (quantity =
Px Py
total expenditure ) , then by substituting in the equation above
price
(1) we get
x + y
R R ~ 1 or xp
x + yp
= R (3)
Px Py
7
At any point then on the price line AB the slope = 0B. At P
0A
where AB is tangent to the indifference curve we have already
shown that the ratio of increments is measured by OB. Now
0A
again substituting the values OB and 0A, we get
R/
— *
„
py = £2 = Sxy (4)0A R/ p7px J
or as we said above the condition of equilibrium is that the
marginal rate of substitution is proportional to price. This
.Cm I vliOi aeT
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will appear even more rational if we understand that the term
S is the measure of the rate of conversion of x into y and
xy
is independent of price. The price, on the other hand, measures
the rate of exchange of the goods against each other. If price
of x is ijplO and y $2, then ratio of prices is 5 to 1. If in
the exchange the individual values a unit of y more relative
to x than does the market, then his S will be greater than
xy
the market and he will exchange y for x and reduce his S
until it equals the ratio of the market prices. We see now
that the condition of equilibrium on the market is where the
price line is tangent to the indifference curve and also that
at this point the quantities of x and y purchased will be pro-
portional to the prices. In effect this is very similar to
Marshall. The marginal rate of substitution of X for Y is
what Marshall would call the marginal utility of X in terms
of Y . 1 He also showed that this was proportional to the
prices. The results so far are very similar.
2. The second concept to go is the principle of diminish-
ing marginal utility. The reason it is discarded is the same
reason for which the principle of marginal utility was dis-
carded, for if marginal utility has no exact meaning, except
in a subjective sense, then certainly diminishing marginal
utility also has no exact meaning. It must therefore give way
^See footnote, page 47.
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to a new principle, that of decreasing marginal rate of substi-
tution. The new principle may be stated as follows. If we
start with a given quantity of x and y, and then increase the
amount of x and decrease the amount of y in such a way that
the consumer is neither better nor worse off after the ex-
changes, then the amount of y which has to be subtracted in
order to set off the second exchange will be less than that
which has to be subtracted in order to set off the first ex-
change. In other words the more we substitute y for x, the
less will be the marginal rate of substitution of x for y
(see Diagram 7). In times of our previous analysis the more
we substitute y for x the less will be 4_y, S . This condi-
4 x
xy
tion is expressed on the indifference diagram by drawing the
indifference curves convex to the axes
.
The principle of diminishing marginal utility and the
principle of diminishing marginal rate of substitution are
not the same thing, or more precisely diminishing marginal
utility and convexity of the indifference curves are not the
same. The increase in x may affect not only the marginal
utility of x, it may also affect the marginal utility of y,
and when we consider the effect of one on the other it is
quite possible to have cross effects cancelling each other.
For example, it is quite possible for an increase in x to
diminish the marginal utility of y which in turn increases
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the marginal utility of x. The cross effects then may cancel
out without any change in the marginal utility of x, or it is
even plausible that a movement along the indifference curve to
the right will actually increase the slope of the curve. This
is no doubt an unusual case, but it is entirely possible under
the principle of diminishing marginal utility.
But Hicks needed an assumption which would entirely pre-
clude any such possibility, and by assuming the diminishing
marginal rate of substitution he accomplished just that. The
replacement therefore is not a mere change in terminology; it
is a "change in the basic foundation of the theory" and as such
requires a definite justification. The justification is as
follows. Hicks needed the principle of diminishing marginal
rate of substitution for the same reason that Marshall needed
the principle of diminishing marginal utility, for unless at
the point of equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution is
diminishing, there will be no stable equilibrium. Even if the
marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio, so that
no advantage accrues in the acquisition or sale of a marginal
unit of x, nevertheless if marginal rate of substitution is
increasing there will be advantage in acquiring a larger
quantity, because it will be possible to proceed to an indif-
ference curve of a higher index. This is explained in Diagram
''
* 1
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Y 18 .
& At point Q on the diagram
the marginal rate of substitution
equals the price ratio, i.e., at
this point the indifference curve
is tangent to the price line. How-
ever, if the individual moves away
from point Q, he will arrive at an
O A indifference curve of a higher
DIAGRAM 8 index. It is clear then that un-
less at point Q the marginal rate of substitution is decreasing,
or in other words, the indifference curve is convex to the
axes, there will be definite advantage to move away from point
^ so that this will not be a point of stable equilibrium.
Actually on price line AB, Q is a point of minimum, not maxi-
mum utility. It is clear therefore that, under a given set
of prices, for any point to be a point of equilibrium, the
marginal rate of substitution at that point must be decreasing.
The use of this principle as a basic assumption means simply
that in a given region any point with appropriate prices may
be a point of equilibrium. However, there are conceivably
1 In Value and Capital
,
page 21, Figure 4, Hicks' diagram
is drawn so that a part of the curve has an upward slope to
the right. This implies negative utility and is not what
was intended. The curve should be falling throughout.
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points at which equilibrium may not take place. At these
points the principle of diminishing marginal rate of substi-
tution would not apply. Fortunately these points are not
numerous so that it is possible to use the principle as a
hypothesis under the assumption that it is universally true.
There may be objection to this assumption just as there has
been objection to the verification of the principle of dimin-
ishing marginal utility by the appeal to experience, particu-
larly that type of experience which offers no opportunity for
testing. But this objection can be overcome largely because
the concept itself is objective. The purpose of the principle
is to deduce laws of market conduct, which deal with the reac-
tions of consumers to changes in market conditions. Certainly
when conditions change we have observed that the consumers
take up new positions of equilibrium. Unless at each of these
positions the marginal rate of substitution is diminishing,
equilibrium will be impossible. Then to make the hypothesis
universal all we need to do is make a further assumption that
the condition will prevail at all intermediate points between
^Such points would take the form of blind spots on the
indifference diagram within which no stable equilibrium is
possible. Hicks includes here the possibility of the case of
Buridan's ass, where the consumer with a given income, con-
fronted with a given set of prices, is unable to decide be-
tween a number of different expenditure possibilities. But
even here, he says, the consumer does not hesitate indefinite-
ly. He finally decides to buy some quantities so that the
principle of marginal rate of substitution must sometimes be
true
.
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two positions of equilibrium so that there are no kinks in
the curves between the positions. If there are kinks then
there will be some systems of prices at which the consumer
will not be able to make his choice of expenditure. But
people do not hesitate indefinitely so that there are points
of equilibrium where choice is made. The principle of dimin-
ishing marginal rate of substitution then merely rules out
the temporarily peculiar situation.
1
The continuous indif-
ference curve with downward and diminishing slope appears to
be the simplest assumption possible "and in fact its accord-
,,2
ance with experience seems definitely good."
We have now disposed of those concepts from the utility
analysis which are objectionable and we have replaced them
with concepts more suitable for the purpose. The mere replace-
ment of these opens up avenues for which additional concepts
are required. These we shall take up below. But before we
proceed an additional qualification is necessary. Until now
the new theory has been simplified by the condition that con-
sumer's choice is restricted to the expenditure of two good3
1
The principle of diminishing marginal rate of substitu-
tion rules out only certain kinks in an otherwise irregular
indifference curve--those kinks which would result in upward
sloping stretches which are concave to the origin. Kinks
which are merely sharp bends or corners which make for two
or more tangents at the same point are allowed so long as
they are convex to the origin, i.e., so long as the tangents
are negatively sloped.
2
Hicks, Value and Capital t op . cit .
.
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only. •Lhis simplification can now be removed so that the
case may be considered where expenditure occurs between more
than two goods
.
For expenditure divided among three goods it is still
possible to use the indifference program, but this would have
to be done in three dimensions and would therefore become much
more involved. For more than three goods geometry no longer
is a tool since the necessary dimensions are lacking. This,
however, does not substantially affect the principles pre-
viously discussed, for if we now make the provision that the
quantities consumed of all other goods remain the same, the
marginal rate of substitution can still be defined as before,
and, as before, the consumer will still be at equilibrium if
the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods equals
the ratio of their prices. The condition with regard to
diminishing marginal rate of substitution is somewhat more
complicated. In order that stable equilibrium be possible
among several commodities, it is necessary that expenditure
be made so that no possible substitution of equal market
values bring the consumer to a more advantageous position.
This means that not only between any two goods must the mar-
ginal rate of substitution be diminishing but also that poten-
tial complicated substitution of other goods be ruled out.
Hicks expresses this by saying that the marginal rate of
substitution must diminish for substitutions in every direction.
c
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If any two possible goods were to be isolated the marginal
rate of substitution between them would be diminishing; thus
this provision eliminates those potentially complicated sub-
stitutions. The justification for this is similar to that
given in the simpler case.
Income and Substitution Effects
The fundamental concepts developed above have been based
entirely on the substitution relationship, but substitution
itself is inadequate to explain all types of market behavior.
It refers only to a particular change, that which occurs when
one commodity is replaced by another; In our terms it refers
to the case where an individual moves from one position to
another on the same indifference curve. This, however, is not
the only change which may take place. In response to new con-
ditions the individual does not necessarily move along the
same indifference curve. More often a change in market con-
ditions will make him either better or worse off so that in-
stead he moves to a higher or lower indifference curve. It
is evident then that the new information required is not about
the shape of a particular curve but rather about the relation-
ships between the many curves.
Two changes effecting these relationships may be desig-
nated. A change in price may bring about increased substitu-
tion of one good for another or It may act like an increase
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in income. It is therefore convenient to designate these
changes as the income effect and the substitution effect.
The income effect will be considered first, since it is
easier to deal with the substitution effects after the income
relationships are understood.
Referring now to the indifference diagram, let us con-
tinue to assume the prices of X and Y as given, but we shall
make the new proviso that income
is to vary. AB will be the in-
come line and the point of equilib-
rium will be located at point P
where AB is tangent to the indif-
ference curve. When income
varies AB will move to the right
or to the left. If prices remain
0 4 X the same and income increases
,
DIAGRAM 9 then the new income line will be
A'B* which is parallel to AB. The new point of equilibrium
will be at P’ where A'B' touches another Indifference curve.
As income continues to increase the points of equilibrium
trace out a curve CD which indicates the new consumption com-
binations which result from our given change. Hicks calls
this curve the income-consumption curve. (In Economica he
called it the expenditure curve. This clearly was a poor
name.) In effect it is Pareto's "line of exchanges," but
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its present significance is entirely different. Pareto’s
device attempted to show the point of equilibrium between two
opposing indifference systems. The curve as it is used by
Hicks merely shows the relationships between one curve and
another of the same indifference system. Geometrically the
curves are the same, but as a tool Hicks' use is far more ef-
fective .
What can be said about the form of this curve? First it
is evident that a given curve cannot intersect a particular
indifference curve more than once. If it did this would mean
that that indifference curve had more than one point of tan-
gency; but this violates the assumption of diminishing marginal
rate of substitution which makes the indifference curves con-
vex to the origin, and it is therefore impossible. Secondly
we can point out that there is no limitation to the slope of
the curve. Ordinarily it would slope upward to the right,
but depending on conditions, it is quite possible for it to
turn to the left or downwards to the right. If the income-
consumption curve is positively inclined, this indicates that
an increase in income will increase the consumption of both
commodities, X and Y. If it is negatively sloped, an increase
in income will increase the consumption X but decrease that
of Y. It also may be backward sloping to the left; indeed
it can take almost any shape without cutting an indifference
curve more than once. This is clearly seen in the case of
^See page 27. Note similarity in the diagrams.
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inferior goods where the curve is negatively sloped. It is
found whenever one commodity X is an "inferior” good largely
consumed at low levels of income, but replaced, or partially
so, by goods of a higher quality when income increases. Mar-
garine is one example, but there are many others; indeed most
of the poorer qualities of goods are in this sense inferior
goods
.
Although the apparatus used above is valid only for the
case of two goods X and Y, it is also valid no matter how many
are the goods among which income is distributed. If income
increases and is spent, then there must be an increase in con-
sumption in some direction if not in all. The increase may be
limited to a few goods; some may even diminish, but this is of
no consequence since the increase must be felt in some direc-
tion.
This stage of the discussion affords an interesting com-
parison with the theory of Marshall where he deduces the down-
ward slope of the demand curve from the law of diminishing
marginal utility. To do this he had to assume that the mar-
ginal utility of money is constant. Therefore the ratio be-
tween the marginal utility of a commodity and its price is
constant; in other words there is no distinction between
diminishing marginal utility and diminishing marginal rate
of substitution of that commodity for money. If price falls,
marginal utility must also fall, but this also implies an
or * r v
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increase in the amount demanded. It would appear then that
constant marginal utility meant for Marshall that changes in
the consumer’s supply of money would not affect the marginal
rate of substitution between money and a particular commodity.
If we let y equal money, then an increase in income will not
affect the consumer's S except as it is affected by changes
in (the marginal utility of ) x alone. The demand for x there
fore becomes independent of income, and this is precisely what
the constant marginal utility of money did for Marshall. It
allowed him to disregard income effects. For his purposes the
device was practically harmless, but it does not give a thor-
ough theory showing all the relationships. One of the chief
advantages of the indifference tool is, as we shall see, that
it allows a clear explanation of many of the numerous relation
ships between demand, income, and price.
Let us now look at effect of change in price aside from
the income effect. Beginning with two goods X and Y, the con-
ditions now are that income remains the same and also the
price of Y. The price of X however will be allowed to vary.
This situation is illustrated on Diagram 10. Here consumption
possibilities are indicated by the expenditure lines AB and
A'B depending on how the price of X varies. Since OB is in-
come measured in terms of Y and is constant, then regardless
of how the price of X changes the total expenditures will
remain the same. As the price of X falls the amount consumed
.•
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will increase. The expenditure
line will move from AB to A'B.
The point of equilibrium where
the expenditure line is tangent
to the indifference curve will
move P to Q. The curve BPQ which
is traced out by the changing
points of equilibrium will be
called the price-consumption
curve. It shows how consumption
varies, when the price of X
changes, all other things remaining the same. In effect if Y
1
is money it is a demand curve for X.
Here also it follows that the price-consumption curve can
intersect a particular indifference curve only once and also
that there is no limitation on the shape of the curve.
Having developed the two curves, let us now coordinate
2
them to examine the effects of a fall in price. Starting
^If Y measures money then the relationship between the
price-consumption curve and the traditional Marshallian demand
curve is as follows: the latter shows price per unit along the
ordinate, the former total expenditure. A price-consumption
curve rising from left to right corresponds to a demand curve
greater than unity. A price-consumption curve which declines
from left to right will correspond to an inelastic demand curve.
^In Economica Hicks develops the concepts of income-elas-
ticity and elasticity of substitution and he frames his discus-
sion in these terms. In Value and Capital he drops them since
he saw that they were not necessary at this point to explain
the two effects. For the sake of clarity I follow Hicks in
this respect. ^For further reference to these concepts see
also Hicks, Theorle Mathematlque de la Valeur (editor, Georges
Lutfalla; Paris: Actuality's Scientifiques et Industrielles
,
1937 )
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from a particular position AB we get two sets of lines and
two points of contact. There are the lines parallel to AB
whose points of equilibrium trace out the income-consumption
curve with contact at P 1
,
and there are the lines passing from
B to A, A' etc., whose points of equilibrium trace out the
price-consumption curve. Within the limits of the price de-
crease any particular indifference curve must be touched by
one line from each of these sets. Thus in Diagram 11 indif-
Y
ference curve number 2 is touched
by a line parallel to AB at P'
and also by a line passing through
B at Q. P' and Q, are the points
of equilibrium. Now from the
fact that curve 2 is higher than
curve 1, and from the convexity
of the indifference curves it
must follow that point Q always
DIAGRAM 11 lies to the right of P 1 . Since
we are varying the price of X only, it likewise always follows
that as we proceed to higher indifference curves the price-
consumption line will always be to the right of the income-
consumption line through P. What does this all mean in terms
of consumer consumption? The significance of this can be
seen if we compare the directions of movement. When the
price of X falls the consumer moves along the price consumption
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line from P to Q. But the drop in the price of X is equiva-
lent to an increase in income so that the movement from P to
(4 is the same as movement from P to P 1 along the income-con-
sumption curve. This in turn is equivalent to a movement
from P' to Q on indifference curve 2. The movement from P to
^ involves then two steps, one directly along the price-con-
sumption line, this we call the substitution effect, and the
other through P' to Q, this we call the income effect. And
this is borne out by experience, for a fall in the price of a
commodity actually affects the demand for that commodity in
two separate ways. On the one hand it raises the consumer's
real income and is thus similar to an increase in money income.
On the other hand it changes the relative prices of a given
commodity in relation to all others, so that aside from the
change in real income, there will be a tendency to substitute
the commodity whose price has dropped for other commodities.
The total effect on demand of a drop in price can then be
thought of as the sum of these two effects, the income effect
and the substitution effect.
The relative importance of each of these effects will
depend on the proportion of total income spent on one good X
and all other goods Y. The extent by which the consumer is
made better off by a fall in the price of X thus depends on
the proportionate amount of X which he was originally buying
to his total income. The greater this proportion, the greater
..
.
.
Ijb i
.
: ° " "
• c • o*., ox r
. c s .
'
*• t -
- v* i 'Jo:/ .1
’
65
will be the increase in real income and the more important
will be the income effect. But if the proportion of X is
small, then the gain to the consumer will be small and what-
ever gain there is, is more than likely to be taken up by
substituting more X. Here we say the income effect is
swamped by the substitution effect. It is on the basis of
this last point that Marshall was partially justified in as-
suming the constant marginal utility of money. He did not
work it out in just this manner but for those cases where the
substitution effect does swamp the income effect his theory
will apply. However as we have previously pointed out, it
does not tell the whole story.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that there is a
great difference in the reliability of these effects. This
in a certain measure also substantiates Marshall, for we can
definitely say that the substitution effect is absolutely
certain. From the original assumption of the principle of
diminishing marginal rate of substitution it must follow
that when the price of a commodity falls the substitution
effect will work for an increase in the demand for this
commodity. Here Marshall is on safe ground. But with the
income effect this certainty is not so absolute. Ordinarily
through the income effect a fall in the price of a commodity
will bring about an increase in the amount demanded, but
this will not always be the result. The income effect is
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not always reliable. This is particularly true in the case
of inferior goods, where a fall in price leads rather to a
decrease in the amount purchased.
This latter case is worth noting. An inferior good is
defined as one consumed at low income levels, but which is
replaced or partially so by other goods when income rises.
This is particularly well brought out by the direction of
the income -consumption line. In Diagram 12 it will be noted
that this line at first
rises with the increase in
income, but as income con-
tinues to increase it bends
around backwards until it
is negatively sloped. In
this case Y is the inferior
0 Y
DIAGRAM 12 good consumed at low levels
of Income. As income increases there will be an increase of
both X and Y until a certain point M beyond which the income
effect with respect to Y will no longer be felt. On the
contrary further increases of income bring about a decrease
in the consumption of Y causing the income-consumption curve
to be negatively sloped. The resulting effect may be con-
sidered as a negative income effect. What happens is that
beyond point M the consumer would rather buy other goods
which he considers of a higher order so that the increase
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in income converts Y into a nuisance. Therefore instead of
increasing his consumption of Y he substitutes other goods
in its place. It is for this reason that the income effect
is not always reliable.
Moreover this has been well brought out by statistical
study. Allen and Bowley have shown this to be true for mar-
garine which is obviously a case in point.'*' They have also
2
shown the same thing with respect to rye bread and flour.
The evidence on rye bread is particularly interesting because
rye is known in Europe as the poor man’s crop. The same will
also hold true for numerous commodities other than food; in-
deed, depending upon Income, price, and the proportion of
income spent on a commodity, it is possible for most commodi-
ties to become inferior at some level. This is especially
so with poorer quality goods which become inferior with very
moderate increases of income and are rapidly substituted for
^R. G. D. Allen and A. L. Bowley, Family Expenditure
(London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1935T,~p . 41
2
Ibid . t p. 29. Notice particularly the negative sloping
line for rye bread. The problem is again treated theoretically
In Chapter 8. Note especially their figure 4, page 106, which
corresponds essentially to my Diagram 12. See also W. E.
Johnson, "Pure Theory of Utility Curves," Economic Journal
,
December, 1913, pp. 491-492, for a similar discussion.
^Inferior goods are always found at low levels of income
so that it may appear that It is the income and not the good
which is inferior. Actually the negative income effect and
the low level Income are both contributing factors.
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goods of a higher quality. This is further basis for the
unreliability of the income effect.
In the previous paragraphs we have set out the develop-
ment of the income and substitution effects as it stands to-
day. This of course is largely attributable to the work of
Allen and Hicks. Their work, however, is very much the out-
growth of groundwork laid by Johnson; in fact the geometric
technique is practically the same. Johnson develops the same
curves as we saw above, only he calls them the expenditure
curve and the price curve. In all probability he was influ-
enced by Pareto's line of exchanges, but the outstanding
feature in his work is the fact that he treats the effect of
an increase in income and the effect of a fall in price . 1
From the development of the two new curves he was able to see
that the effects were interrelated and he proceeded to work
out the relationships. Moreover, in spite of the fact that
his work is based on the utility concept he saw that the
assumption of constant marginal of money was not absolutely
necessary to work out the theory. In this respect he sur-
passes Marshall. Yet in spite of his innovations he still
1
Johnson, ojd. cit . The development of the price and
expenditure curves is contained in the above article. The
work is largely mathematical but there is enough verbal
explanation so that one can see how he approaches the two
effects. Also of great Interest is the fact that he treats
the problem of inferior goods although he does not call it
by that name, and also consumer's surplus which we shall
examine below.
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clung to the idea of utility. It Is for this reason that we
refer to his work as groundwork. However, it was a thorough
type of groundwork, an intermediate step so to speak, in the
development of Indifference analysis and one which is apt to
be overlooked. But that it determined the direction of the
later development can hardly be doubted.
Before leaving the income and substitution effects it
will be well if we set them out in non-theoretical terms so
that there will be no misunderstanding in the meaning. As we
have pointed out above the effect o*f price on consumption
falls into two effects. A drop in price will increase the
buying power of the consumer and a portion of this increase
may be devoted to increased consumption of the cheapened com-
modity (the income effect) or it may induce the consumer to
substitute more of the cheapened commodity for other goods
(the substitution effect). In the graphic description we
started with an increase in income and showed the same in-
crease in satisfaction which would have been possible through
a fall in price. In the example below for the sake of clarity
we will start from the other end.'*' Let us assume a family
expenditure on food distributed so that over a given period
$39 is spent. There will be
1This numerical example is based on the article by
Fritz Machlup, "Professor Hicks' Statics," Quarterly Journal
of Economics
.
February, 1940, pp . 279-282.
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30 lbs. of meat @ .50 per lb $15.00
60 baskets other food @ .40 per basket.. 24 . 00
$39.00
If the price of meat falls to .30 cents per pound the
same combination can be bought for $33, and $6 will be released
for the purchase of other goods. Let us set aside the $6 re-
leased for the moment. What will be the effect of the drop in
price of meat? The drop in price will induce the consumer to
substitute meat for the other food so that spending $33 he
will buy
34 lbs. of meat © .30 per lb $10.20
57 baskets of other food @ .40 per basket.. 22.80
$33 . 00
Without using the $6 the consumer substituted 4 pounds
of meat for 3 baskets of food. Now if we allow this $6 to be
used so as to feel the full effect of the fall in price, it
will be possible for the consumer to purchase more of both
items. Consumption will appear as follows:
42 lbs. of meat @ .30 per lb $12.60
66 baskets of other food @ .40 per basket. . 26.40
$39.00
The effects of the drop in price in meat may be summed
up as follows:
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Original consumption 30 lbs.
Increase due to substitution effect 4 lbs.
Increase due to income effect 8 lbs.
Total effect of fall in price 12 lbs.
Meat consumption at lower price 42 lbs.
The fall in the price of meat, however, not only affects
the consumption of meat but also the consumption of other
foods. This maybe summed up as follows:
Original consumption 60 baskets
Decrease due to income effect on meat
-3 baskets
Increase due to substitution effect of
meat *9 baskets
Total effect of fall of price of meat on
consumption of other foods * 6
Consumption of other foods at lower
price of meat 66
The intermediate situation in the above example is purely
Imaginary, because ordinarily the effect of the $6 will be
felt immediately. However It gives us a clearer picture of
the whole process. The final situation shows an improvement
worth $6 over the imaginary intermediate position. The inter-
mediate position itself is an improvement over the original
position, but by exactly how much cannot be determined. We
do know that the consumer preferred 34 lbs. of meat and 57
baskets of food to 30 lbs. of meat and 60 baskets of food
which he would have bought for exactly ^33. The superiority
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of the intermediate position then is more than $6.
But the superiority of the final position over the inter-
mediate is exactly $6 so that we can say that the superiority
of the final position over the original must be over $6. At
unchanged prices the consumer would have spent $47.40 for the
quantities in the final position, or $8.40 more. This does
not correspond to the increase in satisfaction, for if the con-
sumer had originally $47.40 to spend he would have distributed
it differently, but it enables us to set limits to the income
effect. We can therefore conclude that the income effect of
the drop in price of meat is equivalent to an increase in in-
come of more than $6, but less than $8.40. The income effect
then is in excess of the money income released through a fall
in price. To analyze the total effect it would be necessary
to know the indifference map of the individual concerned. This
of course is a subjective barrier which has yet to be broken
down, but from a theoretical point of view it invalidates
neither the objectivity of the theory nor the theory itself.
To return now to the further development of the theory.
The geometrical argument above applied only to the case where
the consumer divides his expenditure between two commodities.
In the numerical example above we ran ahead of ourselves, but
this can be easily rectified. It need only be pointed out
that a collection of things can always be treated as though
they were divisible into units of a single commodity as long
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as we assume that the relative prices remain unchanged. This
of course is what was done above with the baskets of food.
As long as the prices of consumption goods are assumed to be
given, we can bring them together into one commodity--either
baskets of food, money, or purchasing power in general. This
has no effect whatsoever on the classification of the effects
of price into the substitution effect and the income effect.
Indeed it extends the application.
Summation of the Laws of Group Demand
Our discussion so far has been devoted to the study of
the demand behavior of a single individual. But this by it-
self is not an end. Economics is interested in the behavior of
the individual only in so far as it will lead to the study of
the general market. The study of individual demand then must
be a means to the more inclusive study of market demand. As
is to be expected, our present method enables us to make the
transition without difficulty.
The properties of individual demand are almost identi-
cally those of market demand with the exception that the lat-
ter represent a cumulative effect. We have seen that the
change in the Individual amount demanded in response to a
small change in price can be divided into the income effect
and the substitution effect. The change in the group demand
is the sum of changes in individual demand; it is therefore
. .5 0 ,-C ‘ .
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also divisible into these two effects, the sum of individual
income effects and the sum of individual substitution effects.
The same propositions which evolved from the individual ef-
fects will hold for the group effects.
As the individual substitution effect works in favor of
increased consumption of the commodity whose price has fallen,
so also will the group substitution effect work in the same
direction. Similarly as the individual income effect is not
reliable, so also is the group effect not reliable; an in-
crease in income for the group as a whole may increase or
decrease the amount of a given quantity consumed depending
on whether or not that commodity is inferior. It may be in-
ferior for some members of the group and not for others. How-
ever, the total group income effect will be the sum of these
negative and positive component group effects, one offsetting
the other, but the stronger holding sway. Likewise it can
be shown that the relative importance of these effects depends
on the proportion of total group income which is spent on a
particular commodity. If the group as a whole spends a large
proportion of Its income on the commodity then the Income ef-
fect will be considerable. If the situation is reversed then
it will be negligible. And finally just as it was possible
for the individual income effect to be swamped by the indi-
vidual substitution effect, so also is it possible for the
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income effect of certain members of a group to be swamped by
the substitution effect of other members. As we see, the
cumulative aspect applies but the mere existence of the group
instead of the individual multiplies the possibilities of off-
setting and adding.
Our analysis now provides us with the ability to describe
the general characteristics of the group demand curve. Ordi-
narily the demand curve for a commodity will slope downward,
more being consumed when the price falls, except in those cases
in which the commodity is an inferior good. Even when it is an
inferior good, if the proportion of income spent on the com-
modity is small, then the income effect will be small and the
curve will still slope downward. Furthermore even when the
amount of income spent on an inferior good is proportionally
large, the curve may still slope downward, for as we pointed
out above a large negative income effect of a component part
of one group may be more than offset by a large substitution
effect of another component part. Since the substitution ef-
fect is always reliable and is by far the more important of
the two, and since the income effect works in the same direc-
tion as the substitution effect, except in the case of inferior
goods, we may conclude that in the vast majority of situations
the demand curve will slope downward. This, of course, does
not preclude the possibility of a positive sloping demand
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curve. If the commodity is an inferior good, and the propor-
tion of income spent on it is large, then it is quite possible
for the income effect to swamp the substitution effect so that
1
the resulting demand curve is positively sloped.
The circumstances in Marshall’s famous Giffen case are
particularly applicable for these conditions. Here it was
shown how a rise in the price of bread
makes so large a drain on the poor laboring families
and raises so much the marginal utility of money to
them, that they are forced to curtail their consumption
of meat and the more expensive farinaceous foods; and,
bread being s till the cheapest food which they can get
and will take, they consume more and not less of it.
2
At the low level of income here indicated the consumers had
to give up some of their variety in diet and consume more
bread because of the rise in the price of bread. Had the
price fallen they would have consumed less bread and substi-
tuted more of other foods. This is clearly a case where the
negative income effect is strong enough to more than offset
the substitution effect. We can see, however, that the cir-
cumstances in this case are peculiar and not often likely to
occur when one considers the whole market. Such cases are
In such a situation the marginal rate of substitution
between the given commodity and other goods would be great
so that there would be a tendency to substitute the commodity
for other goods. A high marginal rate of substitution is
characteristic of inferior goods.
2Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (8th edition;
London: The Macmillan Company, 1922T, p. 132.
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rare, but they should not he overlooked. ^
We may conclude then that the downward sloping demand
curve is predominant and that exceptions to it are rare and
relatively unimportant.
This completes the theory of consumer demand in its
direct development. We can now see just what has been ac-
complished. Starting from a given scale of preferences and
given supplies of two goods we have seen how the individual
will attempt to exchange these for each other, when the prices
of both are given. By assuming that one of these is a com-
posite good we have seen the relationship between one good
and all others. Next we have seen the effect of price on the
decisions to buy or sell and particularly in this respect we
have seen the proper importance of the substitution and in-
come effects. Finally we have aggregated these decisions by
^This is particularly true if we do not regard consum-
ers’ income fixed in terms of money. If the consumer comes
to market with a stock of goods, part of which he sells and
part of which he consumes himself, then the income effect and
substitution effect do not work the same. For the buyer only,
income and substitution effects work in the same direction
except in the case of inferior goods. For the seller, how-
ever, they work in opposite directions and only work in the
same direction in the case of inferior goods. This is impor-
tant for it is here that income effects are considerable and
cannot be neglected. In the case of the buyer they can be
largely neglected. This is why Marshall’s constant utility
of money was not such an extreme error. In the case of
sellers, however, particularly since they derive large parts
of their income from a particular commodity or service which
they sell, income effects will be just as powerful as sub-
stitution effects and will very often be dominant.
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the process of additivity so that they can be applied to
groups of individuals, establishing thereby a group theory
of consumer demand.
The most obvious application of this analysis is to the
spending of consumer income in the satisfaction of immediate
personal wants. But it is not limited to this case only.
It was not intended that the goods exchanged be only consumer
goods. The original limiting condition was only that the
goods be objects of desire which can be arranged in an ordinal
preference scale which itself is independent of price. We
therefore can include in the application the supply of labor.
The individual may be thought of as preferring one size income
earned by one amount of labor to another size income earned
by doing another amount of labor. Or the individual may pre-
fer so much time spent in work to so much time spent in lei-
sure. The applications both general and particular are num-
erous. We shall go into some of these in a later chapter.
But before leaving the theory, certain areas of exclusion
must be pointed out. There are two which are important. One
is the case of speculative demand. It is very often pointed
out as an irregularity, how the fall in the price of a good
diminishes rather than increases demand because it sets up
an expectation of further fall in price. In this situation
the indifference analysis does not apply, because through
the expectation of fall in price, the preference scale becomes
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dependent on price . 1 (The marginal rate of substitution be-
tween the good and money ceases to be independent of price.)
The other exclusion is in the field of production. Here the in-
difference analysis does not apply because factors of produc-
tion cannot in the above manner be placed in a scale of prefer-
ence. The demand for each factor is a derived demand depending
on its monetary contribution to the total product. The price
of the product has a direct bearing on what will be paid for
each unit of the factors making up the product. The prefer-
ence scale cannot be formed independent of price, so that this
must be excluded. Production, however, can be treated by the
use of iso-product curves which are similar geometrically to
indifference curves. Treatment of this, however, is beyond
the scope of our discussion.
Both of these exclusions involve the reaction of price
on the scale of preference. Any problem which does not involve
this reaction maybe treated by the above technique.
^Veblen's example of diamonds, an object of ostentatious
expenditure, is a case in point. The demand for diamonds may
be reduced by a fall in price because the desire depends on
price and falls when price falls. The marginal rate of sub-
stitution between diamonds and money depends on price and
the scale of preference therefore cannot be formed independ-
ently .
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Consumer’s Surplus-Restated
One of the most controversial doctrines in economic
theory has been the doctrine of consumer’s surplus put forth
by Marshall. From his work on individual utility Marshall
constructed this doctrine to throw light on certain problems
of taxation. He attempted to show the existence of certain
surpluses of utility which he translated into monetary terms.
He could thereby show the reaction on these surpluses of
specific taxes so that they could be positively or negatively
/
evaluated. The merit of the work on taxation has not stood
up because it was based on a doctrine generally considered
invalid, so much so that it has been excluded almost unani-
mously from the main body of economic theory.'*' The develop-
ment of the indifference analysis has allowed a restatement
2
of the propositions on taxation and, what is more important,
it affords a means of restating the doctrine of consumer's
surplus in terms which appear more generally acceptable. The
theory we have been developing above is considered by its
proponents useful in this respect, so that while the discussion
lies off the main track of our inquiry it will be helpful to
restate the doctrine of consumer's surplus in our new terms.
*-For criticism see H. J. Davenport, The Economics of
Alfred Marshall (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1935}
,
pp. 101-106.
p
The propositions on taxation in terms of indifference
analysis will be discussed in a later chapter.
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Marshall’s argument was taken from Dupuit, the original
1
inventor of consumer's surplus. Dupuit held that economics
must take as a measure of utility the maximum sacrifice which
each consumer would be willing to make to attain a good. Thus
in Diagram 15a if OP measures price and ON quantity, then the
curve Pd will be the individual demand curve showing the vari-
ous quantities the individual would be willing to buy at the
various prices. At quantity r the maximum sacrifice or total
utility which accrues to the individual is equal to the sum of
the increments, previous to r which the individual would have
purchased had the price been higher. Suppose for example that
rn represents 10 cents and that Or represents 20 pounds of
sugar. The individual therefore purchases his 20th pound of
sugar at 10 cents per pound. At price r'n' which is 8 cents,
the individual will purchase 30 pounds of sugar. But for the
20th pound he would have paid 10 cents so that at 8 cents
there is a consumer’s surplus of 2 cents. The total utility
at 20 pounds is equal to the sum of what he would have paid
for the increments previous to the 20th pound, rather than
go without them, or the area OPnr. The cost at 20 pounds is
indicated by what he actually pays OPnr, leaving a surplus
^ Jules Dupuit was a French engineer interested in the
economic aspects of engineering. His work appeared originally
in the Annales des Points et Chaussees in 1844 and was very
inaccessible until translated by Mario de Bernardi under its
original title, "De l'utilite'’ et de sa mesure," in Paris,
1934.
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equal to pPn. Similarly at r' the consumer's surplus would
be represented by p'Pn'
.
This is the theory explained by
Dupuit^ and also by Marshall and through which both arrived
at the same results, but there is a qualification to be made
which Marshall was very particular to include, namely that
the marginal utility of money throughout must be assumed
constant. This is a basic assumption on which is based the
construction of the demand curve and without which different
increments of utility would have a confused meaning. Marshall
was very precise in his development and he therefore included
2
this assumption.
''Ibid., pp. 62-65 for discussion and diagrams 1, 2, 3,
in appendix.
2Marshall, Principles of Economics
.
op . clt .
,
pp . 126,
128, 132, also Appendix, Note VI, p. 842.
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The significance of this is particularly apparent when
we translate the whole argument in terms of indifference anal-
ysis. In Diagram 13b we measure the commodity along the x
axis and money along the y axis. If the consumer income
measured in money is OM and if the slope of the line ML indi-
cates the price of the given commodity, then from our indif-
ference analysis we know that ON will be the amount purchased
and PF the amount of money paid for it. The amount the indi-
vidual would have been willing to pay is indicated by RF where
R is on the same indifference curve as M so that he would be
no better off by making the purchase or holding on to his
money. The consumer would have been willing to pay RF. He
actually pays PF. Consumer's surplus is therefore the excess
of one over the other or RP . The indifference diagram thus
affords a means of expressing in monetary terms the gain ac-
cruing to the consumer over what he would have been willing
to pay, without resort to the utility concept and independent
of any assumption about the marginal utility of money.
But the marginal utility of money is important. Let us
examine the implications. We have by two different means
arrived at a monetary expression of the same surplus. It
must follow then that RP equals the area pPn under the indi-
vidual demand curve; but is this always so? Only when the
marginal utility of money is assumed constant, that is, only
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when the slope of the indifference curve at R is equal to the
slope of the indifference curve at P. This is the correspond-
ing condition on the indifference scale. From it we see that
a slight movement to the right of P will increase PF and RF
by the same amounts leaving consumer's surplus RP the same.
And this is what happens on the demand curve. At point n the
increased increment will increase the total amount spent, cor-
responding to the increment of FP, by an amount equal to
rng'r'. But the total utility corresponding to RF is also
built out of increments similar to rnq'r', so that consumer's
surplus pPn remains the same.
This becomes apparent when we make the transition to
group demand. Let us assume that Pd in Diagram 15a represents
the amounts that different individuals would be willing to pay
at different prices. Then similarly the maximum sacrifice or
total utility derived by all those who purchase at quantity r
is equal to the sum of the increments previous to r which some
would have purchased had the price been higher. The individual
who buys the r^*1 pound pays rn for it. His total utility or
maximum sacrifice is the thin line rn. For the group the
total utility is indicated by the sum of increments similar
to rn previous to r. The consumer's surplus then is the
excess of total utility OPnr over cost OPnr or pPn. Now
comparing this with the indifference diagram we find that
the area OPnr is made up of the sum of increments similar to
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RF at various slopes of ML (various prices); Opnr is made up
of the sum of individual costs or the sum of increments of
PF. If the slope at P is always equal to the slope at R then
the corresponding areas of the demand curve will always equal
the sum of the corresponding increments on the indifference
diagram. If the slope is different then these areas will not
be the same and another effect will enter--this indicated as
the income effect on the indifference diagram. This is the
precise meaning of constant marginal utility of money. We
saw it previously and we see it here again. It enabled
Marshall to neglect the income effect. It is true that this
difference is likely to be small, the less important the com-
modity considered is in the consumer's budget; but even if the
proportion of income spent is small, it can still be important
if RP itself is large so that the loss of opportunity to buy
will be equivalent to a large loss of income. The indifference
analysis thus eliminates that weakness in Marshall's argument
since it expresses the gain monetarily without any assumption
concerning marginal utility of money.
Under the Marshallian analysis consumer's surplus was a
means of expressing in terms of money income the result of a
fall in price. But it may now be viewed differently--as the
compensating variation in income, the loss of which would just
offset the fall in price, and leave the consumer no better off
than before. This is equivalent to the former with the
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exception that it includes the income effect. And it can he
shown that the corresponding variation in income cannot be
less than a minimum amount and is ordinarily greater than
that amount.
If for example oranges are 2 cents each and at that price
6 oranges are bought, what will be the compensating variation
in income when the price is 1 cent and 10 are bought? We know
that it cannot be less than 6 cents for if the individual
bought 6 oranges at 1 cent and we assumed his income had been
reduced by 6 cents then he would still be as well off as be-
fore. What had been his previous position is still open to
him. In all probability he will substitute some quantity of
oranges for some other things and make himself better off.
But if he can lose 6 cents and remain as well off as before,
then 6 cents is less than the compensating variation. He
would have to lose more than 6 cents in order to be just as
well off as before, but just how much more cannot be indi-
cated since the information about the indifference curves in
the new situation is not available. All that can be definite-
ly known is the minimum variation, and fortunately for most
of the propositions in which the concept is used, this is all
that is necessary.
However, it is theoretically possible to make the assump-
tion that the individual's tastes remain unchanged even after
a rise or fall in price. By doing this it becomes possible
'.
.
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to compare two equilibrium situations and to indicate graph-
ically the compensating variation, but it must be remembered
that whatever measures are indicated fall within the limita-
tion of this assumption.
In Diagram 14 we see an individual's indifference curves
between commodity X
and Y, money. It is
assumed that all prices
other than X are constant
so that Y also represents
the quantity of all other
goods. Individual in-
come is taken as con-
stant, OM. The two
equilibrium situations
will appear at points A
and B, points of maximum
satisfaction resulting from the price changes from MPj_ to MPg
or vice versa. What we want to indicate is the gain to the
buyer when the price falls from P-^ to P2 and the loss when
the price rises from P to P 0 and the buyer moves back from
-L &
B to A.
The compensating variation in income whose loss would just
offset a fall in price and leave the consumer no better off
than before, is that change in income which will make trading
'f
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at the new price just as attractive and no more attractive
than trading at the old price with original income. Or in
later Hicksian terminology it is the "price compensating
variation” resulting from a fall or rise in price. ^ If in
our diagram we draw in the parallels to the price line as if
we were going to indicate the income effect, then the price
compensating variation will he indicated by BB 1< BB^ is the
vertical distance between the point of equilibrium B and the
line parallel to price line MF^ and tangent to curve I. The
drop in price is equivalent to an increase in income, but if
thi3 is to be taken away, that is, indicated in the form of
a surplus, and yet leave the consumer no better off than be-
fore, then we must measure the distance between the equilib-
rium under the new price and equilibrium at the previous level
of satisfaction on the basis of the new price. In terms of
income this is the vertical distance BB-^ which may be marked
off on OM to indicate the change in income. This is not a
minimum variation as explained above but rather an indication
of the exact variation. It is possible to indicate it thus
only because the assumption was made at the start.
In Value and Capital and in a subsequent article defend-
ing consumer’s surplus 2 Hicks felt that the change in income
lj. R. Hicks, "The Four Consumer Surpluses," Review of
Economic Studies t 11:31-41, Winter, 1943.
2J. R. Hicks, "The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus,"
Review of Economic Studies
,
8:108-116, February, 1941.
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indicated, by the price compensating variation was what Marshall
meant by a change in consumer's surplus. (It will be remem-
bered that Marshall indicated consumer's surplus by the tri-
angle under the demand curve.) But Hicks was criticized for
this by Professor Henderson who pointed out that under the
above assumption four expressions of consumer's surplus were
possible instead of one which Hicks indicated, but that only
one of the four resembled Marshall's measure. 1 This is indi-
cated by the line BB^ which Hicks in his 1945 article calls
the "quantity compensating variation." This is defined as
the amount of income which the consumer would have to lose
or gain after adjusting his purchases of X to the new price
in order to be no better off than before. Hicks agreed with
Henderson that this was the better measure and the one which
was the closest to what Marshall meant by consumer's surplus.
However in his 1943 article he reverts back to the area between
the demand curve and the price axis within the range of the
price change, as Marshall's measure. In his private corres-
g
pondence Hicks finally clears this up. He states,
1A. Henderson, "Consumer's Surplus and the Compensating
Variation," Review of Economic Studies t 8:117-121, February,
1941. Henderson pointed out the measures. Hicks gave them
the names by which they now go.
^icks, "The Four Consumer Surpluses," o£. clt .
^See James N. Morgan, "Measurement of Gains and Losses,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics
,
February, 1948, pp. 290-291.
Hicks' private letter to Morgan is reprinted in this article.
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I think I would now agree with Henderson that the
quantity variation is the strict meaning of Marshall's
concept of consumer's surplus. But when I talked
about the Marshall measure I meant the approximation
which Marshall gave to this concept, namely the tri-
angle under the demand curve. The price variation
is, I now think, quite foreign to Marshall's theory,
but it is a concept which one naturally drops into
when trying to generalize and it is important as
.
providing a link between consumer's surplus and
index number theory.
So far we have considered only two of the measures pointed
out by Henderson. The other two are the quantity equivalent
variation and the price equivalent variation. The quantity
equivalent variation measures the gain or loss in income on
the original level of consumption which is equivalent (in
utility) to the fall or rise in price. This is equal to the
vertical distance between the indifference curves at the origi-
nal level of consumption, AA^ for a fall in price and BB^ for
a rise in price. It is to be noted that these measures are
identical with the quantity compensating variation except
that they are reversed for a price rise and price fall. The
price equivalent variation measures the gain or loss in in-
come which is equivalent to the fall or rise in the price.
This is measured by AA-^ for a fall in price and BB-^ for a
rise in price. Here also it is to be noted that the measure
Is the same as the price compensating variation except that
It is reversed for a fall or rise In price. The reason for
the reversal lies in the fact that we are comparing two dif-
ferent measures, price and quantity, from two different
.'
.
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points of view. Four measures result which are somewhat
alike, hut are different since four distinct things are being
measured. If additional limiting assumptions were to be made
other measures would be possible.
The doctrine of consumer's surplus as developed above is
a translation of the concept developed by Marshall onto the
indifference map. Herein lies its interest for us. But just
as the work of Marshall was questioned, so also has the trans-
lation onto the indifference map been questioned. And to a
large extent the criticism is justified. The indifference
map assumes only a series of ordinal preference curves and
therefore little importance is to be attached to a numerical
measure of the gain or loss from a price change. Within the
limits of the above assumption one can compare as above the
gain between two price situations, but it is impossible to
compare with any advantage, the gain between two price changes
1
with the gain between two other price changes. And moreover,
those propositions which are explained in terms of consumer’s
surplus, particularly those relating to the burden of taxation
can be stated independently of any numerical measure of gain.
Most of them can be stated purely in terms of indifference
analysis. As was the case under Marshall's theory there
1-See P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947T^ pi 198, especial-
ly footnote 35.
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appears little need for the concept even aside from its
validity. It appears then that the concept is in about the
same state as it was before Hicks revived it. Although he
did restate it, no fruitful results have followed.
.t - , . , .
CHAPTER IV
RELATED GOODS
Early Historical Development
In the discussion to this point I have been very careful
to avoid the problem of related goods. This has been done
primarily for the sake of clarity, because, for the most part,
this problem has been closely interwoven with the development
of indifference analysis and there has resulted a confusion
which has obscured the real significance of each. One of the
main purposes in treating the problem separately is to place
it in its proper relationship to the whole theory of demand
and thereby do away with much of the prevailing confusion.
As we retrace the development this will become apparent.
Previous to the development of indifference analysis very
little was said about related goods. It was recognized that
the demand for one good is not dependent on that good alone,
but is more often tied to the demand for other goods. Par-
ticularly in the productive process it was recognized that
goods are jointly related. This arose from the determination
of joint costs of production. But aside from recognizing the
joint relationship little attention was given the problem and
no exact theory was worked out. John Stuart Mill, for
93
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example, met the problem in his discussion of joint costs of
production.^" He recognized the effect of joint cost on de-
mand, but to him the problem was of the extraordinary variety.
He includes it in a chapter entitled "Some Peculiar Cases of
Value.'* Marshall also discussed joint demand as affected by
the productive process. For him the demand of each of several
complementary things is derived from the service which they
2jointly render, in the production of some ultimate product.
The joint relationship exists, but it is set aside in order
to isolate each factor for separate study. The problem was
also discussed by certain members of the utility school in-
cidental to their main theme. Jevons, for example, treats it,
but he reprimands Mill for considering it a "peculiar case."
On the contrary most commodities are produced jointly with
4
minor commodities. Friedrich Wieser also considers it. In
treating the value of factors of production he uses the prin-
ciple of complementary goods to show "the elements that are
„ 5bound up in production. All these early attempts merely
^John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy
(New York: Appleton and Company, 1880), Book III, Ch. XVI.
p
Marshall, Principles of Economics
,
op . cit
.
,
p. 381.
5Ibid.
,
footnote 2, p. 383.
S. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy (4th edition;
London: The Macmillan Company, 1924)” p. 198.
^Friedrich Von Wieser, Natural Value
,
p. 87.
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recognized a complementary relationship involved in produc-
tion. That the complementary relationship was connected to
the substitution relationship or that these both carried over
to demand was not yet seen. Thus no concise theory was at-
tempted.
Among the very first to go beyond the mere productive
relationship were Auspitz and Lieben. They recognized substi-
tution as it was related to complementarity and more important
they treated the relationships on the demand side. Their dis-
cussion includes a section on complementary and competitive
articles and another on the effects of changes in price of
such articles. The two relationships, they say, are in a sense
opposed. An increase in the consumption of article A generally
increases the consumption of those articles which serve to
complete the enjoyment desired by the consumption of A. On
the other hand for those articles which are competitive with
A the consumption will decrease if that of A increases."^"
Here are perhaps the first precise definitions of complemen-
tary and competitive goods. Complementarity according to this
definition infers that goods are so tied up that one good must
have some other for the two to produce a given enjoyment. The
two goods together complete the enjoyment, such as sugar and
coffee. Competitive goods on the other hand are rival goods;
^Auspitz und Lieben, Untersuchungen uber die Theorie der
Prelses
,
op . cit .
,
section 36, p. 154.
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they compete with each other for the same enjoyment such as
wine, beer, or whiskey. Thus an increase in the consumption
of coffee will always result in an increase in the quantity
of sugar complementary with it; but if the same individual
instead of increasing his consumption of coffee decreases it
and instead increases his consumption of tea, it is possible
(depending on the relative price of these goods) for the
total consumption of sugar to decrease.^ Similarly an in-
crease in the individual's consumption of beer will result
in a decrease of the consumption of wine and whiskey, but it
is possible for the decrease in whiskey to be so great that
there actually will be an increase in the consumption of wine
.
We thus see here a complete understanding by Messrs.
Auspitz and Lieben of the different complex relationships
which are possible. By no means does their treatment go
into every possible relationship, but it does include a great
many and there is a remarkable similarity between their re-
sults and the more thorough results of Hicks which we shall
come to below. They point out how a drop in the price of an
article substitutable for A will cause a decrease in the
immediate consumption of A while a drop in the price of an
article complementary with A may result in an increase in
the consumption of A. The extent of the effect of the fall
1Ibld
.
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p. 155.
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in price will depend on how much of A one is using . 1 Further-
more they show the effects of changes in consumption on total
utility. For complementary articles important in total con-
sumption, a decrease or increase in the price of one will lower
or raise total consumption as the case may be. In the case of
a competitive article a decrease in price will increase the
utility of the article itself and make it more advantageous
relative to others. But regardless of the relationship, the
increase in total utility will depend on the relative impor-
tance in consumption of the article whose price has fallen.
But as we explained earlier, as ingenious as these men were,
they still clung to the utility idea and they thus did not
develop the insight necessary for the next step in the de-
velopment. They recognized the many possible relationships.
While they did not discuss price effects on the basis of a
limited income, they did see that the importance of an article
in the individual's consumption had a great bearing on the
effects of price on related goods. Developments In any theory
do not take place all at once. One cannot expect the final
result immediately. Thus we must recognize the foundation
laid by these men in this problem and continue further to
trace the development of the concepts set out by them.
The insight necessary for further advancement in the
1Ibld
. ,
Section 41, pp. 171-172.
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theory came about as a result of the development of the in-
difference device. This tool was not constructed specifically
for the problem of related goods. In economics it is generally
impossible to construct a tool for a particular problem, but
it was seen almost immediately that the tool lent Itself to
the treatment of related goods and it has become to a very
\
great extent associated with that problem. We ask naturally
therefore what there is in the indifference analysis which
made It so adaptable to and focused so much attention on that
particular problem. The reason for this lies in the very
nature of the indifference curve itself. It will be remem-
bered that in Marshall's work and also in the work of the
early utility proponents, utility was considered as the func-
tion of one good only. It had been recognized that the utility
of a particular good does not exist independent of itself,
but there was no means geometric or mathematic to treat the
relationship of the utility of one good to that of another.
The development of indifference curves supplied this means
at once geometric and mathematic; for it treated goods one
in combination with another and thereby allowed the utility
of one to be considered as it affected and was affected by
the utility of another. This immediately directed attention
to the problem of related goods as it supplied the device to
explain those consumption relationships which had been
previously recognized but inadequately explained.
LO
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Related Goods Under the Indifference Analysis
All studies in economics are directed toward the explana-
tion of phenomena as they occur in everyday life. Unfortunately
the economist is limited in his use of the inductive method.
Society is his laboratory and it is therefore almost impossi-
ble to achieve results from strictly controlled conditions.
He has therefore been forced to fall back on the deductive
method of reasoning--to start with given hypotheses, reason
logically, and then check his results with what actually takes
place and make the necessary correction in his original hypoth-
eses. It very often occurs -under this method that the theory
itself is thoroughly correct in so far as its logical reason-
ing is concerned, but that the basic assumptions do not corres-
pond to what actually takes place or that other forces are
operating which have not been accounted for in the original
assumptions. This has been very true with the problem of re-
lated goods. The development has been achieved for the most
part by the use of the deductive method. Whole theories have
been worked out which in themsevles are flawless. These have
been verified by the use of mathematics, a tool which has
been a very considerable aid in deductive reasoning. But
these theories have proved to be inadequate; not because they
are in themselves wrong, but because their assumptions either
have not corresponded to actual conditions or have excluded
factors which have a great bearing on the theory. This is
•' 1
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the result of the hybrid method (the combination of the induc-
tive and deductive methods) which economics under the present
state of knowledge has been forced to use. Aware then of the
limitations in the methods used, we must examine with care the
definitions which serve as hypotheses for the different theo-
ries that we may understand how they differ and to what extent
one progresses over the other.
The definitions of Auspitz and Lieben were used for a
theory which did not have the benefit of indifference analysis.
In a theory developed by Francis Edgeworth one would naturally
look for definitions of significance since he was the first to
establish the indifference curve. Such definitions are given,
but their significance is not what is expected. It will be
remembered that Edgeworth’s treatment considered the utilities
of two goods, one of which is given and the other, acquired for
the former, the acquisition yielding utility and the sacrifice
disutility
.
^ The indifference curve in this form did not con-
sider the positive utilities of two goods in conjunction with
each other. Edgeworth did not see how readily the indifference
curve could be applied to this problem and his definitions
were therefore not part of an integrated theory of related
goods. The definitions he gives appeared eight years after
his Mathematical Psychics in an article on the pure theory of
1
See above pages 10, 43.
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1
monopoly
.
They are given in pure mathematic terms which when trans-
lated take on the following meaning: Y is complementary with
X when an increase in the supply of X raises the marginal
utility of Y . Y is a substitute for X when an increase in
2the supply of X lowers the marginal utility of Y. Goods are
complementary when their marginal utilities move in the same
direction and substitutable when they move in opposite direc-
tions. Movements in either will have the same effect on each
other or, in other words, the relationships are completely re-
versible. If Y is complementary with X then X is complementary
with Y. The factors considered in these definitions are the
quantity of each good and its marginal utility. But the quan-
tity demanded is a function of the price so that price is also
a factor; Indeed Edgeworth held that variations in utility can
3
be measured monetarily. He has included then these three
^Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy
,
The
Pure Theory of Monopoly
,
op . cit
.
,
Vol. II, p. 117. Edgeworth's
use of complementary and rival goods is in the proof of the
proposition that when two or more monopolists are dealing with
competitive groups economic equilibrium is indeterminate. This
use is entirely Irrelevant to the present discussion and there-
fore will not be treated here.
,2
^Mathematically if ^ Fr is negative the goods are sub-
stitutes. When —
—
Q-
d x dy
is positive the goods are complementary.
d x dy
For the translation see Hicks, Value and Capital
, p 42.
^Papers Relating to Political Economy
.
op . cit
.
,
p. 117.
Edgeworth refers to Dupuit as authority for this statement.
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factors in Marshallian fashion and has used them for a par-
ticular purpose, but from our point of view it is impossible
to evaluate them. His use in the theory of monopoly is very
vaguely related to this discussion and furthermore the defini-
tions were not used in an Edgeworth theory of related goods.
It is to be noted however that with slight change they are
the same as the definitions set out by Pareto. Indeed by some
they are associated together as the Edgeworth-Pareto defini-
tions. We shall therefore have occasion to meet them again
when we shall evaluate them in the light of a system of reason-
ing built on their foundation.
Fisher
The first complete theory of related goods was worked out
by Irving Fisher. It will be remembered from our previous dis-
cussion that Fisher's development of the indifference curve
while appearing at the same time as Edgeworth's, was independent
of it and entirely original. It therefore turned in a slightly
different direction. Fisher actually in his development pro-
duced the curve as we use it today, based of course on the
utility concept. He first considered the utility of a given
commodity as a function of that commodity alone (Part I,
Mathematical Investigations ) , but when he came to the indif-
ference analysis (Part II), he changed his assumption and
assumed that the change in the marginal utility of a given
quantity of a commodity changes the marginal utility of a
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1
given amount of another commodity. From the beginning then
his work was a step advanced over that of Edgeworth, for he
considered marginal utilities positively as they affect each
other
.
This change in the basic assumption immediately raised
questions about the various relationships possible between
the marginal utilities of different goods; that is, it posed
the problem of related goods. Therefore simultaneous with the
establishment of indifference curves it became necessary to
establish definitions to cover these relationships. Since
the curves themselves are derived from surfaces indicating
changing marginal utilities, there must be some property in
them which also indicates the same thing. Thus Fisher gives
the following definition. "The essential quality of substi-
tute or competing articles is that the marginal utilities or
the prices of the quantities actually produced and consumed
tend to maintain a constant ratio.” Perfect substitutes are
defined such that this ratio is constant. "The essential at-
tribute of completing articles is that the ratio of the quan -
tities actually produced and consumed tends to be constant.”
_
_
_ _—
—
_____—_______________
•
"'"Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of
Value and Prices
,
op . clt .
,
p. 64.
^Ibld
.
.
p. 65. Previous to the development of indiffer-
ence curves members of the utility school (Jevons, Wslras)
and also Marshall had shown that marginal utility was propor-
tional to price. Thus the equivalence in the quotation.
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And perfectly completing articles are defined such that this
ratio also is constant, "as many shoe strings as shoes for
instance, irrespective of cost."
1
There is a distinct dif-
ference between these definitions to be carefully noted. One
is based on the ratio of marginal utilities and the other on
the ratio of quantities. Evidently Fisher felt that the es-
sential attribute of complementarity lay in the proportional
numbers of each commodity consumed and not in the change in
the ratio of marginal utilities. The very nature of comple-
mentarity is in association and he therefore shifted to quan-
tities rather than marginal utilities.
It will be remembered from our previous discussion that
Fisher's total utility surface from which the indifference
curves were directly established, was derived from two deriva-
tive surfaces, one indicating the marginal utility of A, B
constant, the other Indicating the marginal utility of B, A
p
constant. The primitive surface, usually in the shape of a
hill, contained the relationships of the previous two. Now
if these are carried over in the indifference curves then
what is the property of the curves which indicates the rela-
tionships or, in other words, to what extent and just how do
they indicate substitution and complementarity? The answer
1Ibid
.
,
p. 66.
2See above pages 20-21.
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is found in the original definitions and in the logic of the
curves themselves.
• Perfectly competing or substitutable goods are defined
such that the ratio of their marginal utilities is constant.
Now we know from previous discussion that the slope of the
line at any point on an indifference curve indicates the
marginal utility of one good, the other being held constant.
For the ratio of the marginal utilities of the two goods to
be constant at every point on the curve, the curve must reduce
to a straight line and the system to a series of parallel
straight lines. ’’For perfect substitutes the curves reduce
to parallel straight lines whose intercepts on the A and B
axes are inversely proportional to the fixed ratio of their
marginal utilities.”
1
As an example of this Fisher gives the
case of "Lehigh” and "Lakawana" anthracite coal which are
nearly perfect substitutes. "If it cost nothing the indi-
vidual would indifferently consume the quantity of one or the
other or any combination of the two on the straight line 99
inclined in this case at 45 degrees." Here the goods are
perfectly substitutable in such a way that as one moves along
a given curve an equal number of units of one will exchange
for an equal number of units of the other. But at this point
1Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of
Value and Prices
,
op . clt .
,
p. 71.
2Ibid.
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PERFECTLY COMPLETING GOODS
DIAGRAM 15
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there is a certain ambiguity which clouds the logic of the
reasoning. According to the definition of the perfect case
the only requirement is that the curves reduce to straight
lines whose intercepts are inversely proportional to the
fixed ratio of their marginal utilities. In the example above
the requirements of the definition are met and the lines in-
cline at 45 degrees. Yet it is possible for these same condi-
tions to be satisfied and have the lines incline other than
at 45 degrees. For example, nickles and dimes may be con-
sidered as almost perfect substitutes in a ratio of two for
one.'
1
’ In this case the indifference curves would become paral-
lel lines inclining at roughly 54 degrees, the degree of in-
clination indicating the two for one relationship. From the
definition this type of substitution is possible. However,
no discussion on this possibility appears and therefore it
is not clear whether the curves in this limiting case take
on meaning Fisher intended for them. In the example above
the "in this case" qualification may allow for a two for one
substitution relationship but if Fisher felt that such a
relationship comes within the area of his definition, he
should have discussed the point since it makes a great dif-
ference in the essential nature of the concept. If, on the
1This example Is given by Stigler, Theory of Price
,
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p. 72. Stigler’ s curves do not necessarily incline at
45 degrees.
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other hand, he felt that perfect substitution can occur only-
on a one for one basis, then his definition should state that
the ratios of the marginal utilities tend to maintain a con-
stant ratio of unity. It may be that Fisher himself was not
quite sure about the precise meaning of the concept. At any
rate it is not clear from his discussion just what was in-
tended. In spite of this, however, it should be recognized
that this was the first attempt made in this direction and
as such it pointed the way. From it we can derive a basic
understanding of the concept and how it is to be treated with
the use of the indifference tool. We see clearly that the
essential characteristic of substitution is indicated by the
flatness or lack of flatness of the indifference curves. The
conclusion must follow that for articles which are more or
less substitutable the curves will be more or less flat.
For completing articles the reasoning is similar. The
more curvature to the curves the more will the articles be
complementary. This follows somewhat from his definition
of the limiting case. The essential nature of perfect com-
plementarity is such that the ratio of the quantities con-
sumed is constant. Here the "whole family of indifference
curves" reduces to a straight line passing through the origin.
If we regard right shoes and left shoes as two distinct com-
modities, then the desire for right shoes vanishes as long
as left shoes are not admitted. The marginal utility for
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right shoes has no application though that for pairs of shoes
has."^ In the diagram which Fisher uses to illustrate this
case his line of the family of curves is inclined at a 45
degree angle. As in the case of substitution the discussion
here is inadequate, but for clarity it must be stated that
it is quite possible for goods to be associated in any quan-
titative relationship. For example, some people use two
teaspoons of sugar for each cup of coffee. Assuming that this
were a perfect case the line of the curves would be inclined
at roughly 54 degrees rather than 45. Here again the discus-
sion is not clear.
It is quite evident that while Fisher felt he had to
treat the problem, he did so only in a cursory fashion. It
is not that his reasoning does not follow from his defini-
tions but that it is very incomplete; also even aside from
the ambiguity which we have just treated, there are many other
possibilities which are not accounted for. Complete relation-
ships between the limiting cases are not explained. For exam-
ple, what happens to marginal utilities in the completing case
is not answered. The relationship of degrees of substitutabili-
ty and complementarity is vague. Mhat Fisher has done is to
present a tool which has possibilities, but he admits that
^Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of
Value and Prices
,
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the relationships are not simple. "Articles may be competing
at some combinations and completing at others."'1' He suggests
that statistical inquiries might be made to clear up some of
the difficulties. It is apparent that he himself was not too
clear about the problem and that there are many intricacies
still to be worked out.
Yet in spite of this there is a definite value to Fisher's
work. He has set up definitions and then reasoned on the
basis of them. While his reasoning is not as complete as one
would like, to the extent that he has carried it out, it is
correct. Whether the results or the definitions on which these
results are based are adequate is quite another question. Ob-
viously there is room for improvement in the establishment of
definitions which more adequately describe the true relation-
ships. But Fisher's work is a step forward. It contains the
seeds to the theory which was to flourish later.
A further point is necessary before we leave the discus-
sion of Fisher. It will be recalled from our previous inquiry
that Fisher sought to objectlvize the theory of value, and
that he thought he had attained this by the use of the indif-
ference analysis. Total utility was done away with. The eco-
nomic world was to be filled only with lines of force or
"maximum directions" in the orbit of which all economic
1
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motivation transpired. Indifference analysis, then, became
the tool by which objective theory could prevail. To a large
extent this was true, for it enabled Fisher to do away with
many of the purely hedonistic elements which had been firmly
embedded in past theory; but it was not entirely so. There
was still something lacking in his objectivity. Particularly
is this apparent in his treatment of related goods. The defini
tion of substitutability is framed in terms of marginal utility
which is certainly a utility concept. The definition of com-
plementarity is based on the ratio of quantity. But while this
itself is not utilitarian, the area between the limiting cases
is in some manner dependent on marginal utility. The line of
demarcation where marginal utility ceases to be factor and
quantity begins to dominate is not thoroughly explained, but
there is somehow a tie-up, and in it the utility concept
definitely seems to predominate. The significance of the ob-
jectivity is therefore diminished, for while some things can
be explained by lines of force, the theory of related goods
had to be explained in utilitarian terms. T0 this extent ob-
jectivity Is lacking. If it is possible to work out an objec-
tive theory of value, then certainly the problem of related
goods, which is only one small phase of this theory, should
be able to be stated in the same objective terms. From the
"^See above, pages 23-24.
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nature of Fisher's assumptions this was impossible and there-
fore a truly objective use of the indifference tool could not
be accomplished.
Pareto
Economists have come to associate the indifference tool
with the problem of related goods, and with these they have
also associated the name of Pareto, for it was he who developed
the first significant theory of related goods with the aid of
indifference analysis. It almost appears that Pareto developed
the indifference curve expressly for its application in this
problem. We know, of course, that this was not so. Pareto
took the tool from Edgeworth and after significant alteration
he saw in it a valuable tool for the explanation of related
goods. His accomplishment in this respect consists in the
fact that he saw immediately that it was a means of treating
the utility of one good in relation to that of another and
that he proceeded to work out precise relationships, To a
considerable extent this was also true of Fisher, but Pareto
attached much more importance to the aspect of dependence and
his treatment is thus much further developed. His discussion
accounts for many of the intricacies which Fisher felt might
be cleared up by statistical inquiry. His conceptual discus-
sion of complementarity and substitutability are classic.
His use of the indifference curves and particularly the
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thoroughness of his theory account for the long period, of time
in which it went unchallenged.
It will be remembered from our previous discussion that
the theory of economic equilibrium was established by resolving
equilibrium price out of the conflict of tastes and obstacles.
The same over-all results had been attained through a different
channel by Marshall, but Pareto, through the use of indifference
analysis, achieved in many respects a more inclusive theory.
Particularly is this so with the theory of individual consumer
demand where , besides attaining fuller results, he was able to
treat the problem of related goods which Marshall mentioned
only incidentally as a relevant phase of individual demand.
As we did in the discussion on Fisher, we begin first by
examining basic definitions. But in the case of Pareto, there
are certain basic conceptual considerations to be examined
which account for his definitions. It is there to which we
turn.
^
/ / .
The utility ( ophelimite ) , which is attained from the
consumption of a given quantity of goods, may be dependent or
independent of other goods consumed. In the case of inde-
pendent goods the utility will be the same regardless of what
other goods are consumed. This was the situation which
^The following discussion of the conceptual nature of the
complementary and substitute relationships Is based on Chapter
IV of the Manuel d'Economle Politique . Sections 1-42.
'.
. HT '
114
Marshall established by definition and from which he evolved
the law of diminishing marginal utility. But this situation
does not always prevail. Usually the relationship is one of
dependence; that is, the utility attained by a given consump-
tion depends on the consumption of other goods. Pareto dis-
tinguishes two types of dependence: that which arises from
the fact that the utility of one good is in direct relation
with that of another, and that which arises from the fact that
one good can be substituted for another and produce the same
individual sensation. Broadly speaking we call the first com-
plementarity and the second substitution.
Complementarity is a relationship of necessity; that is,
for goods to produce utility they must be joined to others in
the consumption process. The extent of the dependence will
depend on the accompanying circumstances. A person dying of
hunger will not demand fine service wear if he is given food.
He probably will ask for food regardless of the service wear
or any other trimmings which usually accompany food. Here the
dependence is destroyed because of an accompanying circum-
stance. But similarly it is possible for peculiar dependen-
cies to be established because of extenuating circumstances.
In general while peculiar conditions are recognized as having
an effect on the types of dependence, if the effect is not
unusual, if the variations are small, these conditions can be
disregarded and the relationship simplified so that utility
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of one good depends only on the fact that it must be associated
with an other in a certain quantitative measure.
But even on this basis limitation is necessary. The whole
concept of complementary goods can be a very extended one.
For example, sugar and coffee may be considered dependent on
each other in a quantitative relationship. But so is the cup,
saucer, table, chair, house, and land, which are also used so
that coffee or sugar may be consumed. Here we must limit the
concept, because the extended cases while plausible have little
effect. In reality, the utility of houses has little effect
on the utility of sugar, and a change in the price of one will
have no bearing on the price of the other. What we do is to
recognize that the extended relationship is present, but when
the effects are so minimized, when the variations are so small,
as to be entirely insignificant, we merely treat the other
goods as given and consider only the quantitative aspects.
Substitution is also a relationship of dependence but in
a different manner. Man can clothe himself with cotton, wool,
rayon, and silk. To a certain extent these are all substitutes
and there is a general preference of one for the other. But
the preference Is a particular type. It refers not to taste
alone, but also to the particular need to be satisfied. Cot-
ton and silk, for example, can be used interchangeably in
certain circumstances. Generally silk is preferred to cotton,
but for many needs cotton will be superior to silk; that is,
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it will do a better job than silk. A given consumption com-
bination will then be effected not only by taste, but also
by the need of the consumer. If we consider just tastes alone,
then the situation is given on the indifference curve and a
theory of substitutable goods is not necessary. But the fact
that people consider both effects the shape of indifference
curves and thus necessitates a separate treatment for related
goods
.
Also out of this is born a hierarchy of goods. If A B C
are capable of satisfying a particular need, the amounts of
each used will depend on the relative financial well-being of
the consumer. The consumer may prefer B to A, but because it
is too expensive he uses A. As his income increases he will
be able to use B and as It increases more he may use C.
1
The
goods which are used at the higher income levels are referred
to as superior, those at the lower levels inferior. If the
hierarchy is considered in Its complete amplitude, it may be
extended almost Indefinitely. We may consider different quali-
ties of bread, then go on to different qualities of meat,
drinks, etc., each satisfying hunger but varying, in so far
^Pareto recognizes here the problem of inferior goods
which we discussed previously. He does not attack this with
the use of indifference curves, but in his discussion he does
show how the increase in income will cause less of the inferior
good to be consumed. Out discussion below went further than
that. It showed the drop In quantity consumed of the inferior
good as a result of the drop of price of that good; that is,
the drop in price set up an income effect. See Manue 1 d ’Econo -
mi e Politique
.
pp. 258, 274. Below pp. 56-57.
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as they are substituted, as income changes. As was the case
in complementarity, the concept here must be limited. Either
we can consider only those cases where the effects are very
important, or we can take pairs of substitutes and consider
the others as given. But no matter how it is done the concept
must be limited so that only those elements will be considered
which will make up a useful theory.
In almost every economic problem the element of time is
a factor. Pareto recognizes this with regard to the problem
of related goods and he attempts to treat it. However, his
treatment adds nothing to the development of a dynamic system
and his theory remains essentially static. He shows how chang-
ing conditions over a period of time bring about changes in
tastes. To be very exact any change considered in relation to
time is a radical one. "An individual on the morrow is not
the same as he was the day before." 1 But for economic purposes
this Heraclitian approach is not useful for one need not be so
exact. It is sufficient to divide the changes in time into
the long run and short run and consider the effects. In the
long run one cannot compare the new curves with the old, be-
cause there will have been a change which has come about.
The long run infers this change. The short run on the other
hand excludes any change so that the indifference curves remain
the same. This technique is of course not new and to the extent
1Ibid
.
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that it is so used by Pareto one can probably agree with him.
However, it is very possible that one may disagree with his
notion of the length of time involved in the short run. He
suggests for the group curve a period of two or even four or
five years, the idea being that in the long run changes must
have sufficient time to work themselves out. His example is
an assumed change in taste by the Italian people in their
consumption of coffee and tea. A change of this sort may
perhaps require five years to come about, and in the light
of the above technique any period less would have to be con-
sidered as a short run. However, there is an element of gradu
al change which enters, and this I feel is important, especial
ly since the individual indifference curves are almost instan-
taneous. A period of five years is rather long for a short
run period. However, as this technique is used it would have
to be so considered.
Aware now of the ramifications of the concepts and their
limitations, Pareto proceeds to examine them in relation to
marginal utility analysis. For this purpose he makes a very
necessary assumption; namely
,
that the individual always knows
whether the change in utility due to the transition from com-
bination I to II is greater or less than the change from com-
bination II to III. This assumption is highly significant for
in Pareto's mind it allowed the comparison of marginal utili-
ties on an objective scale of preferences with utility
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considered as a quantity only. The assumption does not say
by how much one transition is greater or less than another;
it merely assumes that the individual knows which he prefers.
It will be remembered from the development of the curves that
the slope of the tangent to an indifference curve at a given
point indicated the marginal utility of one good at that point.
Now with the assumed curves Pareto still needed some device
which would give meaning to marginal utility and yet not have
the utilitarian aspects of marginal utility. This was accom-
plished, so he thought, by the above assumption, because by
it Pareto could still refer to marginal utility without bring-
ing in any direct measurement.'1' It accomplished what he was
seeking
.
Having laid the necessary foundation Pareto now estab-
lished his definitions of the different aspects of related
goods. He considers first an increase in B, A remaining the
same. If A and B are complementary an increase in B, A re-
maining the same, will generally bring about a decrease in
the marginal utility of B. Also if they are substitutes , an
increase in B, A the same, will decrease the marginal utility
of B. To this point he is merely repeating the law of di-
minishing marginal utility. But he then asks, what happens
^It is at this point that Pareto compromises his objec-
tivity, for actually this assumption indirectly admits the
measurability of utility. See above pages 39-42.
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to the marginal utility of A when B is increased? And from
the answers to this question he derives his definitions of
substitution and complementarity. For goods that are com-
plementary an increase in the quantity of B will generally
increase the marginal utility of A. The pleasure derived
from one lamp added to others is greater the more oil one
has. Thus he defines complementarity such that an increase in
B raises the marginal utility of A. For substitutable goods
the relationship differs. If A can be substituted for B,
then the more B one has the less will be the marginal utility
of A. He therefore defines substitute goods such that an in-
crease in B decreases the marginal utility of A. These are
his definitions.
But immediately there arises the question of proof. From
the first assumption Pareto was able to treat variations in
marginal utilities objectively. Now that he has framed his
definitions in terms of these fluctuations, it becomes neces-
sary to examine them on the indifference map to see just how
they apply, and there should follow from the indifference map
a geometrical and economic proof. Before we do this, however,
it should be pointed out that by formulating the definitions
in terms of fluctuations of marginal utilities, Pareta has
adopted an approach which considers the two cases of dependency
as extremes on a scale. An increase in B brings about either
an increase or decrease In the marginal utility of A, and the
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condition of dependency is governed by that fluctuation.
This immediately sets up a scale on which one can place dif-
ferent degrees of dependency. Thus when we examine the defin-
itions in the light of the indifference map the scale of de-
grees should also be present.
For the proof on the indifference map Pareto begins with
the situation where the individual possesses two goods A and
B, but of these only A is useful to the individual. This is
admittedly a peculiar case, but it is entirely possible and
there is nothing wrong in using it as a starting point. It is
not a case of independent goods. The marginal utilities of the
two goods are dependent on each other, but one is a constant,
zero. Now, picturing this situation on the indifference map,
the hill of utility will rise from the B axis, the height in-
creasing at a decreasing rate. The hill will be in the form
of a cylindrical surface any section of which parallel to the
A axis will be indicated by the shaded area in Diagram 16.
Since the utility of B is zero the indifference curves will be
straight lines parallel to the B axis. For a given amount of
A In combination with any amount of B this shows the constant
utility required of the Indifference curve. Furthermore as
the quantity of A decreases, in combination with any quantity
of B, its marginal utility decreases. This follows from the
law of decreasing marginal utility and it is indicated on the
utility surface by the decreasing slope of the surface from
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c to to" . These so far are basic properties indicated by the
utility surface which follow from previous discussion.
In the next step Pareto examines the line of exchanges.
It will be remembered that this is formed by joining the points
of equilibrium, that is, the points of tangency between the
"sentiers" and the indifference curves. The situation here by
hypothecation is peculiar. The individual possesses B which
is not useful to him; he will, therefore, never demand it,
but he can always offer it. Thus the line of contracts is
different than that which we met before. If possessing vari-
ous quantities of A the individual never demands B, then that
line which indicates the various quantities of A and no B must
make up part of the line of contracts, for every point on it
is for the individual a point of equilibrium. Furthermore
since B is always given up and never demanded, its demand
price is zero. The price of A on the other hand depends on
the position of the curves a b, a'b', etc., and any point on
a given indifference curve, becomes a point of equilibrium.
The line of contracts then, depending on the price of A, is
made up of the A axis and the indifference curve.
We now come to another definition which accounts for
the peculiar situation from which the proof is started.
Pareto now defines complementary goods in the perfect case.
Here A and B are complementary only when they can be used in
combinations vigorously defined. The definition here in the
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perfect case is apparently different from the one given pre-
viously. It is now based on quantity rather than marginal
utility. Actually the two definitions are the same, for al-
though Pareto does not show it, the definition based on mar-
ginal utility does in the perfect case reduce quantitativity
to goods used in vigorously defined proportions. This will be
apparent from the proof. But on the basis of this definition
perfectly complementary goods are those dependent such they
can be enjoyed only in combinations vigorously defined. The
only quantities demanded will be those which meet this re-
quirement. The others, though possessed, will not be demanded
but they can be offered. On the indifference map the curves
in this case will be represented by straight lines which cut
each other at right angles (Diagram 17). The pleasure which
an individual derives on any indifference curve will be the
same. However, while different quantitative combinations of
A and B are possessed, it is only at c that the necessary
vigorously defined requirement is met precisely. It is met
also at all other points on the curve, but at these points
there is an excess of one good or the other, and being an
excess it is offered and not demanded. At c the requirement
is met exactly. We see therefore why Pareto started from the
peculiar case where goods are dependent but only one good is
useful. At every point on the perfectly complementary curve,
except at c, this situation prevails to some extent. Of
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course the utility of one good is not always zero, but it
remains at a given constant according to the defined propor-
tion required. Thus from this peculiar case which contains
the essential characteristics of the perfect case, he is
able to make the transition to the perfect case.
To proceed now with the proof, Pareto assumes for the
moment that A and B are not dependent but independent goods.
The marginal utility of A depends only on the quantity of A
and not on the quantity of B. Following the same method he
erects a surface for this situation (Diagram 18) . Here the
indifference curve (it is strictly speaking not an indifference
curve) is represented by ur . At any point along this curve
b, b’, b”
,
the marginal utility of A will be the same, because
the utility of A is independent of that of B. Expressing this
another way the slope of the surface at points b, b', b",
or bt, b’t', etc., will always be the same.
The final step in the proof consists of comparing the
two cases in Diagrams 17 and 18. In Diagram 17, the perfect
completing case, the marginal utility of A will be the same
from b to c, but from c to a it diminishes very quickly
becoming zero at a. This is different in Diagram 18 where
the goods are independent. Here the marginal utility of A
remains the same all along the curve. It must necessarily
follow then that Diagram 17 represents completing goods.
By itself it is the sum of two different dependencies of the
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type indicated in Diagram 16. But since each dependency
taken by itself is not an independent relationship of the type
in Diagram 18, then it must be a dependent relationship; and
since at point c it meets the vigorously defined proportion
then, it follows that the curve indicates the perfect comple-
mentary situation.
1
Thus by a rather intricate route Pareto
has indicated the nature of the indifference curve in one per-
fect case.
Fortunately, the other limit involves much less difficulty.
Here again Pareto does not utilize his definition based on
marginal utility, but resorts to a quantitative relationship.
A and B are perfect substitutes when a quantity of one can
replace a quantity of the other in exactly the same propor-
tion; for example, A and B are perfect substitutes if 4 of A
can substitute for 3 of B, 8 of A for 6 of B, etc. As in the
case of complementarity, this definition follows from the
previous one, although Pareto has not bothered to show how
it does in his context. On the basis of marginal utility
the previous definition for the perfect substitutable case
*"The proof here is a negative one. Since the slope of
the surface increases rapidly from c to a, it follows that
the goods in Diagram 17 represent dependent and not inde-
pendent goods. It might be objected here that the fact that
goods are not independent does not prove that they are de-
pendent. However, it will be remembered that the relation-
ships are classified by definition as dependent and inde-
pendent only, and if they are not independent, then it must
follow from the classification that they are dependent.
See Manuel d 'Economle Politique
,
p. 279.
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becomes: A is perfectly substitutable for B when an increase
in the quantity of B decreases the marginal utility of A in
the exact proportion that that of B has been increased. This
can be expressed quantitatively as we have done above.
Now translating this definition on to the indifference
map, it is found that in the perfect case, the curves become
straight lines parallel to each other; and their slope is
determined by the ratio in which they substitute for each other.
This follows directly from the definition, and without further
proof it becomes possible to indicate the nature of the curves
in the perfect case. It remains to point out incidentally
that in the position of equilibrium in the perfect case, the
line of contracts, or "sentier," will coincide with the indif-
ference curve
.
To this point Pareto has set up definitions of the perfect
cases at either end of the scale and he has indicated the na-
ture of the indifference curves in each case. The question
which follows is what happens in between these limits, and
here unfortunately Pareto is weak. His reasoning is merely
a glossing over of the situation. If the L-shaped curve
indicates perfect complementarity then it is this characteris-
tic of the curve which indicates complementarity to a greater
or lesser degree. Thus the more bent are curves the more do
they Indicate complementary goods, the less bent, the less
do they indicate complementary goods. Similarly for perfect
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substitution, the essential characteristic of the curve is
flatness; so the more flat the curves are the more substi-
tutable are the goods, the less flat the less substitutable.
It is at once obvious that Pareto’s work is lacking.
He has set up limits and to a reasonable degree has succeeded
in coinciding the indifference curves with his definitions in
these limits, but the area in between is sadly lacking. It
is not sufficient to glide over this area with a '’more or
less” reasoning, particularly since it is in this area that
the greatest actual number of relationships occur. While the
perfect case is necessary to the theory, in actuality it is
the exception. Pareto's theory is not wrong, but rather in-
adequate. However it has established certain parallels be-
tween his definitions and the indifference curves in the
limiting cases, and to this extent it adds something.
Allen
Allen recognized the difficulties inherent in Pareto's
treatment and his work was an attempt to correct them. His
approach, was somewhat different. Whereas Pareto first estab-
lished limits to a scale and tried to coincide the interven-
ing positions on the basis of these limits, Allen starts from
the middle of the scale and attempts to establish the positions
lThe substance of this section is based on Allen’s article,
"The Nature of Indifference Curves" in Review of Economic Stud-
ies
,
February, 1934. This work was done before AlTerTT'"collabo-
ration with Hicks and is therefore to be considered as an in-
dependent contribution.
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on each side. In so far as he utilizes the indifference
curve, Allen relies on Pareto's previous development. It
is only in his discussion of related goods that his approach
differs, thereby enabling him to add something new.
Allen considers first the case of completely independent
goods. This occurs when two goods X and. Y each make "separate
and independent" contributions to the utility function so that
the total utility function appears as the sum of two separate
and distinct functions. Ihis is somewhat different from
Pareto's use of the word and is therefore to be noted. As
in Pareto's sense the goods here are not related; that is,
there is no relation whatever between the marginal utilities
of X and Y. For each good by itself the law of decreasing
marginal utility applies. hut whereas Pareto considers each
good by itself and arrives at the perfectly straight indif-
ference curve of Diagram 18
,
Allen considers the two goods
together so that for a particular combination the total utili-
ty of the two goods is made up of the sum of the separate
utilities of each, or the total marginal utility of the com-
bination is made up of the sum of the separate marginal utili-
ties of each.
To attain his ends Allen requires two basic assumptions.
He assumes first that the second derivative of each utility
function is always negative; that is, that the marginal utili-
ty of each good decreases as the quantity of that good
• y r. *» a f , . • . • r
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Increases, the law of decreasing marginal utility. Secondly
he assumes that the marginal utility of X becomes zero at a
definite saturation value of X and. that this value is related
to Y so that at that point it is a function of Y. In other
words the marginal utility of X varies from a positive value
to zero to a negative value. Similarly the marginal utility
of Y becomes zero at a definite saturation value of Y such
that at that point it is functionally related to X. Now
strictly speaking these assumptions are not necessary, "but
they are appropriate to a 'normal' type of individual behav-
ior. As Allen explains, it is quite possible to assume that
the marginal utility of X and Y increase as their quantities
increase, but for the sake of convenience it is better to use
the opposite assumption since it is required that certain por-
tions of the indifference curves be convex to the origin, a
fact which follows on the above assumption.
On the basis of these assumptions Allen examines the
utility surface in the case of independent goods. Utilizing
the three dimensional device the utility surface appears in
the form of a hill. Those sections perpendicular to the
utility ordinate and parallel to the base will be the con-
tours of the hill recognizable as indifference curves. But
here special attention is given to the vertical planes, those
-^Ibld
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perpendicular to OX or OY. It is assumed that a constant
value is given to Y; then in this case the utility becomes a
function of X only. On the utility hill this will appear as
the section of the hill made by the plane perpendicular to
OY at the given value for Y. This section of the surface will
show the variation in utility height corresponding to various
amounts of X at the given amount of Y. As the given value of
Y changes a series of such sections will be obtained each of
the same form but varying in height. On any section, the
slope of the tangent at any point on the surface is the mar-
ginal utility of X. (Since utility depends on the amount of
X only for a given value of Y, it is a function of X only and
the marginal utility is indicated by the first derivative of
that function or the slope of the tangent to the surface.)
Now on the basis of the assumptions made above each curved
section will rise at a decreasing rate up to the saturation
value of X after which it falls. Each section then has some
maximum value for X, the saturation value where the marginal
utility changes from positive to negative. Similarly con-
sidering the vertical planes perpendicular to OX for given
constant values of X, there will be a series of saturation
values for Y. Now joing these saturation values to form a
continuous line, the utility surface appears as a hill with
two Intersecting "ridge lines." As we shall see these ridge
lines are important for they represent a new aspect of the
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indifference tool which will allow for further insight into
the problem. Each ridge line by itself consists of the high-
est points of the sections perpendicular to it and thus gives
the partial saturation point for each good separately. Every
point on the ridge line is a point of complete saturation for
one good, where the marginal utility for that good is zero;
then the point of intersection of the ridge lines is the point
of complete saturation for both goods, the peak of the hill.
Reverting now to the two dimensional system of indiffer-
ence curves, Allen introduces on these curves the new idea of
ridge lines. The indifference system appears now as in Diagram
19. It shows the indifference curves in relation to the com-
plete saturation point c, with the partial saturation lines
AA’ and BB’ intersecting at c. The OXY plane is divided by
these lines into 4 areas, the characteristic of each being
the sign of the marginal utility function of each good.
It can be shown from the assumptions made above that in
three of these regions at least one of the signs of the mar-
ginal utility of X or Y will be negative. However, in the
rectangular area OBCA both are positive. This area Allen calls
the "effective" region. It is in this region that the indif-
ference curves are always negatively sloped and convex to the
origin. Any point moving parallel to the OX axis will cross
indifference curves in an increasingly higher order of utility
up to the line AA ’ . beyond AA' the order of utility decreases.
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The parallel line described by this point crosses higher in-
difference curves until it becomes tangent to the highest
indifference curve at AA' . Beyond AA' the line crosses de-
creasing curves in reverse order. Similarly a point moving
parallel to OY will cross higher indifference curves to the
saturation line BB' beyond which the curves decrease. The
significant fact in this is that it is only in the effective
region that both lines will cross increasingly higher curves.
Thus viewing the whole area of the indifference system, we
see the validity of Allen's use of the term "effective"
region, for this is really the only region to be considered.
This is brought out further when it is understood that in
general the purchases of the individual are small compared
with the saturation values. For most purposes the saturation
values can be taken as infinite so that only a small portion
of the system within the effective region is required. This
takes the form of Diagram 20 developed by Pareto which is
the conventional form of the indifference system. Within
this partial area the curves are negatively sloped and convex
to the origin. As either X or Y tends toward infinity, the
curves tend to become parallel to the respective axis. Thus
the conventional form is broadened by an additional perspec-
tive .
So far only the case of completely independent goods
has been considered. But in general goods enter into
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consumption in various related ways so that usually the mar-
ginal utility of one is directly dependent on that of another
(or of several others). Considering two goods X and Y, the
marginal utility of X and that of Y depends now on the amounts
of both X and Y possessed. The utility function is no longer
a mere summation of the marginal utilities of each but rather
an expression containing values of both, the variations in
which are obtained only by using the partial derivative form.
Under this situation, saturation values for both goods exist,
as they did before, but they are not constant values through-
out; that is, the ridge lines are not perpendicular to the
axes. The value of X which makes the marginal utility of X
vanish will depend on a constant value of Y in the partial
derivative, but this will be a varying constant value; that
is, the ridge lines will take different directions depending
on the way the goods are related. Under this method then the
relationships are regarded more readily according to the
twisting and turning of the ridge lines. There are, however,
certain essential characteristics which are still preserved.
The concept of the effective region still applies. Within
this region the indifference curves are negatively sloped
and convex to the origin. Also the indifference curves in-
crease in higher order the closer they get to the complete
saturation point c. Finally at all points where the indif-
ference curves cut the ridge lines, tangents at these points
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will be parallel to the axes. For the exact form the ridge
lines and indifference curves take in every case it is neces-
sary to know the exact nature of the relationship between two
goods. Allen does not attempt to examine all possibilities.
However, he does indicate the two cases which are typical of
the two general classes of related goods.
In the first case the marginal utility of XY, ^ , is
1
Xy
positive at all points. The marginal utility of X increases
as the amount of Y increases and the goods are complementary.
Here the ridge lines bounding the effective region are posi-
tively sloped so that the saturation value of X is greater
the greater the amount of Y possessed, and conversely. This
is diagramed in Diagram 21. It will be noted that within the
effective region the basic elements of the indifference sys-
tem, previously attained, will still apply. However, the
variation in the slope of the curves within the effective
region will differ. In this case the slope becomes flatter
as the tangent to the curve moves parallel to the X axis and
steeper as it moves parallel to the Y axis. The significant
characteristic of the relationship is indicated thus not only
by the direction of the ridge lines but also by the shape of
the curves within the effective region, as shown by the varia-
tion in the slope of the tangent to the curves.
In the other case. Diagram 22, the goods are competitive.
Here the marginal utility of XY, 0 is negative at all points,xy
j
^0 is the second derivative of the marginal utility
function*^
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and the marginal utility of X decreases as the amount pos-
sessed of Y increases. The ridge lines bounding the effec-
tive region are negatively sloped sipce the saturation value
of X is greater the smaller the amount of Y possessed. The
essential form of the system is the same as in the case above
with the exception that the ridge lines are negatively sloped
and the shape of the curves is different. The slope of the
tangent to the curves will be flatter as the point moves
parallel to the X axis and steeper as it moves parallel to
the Y axis, but the change in the slope is not as sudden or
in other words the curve itself is flatter. Allen has thus
established two criteria to express the nature of the relation-
ship. The first is the sign of the second derivative, d
,
i
y
the second is the direction of the ridge lines. But for the
most part these criteria are similar to those of Pareto. The
point in question is how they differ.
It will be remembered that Pareto's definitions were
based on the variations of marginal utilities. By framing
his definitions in these terms Pareto assumed the existence
of a total utility function. As was previously pointed out,
Pareto compromised at this point on the question of measura-
bility. He evidently overlooked the fact that the marginal
lit is to be noted that the ridge lines need not be
straight lines as shown in the figures. They can be curves,
but they must lie in directions which will form either an
acute or obtuse angle, as is called for by the nature of
the relationship.
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utility expression becomes indeterminate because it depends
solely on the existence of a total utility function which
itself is indeterminate if the indifference curves are assumed
as given, the way he does. Allen recognized this and attempted
to construct his definitions so that the criteria of comple-
mentarity and substitution would be independent of the existence
of a utility function and the indeterminateness of that func-
tion.'*' He does this by elaborating on an idea first developed
2 ' -
by Johnson. Instead of assuming indifference curves as Pareto
did, Allen assumes continuous marginal utility functions. On
the bases of these functions the scale of preferences or in-
difference system can be represented by ratios of marginal
utilities so that in the relationship of any two goods the ex-
pression - x will indicate the direction of preference. In
P y
this way he arrives at the same indifference curve and can
still use the variation of the slope to explain the relation-
ship between goods. This is a definite theoretical improve-
ment over the work of Pareto.
In so far as he is theoretically more precise, Allen
improves over Pareto. But essentially he adds nothing to the
solution of the central problem, for the same difficulties
*366 R. G. D. Allen, "A Comparison Between Different
Definitions of Complementary and Competitive Goods," Econo -
metrics
,
April, 1934, pp. 168-175.
^Johnson, ojd. clt
.
,
pp. 495-496.
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which existed after Pareto's work are still present. Even
with the use of ridge lines it is impossible to coincide a
particular relationship with a particular shape of indiffer-
ence curve or slope of the ridge lines. The degree of shading
from one case to the other and the particular degree still
present a problem. Allen has explored certain ramifications
of the indifference system and in so doing has given addi-
tional understanding to the meaning of the concepts involved
in the problem of related goods, but on the whole his work
is not too far advanced over that of Fareto.
On the question of measurability of utility it should be
clearly understood that, although Allen's assumption was more
precise than Pareto's, he still did not avoid the use of the
immeasurable concept. Marginal utility, whether it is assumed
in the form of ratios of continuous functions or merely de-
rived from a total utility function, cannot be measured, for
it involves a type of introspective data which is incapable
of objective expression. In terms of the two basic assump-
tions discussed at the end of Chapter II, it assumes that
the individual can compare gains between transitions from
different combinations. Such gains, of course, aside from
the fact that they can be expressed only through introspec-
tion, are meaningless, for the individual in maximizing his
position will always seek the highest combination, however
small the gain may be. Allen attempted to avoid this pitfall.
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but it is quite evident that at this stage he was not fully
aware of the psychological implication which his new assump-
tion entailed. However, the difficulty of measurement (mathe-
matically the determinateness of the second order derivative)
was not what held back further development in the field. To
be sure this was vital to the problem, but it was not the key.
The light which led to the Hicksian development came from the
reworking of the indifference analysis on the basis of new
definitions which did not include marginal utility, but the
real key to the Hicksian development (which was recognized by
Allen and Hicks in collaboration) came from a fuller under-
standing of the relationships of the concepts of complemen-
tarity and substitutability, particularly in so far as money
entered. We shall examine this in the following section.
Hicks on Complementarity
The traditional treatment of related goods has been in
terms of utility, but as we saw in Chapter III, Hicks did away
with the utilitarian concepts and replaced them with concepts
of substitution which were similar in purpose. But having
done away with fluctuating marginal utilities, he also dis-
posed of the criteria for substitutability and complementarity.
If he had replaced fluctuations in marginal utilities by
fluctuations in marginal rates of substitution, he could
perhaps treat the case of two goods where one substitutes
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for the other, but the moment he attempts to treat comple-
mentarity this breaks down, because the fluctuations of the
marginal rate of substitution cannot explain complementarity
unless it is known what each good substitutes for. Under
the new concepts a common denominator is clearly necessary.
This is found in money, whatever its form. It may be in
the form of legal tender as is customary or it may be in the
form of some third good which serves as a yardstick. But
whatever the form there must be a third comparable.
The necessity for the third good which serves as a basis
of comparison is a direct result of the changing of diminsh-
ing marginal utility into diminishing marginal rate of sub-
stitution. Hicks wanted a definition of substitute goods
which would make absolutely certain that an extra unit of
the same physical commodity was a substitute for preceding
units. The definition of substitute goods on the basis of
fluctuating marginal utilities did not afford this certainty
of unitary substitution because the marginal utility of money
was not considered. (It was assumed to be constant.) But
by using the third good as a denominator of comparison the
marginal utility of money is considered. It is definite then
that an additional unit of X will lower the marginal rate of
substitution of X for money; that is, the additional unit of
X will be a definite substitute for the preceding units.
Considering X and Y (money) on the indifference map, an
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additional unit of X definitely lowers the marginal rate of
substitution of X for money if X is substituted for money in
such a way as to leave the consumer no better off than before.
This results from the law of diminishing marginal rate of
substitution (between X and money) . Therefore in defining
substitute goods it readily follows that Y i_s a substitute
for X i_f the marginal rate of substitution of Y for money is
diminished when X i_s substituted for money in such a way as
to leave the consumer no better off than before ; for if sub-
stituting X for money lowers the marginal rate of substitution
of X for money, and if substituting Y for money lowers the
marginal rate of substitution of Y for money, then, if by the
definition X and Y are substitutes, when the marginal rate of
substitution of one is lowered it must induce a lowering of
the marginal rate of substitution of the other. This follows
from the principle of diminishing marginal rate of substitu-
tion and the use of the third good as a medium of comparison.
For complementary goods the definition follows along the same
lines, but in a different direction. Y is_ complementary with
X if the substitution of X for money Increases the marginal
rate of substitution of Y for money in such a way as to leave
the consumer no better off than before . Here the substitution
of X for money induces a change in the marginal rate of sub-
stitution of Y for money, but in the opposite direction.
~
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These definitions are complicated, but when digested it
will be seen that they clarify the meaning of two phases of
related goods. In comparison to the previous definitions they
certainly are free from quantitative utility measurement. Yet
they can be tied together. The Edgeworth-Pareto definition
was based on the assumption that the marginal utility of money
was constant. Treating the effect of the change in marginal
utility of one good on another, it was necessary to make this
assumption, or to infer it, in order to rule out the effect of
1
any change in the marginal utility of money. Therefore on the
new definitions, if it is assumed that the marginal utility of
money is constant, that is, no income effects will be wrought
by changes In the marginal utility of money, then they will
reduce to the previous definitions. But it is one of the im-
provements of the new definitions that they can be applied in
cases where the marginal utility of money cannot be assumed
to be constant.
The new definitions are more easily understood If they
are translated into Marshallian terms. From our early discus-
sion it will be remembered that the marginal rate of substitu-
tion of X for Y is in effect what Marshall calls the marginal
o
utility of X in terms of Y. Transcribing this into the present
do not find any direct reference in Pareto where he
specifically makes this assumption, but it certainly is inferred.
p
See above, page 50.
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terminology, if we let Y be money, the marginal utility of
X in terms of money is equal to price, which in Hicksian
terminology is equal to the marginal rate of substitution of
X commodity for money.
1
This will help in understanding the
new definitions, for they take on a clearer meaning in
Marshallian terms. If In the previous definitions we now
put the word ’’price" in place of "marginal rate of substitu-
tion of money" they become: Y is a substitute for X if the
(demand) price of Y is diminished when X is substituted for
money in such a way as to leave the consumer no better off
than before. Y is complementary with X if the (demand) price
of Y is raised when X is substituted for money. Clearly then
the idea is that in the case of substitute goods an increase
in X lowers its price so that more of X is demanded. As in-
come is fixed this causes less Y to be demanded so that the
price of Y drops. With complementary goods the increase in
X lowers its price, allowing more of It to be purchased.
This in turn induces an increase in the demand for Y thereby
raising its price. In Marshallian terms therefore the dif-
ference between the two cases depends on whether the increase
of X which accompanies its drop in price induces an increase
or a decrease In the price of Y and also the quantity of It
demanded. But all this is based on the premise that the
•^Hicks, Value and Capital
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marginal utility of money is constant. If we remove this
premise, then the marginal utility of X in terms of money is
not equal to the price (income effects now enter) and Hicks'
more complicated definitions become necessary.
Having established new definitions it now is necessary
to see what kind of a theory can be derived from them. And
oddly enough there are some peculiar consequences. It will
be remembered that one of the immediate results of Pareto's
development of the indifference analysis was that it served
to throw some light on the problem of related goods. How,
however, on the basis of the new definitions, the indifference
tool is of little use. By its very nature it is useful only
when the consumer is assumed to spend his income on two com-
modities. This means that it is applied generally to treat
the demand for one commodity and all others (money) . For this
type of problem the indifference analysis is very informative.
It allows a more thorough explanation than Marshall's method
since it also includes income effects. But for the problem
of related goods it fails almost completely for this problem
cannot be treated on the two dimensional indifference map.
It needs three dimensions to represent the three goods, X, Y,
and money, the common denominator of exchange. Since the tool
which formerly facilitated explanation now does not apply,
the theory must be represented in ordinary words.
^
lit can be represented in algebra. See ibid . , Appendix,
Chapter 3.
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In the explanation of the income and substitution effects
.
set out in the discussion of the theory of demand, it was seen
how the effects set up by a fall in the price of a given good,
exert themselves on the demand for that good, Now it is neces-
sary to see how they work out in the general rearrangement of
the consumer’s expenditure, particularly in the expenditure
on those goods which are related in consumption. First let us
repeat the results previously attained.
A fall in the price of X reacts on the demand for X and
for other goods through two effects, the income effect and the
substitution effect. The income effect treats the conditions
where the fall in the price of X acts like an increase in in-
come. It tends to increase the demand for every good consumed,
except inferior goods. If the proportion of income spent on
X is small, the income effect will be small and will have lit-
tle influence on the demand for X or for other goods. The
substitution effect, on the other hand, involves a substitution
in favor of X and against other goods. If all other goods are
lumped together and treated as a composite commodity, the sub-
stitution effect tends to decrease the demand for the composite
commodity. It does not decrease the demand for each good taken
separately but it does decrease the demand for all goods lumped
together
.
Now If, according to the new definition of complementarity,
X is complementary with Y, one good out of the composite, then
o' lO'l $Jh ’ :o ;$ r . . . 1& i'rt
ill ih w mod &ee \'ib«
.
d . Lf ‘ -•£; ‘ . ' t.
•i • t: x 90 Jt r; r ;1 £ - a
. rboc
.
T J 1 . OO. , ::..T ' C : ‘1 . •;•
... J - _ •
• ri
'
. rre iSz e :jt
. I
'
'
.
1 '
_
r:
-
• ~
‘
'
'
<
147
it is known that if Y is held constant, a substitution in favor
of X and against money (a decrease in the marginal rate of
substitution of X for money or a fall in the price of X) will
raise the marginal rate of substitution of Y for money. This
follows right from the definition itself. But the price of Y
is assumed constant, therefore an increase in the marginal
rate of substitution of Y for money tends to encourage a sub-
stitution of Y for money so that the marginal rate of substi-
tution of Y for money is kept equal to its price . 1 In other
words a fall in the price of X tends to encourage an increase
in the price of Y or in terms of the present definitions, if
Y is complementary with X, a substitution in favor of X tends
2
to be accompanied by a similar substitution in favor of Y.
But if Y is a substitute for X, then according to the
definition a substitution in favor of X and against money (Y
constant) tends to encourage a substitution against Y and in
favor of money. In other words the substitution in favor of
X induces a substitution against Y.
-*-The marginal rate of substitution between X and Y is
proportional to the prices of X and Y, but the marginal rate
of substitution of X and money is equal to the price of X.
O
if the price of Y is kept constant, the decrease in the
marginal rate of substitution of X for money lowering its
price cannot raise the price of Y but it does increase the
marginal rate of substitution of Y for money which, when Y
is allowed to vary, will tend to raise its price. The mar-
ginal rate of substitution of a good for money and the price
of that good are not the same thing. When the marginal utili-
ty of money is assumed constant as in the Marshallian analy-
sis, then they are the same. But Hicks makes no such assump-
tion so that it is possible to hold the price of Y constant
and allow the marginal rate of substitution of Y for money to
vary
.
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Now what is the connection between this type of substi-
tution, that which is opposed to complementarity, and that
which was discussed earlier? The distinction between the two
cases, when made as above, clears this up, for it can now be
said that they are the same. When a consumer divides his in-
come between two goods only, the purchase of all others being
ruled out, then a substitution relation is the only relation
that can exist. This applies above with regard to the mar-
ginal rate of substitution of a good and money. If the con-
sumer is to have more of one and still be no better off than
before, then he must have less of the other. This works out
particularly well on the indifference map. But when income
is divided between more than two goods other relationships are
possible. Let us assume three goods X, Y and Z with Y and Z
both substitutes for X. An increase in X can only be made
against Y and Z, if the requisities of the problem are to be
maintained; namely, that the consumer is left no better off
than before and that the marginal rates of substitution be-
tween other goods remain unchanged. But this substitution is
made against each good taken separately. Yet it is quite pos-
sible that for the two requisites to be satisfied, one of
these goods must be increased. This occurs if either Y or Z
is complementary with X. In this case, however, the increase
in Y, if Y is complementary with X, will be made at the ex-
pense of Z, for Y and Z taken together as composite must
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decrease. Thus It is seen why complementarity does not arise
on the indifference map. X and Y can only be complementary
if there is some third good at whose expense the substitution
of both X and Y takes place, and the indifference map, since
it is a two dimensional device, cannot show this third good.
Obviously then, the essence of indifference analysis is sub-
stitution, the same type of substitution which is defined in
our definition above. Indeed it is the definitions of com-
plementarity and substitution, as opposed to it, which bring
this out and which tie together the two types of substitution.
The key to the Hicksian treatment of related goods lies
in the recognition that complementarity is possible only at
the expense of a third good and also in the introduction of
money as the good at whose expense substitution takes place.
Considering three goods X, Y, and money, if X and Y are com-
plementary there must be a third good against which substitu-
tion takes place. If X and money substitute, then Y and money
must also substitute. Of four goods, X-Y-Z and money, X, Y,
and Z may be complementary, but if they are, each must be a
substitute for money. Thus no matter how many goods enter
into the consumer’s expenditure, if they are all complementary,
they all must substitute for money, or for some outside good.
This establishes a theroetical maximum limit of complementar-
ity. Of n goods, all may be complementary except one. The
limit of complementarity then Is n-1 goods. The other limit
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is a complete lack of complementarity. Of course in actuality
the most common cases will be those which come near the mini-
mum of complementarity. One particular good will usually
have a small group of goods closely associated with it in a
complementary relationship, but with regard to another good
chosen at random the most likely relationship to exist is
that of mild substitutability.
Hicks--Theory of Related Goods
Having seen the definitions established by Hicks and the
consequences of these definitions, it remains now to sum up
the conclusions into a consistent and precise theory. In the
theory of demand the investigation was made in the light of
the effect of a change in the price of commodity X on the con-
sumer’s expenditure. The same procedure will again be fol-
lowed.
A fall in the price of X affects the demand for X and
the demand for other goods through the substitution effect
and the income effect. As far as the demand for X is con-
cerned the substitution effect increases it; the income effect
diminishes it unless X is an inferior good. As for the demand
for other goods taken compositely, the substitution effect
diminishes it, the income effect increases it. Whether or not
the demand for other goods will move in one direction or anoth-
er depends solely on the magnitude of each effect and the
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extent to which one counterbalances the other. All this merely
follows from results attained through the use of the indiffer-
ence system.
Now with regard to the effect of a fall in the price of
X on the demand for Y, some particular good in the composite
commodity, the direct dependence on the indifference analysis
fails, for here we must consider whether Y is complementary
or substitutable with X. Ordinarily the fall in the price of
X sets up a substitution effect which diminishes the demand
for Y, but this does not necessarily follow, for if Y is com-
plementary with X, the substitution effect induces as similar
substitution in favor of Y increasing the demand for Y. As
far as the income effect set up by a fall in the price of X
is concerned, regardless of the relationship it will increase
the demand for Y, unless of course Y is an inferior good.
Thus in considering all the influences in the demand for Y,
not only must there be included the income and substitution
effects, but also the relationship between the goods them-
selves in so far as this alters the substitution and income
effects. It is possible to distinguish several cases within
which various possibilities may occur.
1. Y may be highly complementary with X. A fall in the
price of X may induce an income effect or substitution effect
on the demand for X. Both effects move in the same direction
but if the substitution effect on the demand for X is large
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relative to the income effect, then it may completely outweigh
it so that the induced demand for Y will move very closely
with the demand for X. An example of this, and Hicks specifi-
cally points out that this is only an example, is the case
where X and Y must be used in fixed proportions so that the
substitution in favor of X is matched by the substitution in
favor of Y. There may be other cases where the substitution
effect on X drowns out the income effect, but aside from the
proportion in which the goods are used, when this occurs the
demand for Y will definitely increase. When the goods are
highly complementary this situation usually prevails because
by the very nature of the relationship the income effect is
of little importance.
2. Y may be mildly complementary with X. Here the income
effect becomes more important. Usually in its reaction on the
demand for Y, it goes in the same direction as the substitution
effect so that total effect corresponds to an increase in Y.
But if Y is an inferior good the two effects oppose each other
and may cancel out. In the very extreme case the income effect
may outweigh the substitution effect so that the demand for
Y will diminish slightly.
5. Y may be mildly substitutable for X. This is a very
common situation. Ordinarily the income and substitution ef-
fects in this case will go in opposite directions, leaving
only a very slight effect on the demand for Y which may go
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in either direction. However, if Y is an inferior good the
demand for it will definitely contract, though perhaps very
insignificantly.
4. Y may be highly substitutable for X. Here the substi-
tution effect will dominate and the demand for Y must diminish
Also here it is possible to designate the extreme case where
X and Y are perfect substitutes. This occurs when a substitu-
tion in favor of X reducing the marginal rate of substitution
of X for money induces a reduction in the marginal rate of
substitution for Y for money by exactly the same proportion
as that in which that of X has been reduced. This cannot be
illustrated on the indifference map since the definition is in
terms of money (the third good), but if we revert back to the
earlier terminology, this will occur when the marginal rate
of substitution of X for Y decreases in exactly the same pro-
portion as that in which the marginal rate of substitution of
Y for X increases. On the indifference map this will appear
as a series of straight lines.'1' For a precise theory, how-
ever, it is necessary to stick to the definitions and since
money is required in the definitions it is incorrect, strict-
ly speaking, to refer to the indifference map. In his explana
tion Hicks does not make this reference, but I bring it in
here to make the point that on the basis of the definitions
1There is no limitation on the slope of the lines. This
therefore covers Stigler’s case of nickles and dimes being
perfect substitution.
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of marginal rates of substitution of one good for another,
the shape of the curves on the indifference map indicates
only substitution or the lack of it. Under the utility analy-
sis it indicated both substitution and complementarity and
much confusion resulted. Here the shape of the curve is
limited only to the substitution relationship. This of course
does not answer the question of what shape curve corresponds
to a particular degree of substitutability, but it does show
how substitution is the essence of the indifference system.
Ordinarily in this case the consumer will find the two
goods indistinguishable in satisfying his wants. If the goods
are physically indistinguishable, then they are for all In-
tents and purposes the same good, but it is not absolutely
necessary that the goods be physically indistinguishable to
be perfect substitutes.'1" The case of nickels and dimes made
previously Is a case in point. Furthermore it should be pointed
out that the relationship in the perfect case is reversible.
If Y is a perfect substitute for X then X must be a perfect
substitute for Y.
In the above discussion interest has been focused on
those cases in which a fall on the price of X affects the
demand for Y. But it is very possible that a fall in the
^This point is open to question. It may be argued that
nickels and dimes are not perfect substitutes, and that where
perfect substitutes occur they are really the same good and
therefore physically indistinguishable.
• o i
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price of X can have no influence at all on the demand for Y.
This may occur if the income and substitution effects on the
demand for Y are negligible or if not negligible, go in dif-
ferent directions and exactly counterbalance each other so
that there is no difference between them. It is probable
that many of the goods which economists have treated as inde-
pendent come under the case where the income and substitution
effects are negligible. But there also must be a few which
come under the second case. It is possible in many cases that
substitution in favor of other commodities comes about at the
expense of close substitutes, but also there is probably a
good deal of mild substitution which is present but prevented
from showing itself because it is offset by income effects.
This is the theory of related goods as worked out by
Hicks. It is a theory which applies to effects on individual
demand, but by the process of additivity it becomes applica-
ble to market demand as well. A fall in the market price of
X affects the demand for Y through the income and substitu-
tion effects. As before the final direction of these effects
is determined by the cumulative effects which may or may not
cancel each other, but again here the possibilities of counter-
balancing and cumulation are very numerous. For example X
and Y may be complementary for some people and substitute
for others. These individual effects then must be weighed
against each other. In final analysis goods for the group
•-
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as a whole will still be regarded as complementary if the
total substitution effect (which itself is the result of the
counterbalancing of individual substitution and income ef-
fects) increases the demand for Y when the price of X falls.
Goods may be regarded as substitutes if the reverse holds
true
.
It is seen then that in its connection to the theory of
consumer demand, the important aspect of the new theory is
the negative distinction which it makes in discarding indif-
ference analysis. It is no longer directly dependent on this
tool. But it is for this very reason that the indirect de-
pendence should not be overlooked. It may be impossible to
compare on the indifference map the marginal rates of substi-
tution between two goods and money, but it is possible to
establish the marginal rate of substitution between one good
and money by this means, and since the new definitions are
based on the latter concept, there is an indirect dependence.
Furthermore in so far as the new theory compares income and
substitution effects, even though the comparison is in words,
there is a dependence on the indifference analysis. There-
fore, as it was in the earlier development, the theory of re-
lated goods is still a special aspect of the theory of con-
sumer demand, but the relationship between the two is much
less close. This should make it much easier to distinguish
them
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CHAPTER V
APPLICATIONS
We have spent much time in examining the indifference
technique as it is used directly in the theory of consumer
demand and indirectly in the theory of related goods. There
remain now to be examined the various applications which can
utilize the indifference technique. These fall into two
broad classifications, those which limit themselves to the
main theory of consumer demand only, and those which rely on
the somewhat debatable concept of consumer’s surplus.
Applications in the Theory of Consumer Demand
1. The Supply Curve for Labor . The number of hours a
laborer will work per week is determined by the attractive-
ness to him of the money income received from working and the
leisure which he must give up. This may be considered by
means of indifference analysis where an ordinal preference
scale is assumed in which the individual is indifferent as
to quantities of income and hours of leisure. In Diagram 23
leisure is represented along the X axis and money income per
week on the Y axis. Leisure is measured along OX up to point
R which represents the total hours per week which may be
157
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1
divided between leisure or working. PR, P^R, PgR, etc * *
2
are wage lines. Since the total number of hours is fixed,
they measure all possible combinations of leisure, work, and
income with a given maximum possible income. As in our pre-
vious argument the laborer will seek that combination of in-
come and leisure which will put him on the highest possible
indifference curve. This will occur where the wage line is
just tangent to the indifference curve, point Q, on indifference
DIAGRAM 23
vr
q h o vooRneo x
DIAGRAM 24
*In this case since total hours are limited, those hours
not spent in leisure will be spent in work. Work may be con-
sidered as negative leisure.
^These are called wage lines because the slope of the
line indicates the wage rate per hour which the individual
receives by giving up leisure.
rli
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curve I. At this point OS hours will be devoted to leisure
and SR hours to work. Similarly if the amount of income is
allowed to vary, different divisions between leisure and work
will be obtained at each point of equilibrium, etc.
If we now connect the points of equilibrium we obtain a de-
mand curve for leisure in terms of income (also for negative
leisure, or work). This takes the form Q Q .
6
Several points are to be noted from the diagram. First
of all the indifference curves do not begin at the Y axis.
This results from physical limitations. There are a certain
number of leisure hours which the individual cannot possibly
give up. A certain minimum number of hours are needed for
eating, sleeping, etc. These are minimum requirements for
the maintenance of life, which the individual cannot even be-
gin to consider in relation to money income, no matter how
high it is. Secondly it is to be noted from the shape of the
demand curve that it is negatively sloped at the lower levels
of income and becomes positively sloped on the higher levels.
This results from the assumption of the preference field,
and it has been assumed in just this manner to indicate that
the laborer will be attracted by the higher income and per-
haps give up some of his leisure. But beyond ^ be be
more reluctant to give up his leisure in return for higher
income, and will work less hours at the higher wage rate.
This perhaps suggests that the higher the income the more
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leisure will be needed to spend and enjoy that income. At
any rate it is a possible suggestion of the explanation of
the long decline in the hours of work which the current trend
1
has indicated.
It is just one step further to derive from the system of
indifference curves the individual supply curve for labor.
Since the hours of work are considered negative leisure, all
that is necessary is to construct a scale in which hours of
work appear along OX positively. This could not be done pre-
viously because hours of work are generally substituted for
money in a direct ratio. In other words the indifference sys-
tem could not be assumed with the curves having a diminishing
marginal rate of substitution throughout. But if we now con-
struct the new scale the result will be a reversal of the
demand curve for leisure or the customary supply curve for
labor shown in Diagram 24.
2. Effects of Different Taxes on Individual Effort. The
question here is to what extent will individual effort be af-
2 Afected by the different types of taxation. As in the pre-
vious case we assume a preference field as between hours of
^This is by no means the only explanation. Increased
productivity, a better standard of living, higher real wages,
these are all to be considered, but in so far as they are
indicated on the indifference system they will influence the
curves toward the situation in Diagram 23.
2See Otto von Mering, The Shifting and Incidence of
Taxation (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1942)", pp.
111-114
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leisure and earned income. The line PR (Diagram 25) now
indicates the market price at which the exchange of leisure
for earnings takes place before the imposition of a fixed
tax. Q, the point of tangency to the indifference curve, is
Y
the equilibrium position before the tax is imposed.
Let us now levy a fixed tax equal to PP '
.
Automatically
this reduces the amount of income the individual can- earn.
But at the same time it also reduces the maximum hours of
leisure, for part of the total time available must be devoted,
after the imposition of the tax, to the earning of the tax.'*'
^Ibid.
,
footnote, p. 112.
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If the entire tax is earned, the market price of the exchange
of leisure for earnings will remain unchanged and the price
line will be shifted to P-jR-j^ by the exact amount of the tax.
The new position of equilibrium will be where the indif-
ference curve is tangent to P-jR.^ Now joining the points of
tangency we obtain what may be called the income-leisure
1 2
curve, Q Q. This curve will slope upward to the right.
Consequently the abscissa to will be smaller than the
abscissa to <^. The fixed tax thus decreases leisure and in-
creases efforts. Furthermore the difference between the ordi-
nate at Q. and (SS^) will be smaller than the amount of the
tax PP-^. That is, the earnings after the deduction of the
tax though smaller than before the imposition of the tax are
decreased by less than the amount of the tax.
This corresponds to the income -consumption curve de-
veloped by Hicks, see p. 58.
2
A tax of a fixed amount may be considered as a negative
gift. If the individual were originally at and suddenly
were given a gift equal to the amount of the tax, then with
an unchanged market price of leisure, he would divide his
leisure and income at point Q so as to increase the amount
of leisure and at the same time have
more money to spend. For this reason
the curve slopes upward to the right.
See von Mering, ojd. cit .
,
p. 112. This
is similar to the income effect devel-
oped by Hicks, but there is a definite
limitation on the position of the in-
difference curves, that is, the slope
of the income-consumption curve, im-
posed by the conditions of the problem.
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Let us now assume that a proportional income tax is
levied instead of the fixed tax. The new price line appears
as RP2> showing that as income increases the amount of the
tax becomes greater by the fixed proportion and the amount
of leisure less. The actual tax at any point is measured by
the vertical distance between RPg and RP . The effect of this
tax on effort depends on the position of the indifference
curves and it is generally impossible to say what the position
will be. The point of tangency Qg may fall to the right or
to the left of Q. either increasing or decreasing effort. What
is involved here is the substitution effect between leisure
and income as a result of an increase in the market price of
exchange of the two. The direction of this effect will be
indicated by the direction of the price-consumption curve QQg
and as we saw previously there is no limitation to the slope
of this curve.
1
In this situation particularly it is impos-
sible to say what the slope will be. We may conclude then
that a proportional income tax may increase, decrease, or
leave unchanged the effort of the individual.
Again let us change the conditions of the problem and
assume instead a progressive income tax. The price line is
no longer a straight line, but now becomes a curve convex
from the origin similar to RT. This indicates, of course,
that the tax becomes greater, the greater the income and
^See page 62.
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this is borne out by the increasing vertical distance between
RT and RP as income becomes greater. how if we make the as-
sumption that there are points of equilibrium along this price
line, like Q3 , it becomes apparent that as the tax becomes
greater the abscissa to the point of equilibrium becomes less.
In other words the more progressive the tax the greater the
effort required . 1
5. The Effect of Taxation on Individual Welfare . The
problem here is whether or not the individual is better off
with a commodity tax or a personal income tax. Obviously if
the individual is to be taxed he will not be as well off as
if he were not taxed, but how will Individual welfare be af-
fected by each of these taxes? Will he be on a higher indif-
ference curve if the tax is levied in the form of an income
2
tax or will a commodity tax place him on a higher curve?
^It may very well be that the tax at the higher or even
the lower levels of income (depending on the rate of pro-
gressiveness) is large enough to stifle incentive so that the
increased effort will not be put in. This of course would
not appear on the above diagram where we consider effort
negative leisure, but it is a limitation on that assumption
which should not be overlooked even though it must be used
in our analysis.
^This is based on the discussion by P. M. Joseph, "Excess
Burden of Indirect Taxation," Review of Economic Studies
,
Vol.
VI, 1959, pp. 226-227. Joseph's discussion attempts to anal-
yze and measure the monetary loss to the treasury by the
imposition of a commodity tax as opposed to an income tax.
This utilizes the concept of consumer's surplus. I have
therefore altered the discussion to avoid for now this con-
cept, but my discussion is essentially the same as his. The
consumer's surplus aspect of this will be treated below.
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The problem Is analyzed in Diagram 26. In this figure
OX represents the commodity taxed and OY the individual’s
money income. The ordinal preference field is assumed as
between Y (say, cigarettes) and money. The individual’s
money income will be equal to OQ. The price line will be
QR. Any point on it represents the amount of income given
up divided by the quantity. This of course equals price,
but it is also equal to the tangent of QR or tan a. Before
the imposition of the tax, QB cigarettes will be consumed
and AB spent. The individual will be at equilibrium at A
where the price line is tangent to the indifference curve.
Y
Now if a commodity tax is imposed on cigarettes, the
price will rise to QS. The individual will be at equilibrium
at point C where the indifference curve touches the new price
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line. At this point he will buy QD cigarettes at a total
cost of CD out of which KC is paid to the government as a
commodity tax. Let us assume that the same amount of tax
had been taken instead in the form of a personal income tax.
The price of cigarettes remains unchanged, but income is
reduced by the amount QH = KC . The new price line is HT
through C but parallel to QR, and the point of equilibrium
is at E where the new price line is tangent to curve Ig.
Since E, the point of equilibrium, is on curve Ig which is
higher than curve 1^, on which C the previous point of equi-
librium was located, it follows that the taxpayer will lose
less, and thus be better off, by an income tax than by a com-
modity tax of the same amount.
4. Theory of Savings . The indifference technique may be
used as a rough means to throw some light on the motivation
behind saving and borrowing. In this use it by no means pre-
tends to completely e xplain savings and borrowing. However,
under the assumed conditions a certain insight is gained by
the application of indifference analysis.
Let us assume an individual with no accumulated resources,
who has but two years to live and proposes to spend his income
of the two years in such a way that at the end of the period
he leaves nothing for his descendants. Let it also be as-
sumed that at any time he can borrow or lend unlimited amounts
of money at rate of interest i. Then the question at hand is
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how shall he divide his expenditures in the two years so as
to get the most for his given income.^
As previously we assume a system of indifference curves.
X represents expenditure of the first year and Y expenditure
of the second year. The preference field shows the indifference
^The essence of this application under the given condi-
tions was developed by I. Fisher, The Rate of Interest (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1907). Fisher used this as a
"first approximation" in the explanation of the preference of
present over future income as determined by the supply and
demand of present and future income. His use of the indif-
ference technique (except for the utility concept) is similar
to that given above and his results are substantially the same.
See Appendix, Chapter 7, pp. 387-392. See also the later ex-
pansion of this application by Fisher, The Theory of Interest
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), Ch. 10, pp. 231-258,
particularly p. 255.
Boulding also has. worked up the same application. His
is taken from Fisher, but he has added a simple algebraic ex-
planation which may prove helpful. See R. E. Boulding, Eco -
nomic Analysis (New York: Harper Brothers, 1941), pp. 669-673.
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as to combinations of expenditures in the two years. Like
all indifference curves the marginal rate of substitution
between expenditures of the two years is decreasing so that
the curves are convex to the origin.
In Diagram 27 C-^Cg will represent the opportunity line.
This is strictly speaking a price line as between expenditure
of the first year and expenditure of the second year, but in
this application, the meaning is clearer if we refer to it
as an opportunity line, for it actually shows all combinations
of expenditure which are possible in the two years under a
given income and a given rate of interest. The slope of the
line depends on the rate of interest. If, for example, in-
come is $1000 the first year and $2000 the second year and
the interest rate zero, the individual can borrow $2000 the
first year and spend $3000 or he can loan out $1000 the first
year and spend $3000 the second year. With a zero interest
rate OE-^ = 0Eg , and E^Eg becomes the opportunity line when i
is zero. On the other hand if i is 10 per cent the individual
can lend out $1000 the first year and receive interest on this
to spend in the second year making a total expenditure of
$3100, OCg. Or he can borrow $1818.18 the first year which
together with his income will allow him to spend $2818.18,
0C 1 , the first year. The second year he will spend nothing
but out of the $2000 income he will pay back his loan of
$1818.18 plus the interest at 10 per cent of -^181.82. The
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opportunity line in this case will be C^Cg indicating possible
expenditure combinations in the two years at an interest rate
of 10 per cent. If the individual neither borrows nor lends,
but spends each year his exact income, then regardless of the
interest rate, his given yearly income is an expenditure pos-
sibility. We may say then that the opportunity line changes
its slope depending on the rate of interest, but whatever the
rate, it rotates on the point of yearly incomes, point B.
From the technique of the indifference analysis, the
individual will seek that combination of expenditures which
is on the highest indifference curve touched by the opportunity
line; that is, he will seek the combination which will give
him the greatest satisfaction consistent with opportunity pos-
sibilities. Point therefore, where the opportunity line
G-^2 1s just tangent to the indifference curve will Indicate
the best combination on that line. With the given yearly
incomes and a given interest rate of 10 per cent the indi-
vidual will spend Oxg the first year and 0y2 the second year.
He will have to borrow the sum x^Xg the first year and pay
back the sum y^y2 tiie second y© a^« y^y2 however includes
the interest on x-^x2 so that the total amount of interest
paid will equal y-^g " x ix2*
It should be particularly noted that the interest rate
is fixed. This however should in no way influence the instan-
taneous establishment of the indifference curves for they
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merely represent the level of individual indifference to
given combinations of expenditure. The slope of the indif-
ference curve at any particular point represents the indi-
vidual’s marginal rate of substitution between expenditures
of two years. Actually according to the conditions of the
problem the process of seeking an equilibrium point amounts
to just equating two independent factors, one the given mar-
ket rate of interest, the other the assumed marginal rates
of substitution. 1 This is important for it is very easy to
fall into the erroneous belief that the indifference curves
are influenced by the given interest rate. This, however,
is ruled out by the hypotheses.
It is evident from Diagram 27 that an increase in the
interest rate will make the individual worse off. The oppor-
tunity line 0-^2 must rotate on B, the given yearly income
combination. If the interest rate is increased, C^Cg becomes
steeper. Therefore the new equilibrium point must lie on
some curve below the one given in the diagram. The reason
for this is that the individual’s income is concentrated
mostly in the second year and as a result he borrows the
first year and repays in the second. The increased rate of
interest will make him borrow less, but it will also lower
^Boulding refers to this as the "rate of time substitu-
tion of expenditure" or "time preference." See Economic
Analysis
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the terms on which he can borrow so that the net effect will
be a decline in individual well-being. On the other hand if
the greater part of the total income is concentrated in the
first year (Diagram 28)
,
the individual has an excess of in-
come that year and becomes a lender. An increase in the rate
of interest therefore makes him better off.
It is apparent from this reasoning that there are three
factors governing the position of the individual, the indif-
ference curves, the interest rate, and the distribution of
income. If the interest rate and indifference curves are
given, then the distribution of income will decide whether
the individual is a lender or borrower the first year. In
other words, the individual's impatience to possess money now
or in the future would be directly dependent on the distribu-
tion of income. On the other hand once the distribution of
income is determined, and from this it is decided whether the
individual will be a borrower or lender, the amounts borrowed
or loaned, and the amounts spent each year will depend upon
the rate of interest. In this case the rate of interest de-
termines the individual's preference for money in the present
or in the future, and it also determines individual well-being.
This application, within the scope of its limitations,
shows some of the relationships between the rate of interest,
preference for money, and individual well-being. By its very
nature it is limited to two periods of time. They may cover
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two years, or may be considered as early years or later years.
If three periods of time are considered, then it becomes
necessary to construct a three dimensional diagram. Beyond
three periods diagrams fail, but enough can be learned from
the simple application to make the extended analysis by means
of algebra.
Applications Involving the Concept of
Consumer’s Surplus
As we saw in our previous discussion, the restatement of
the concept of consumer's surplus in terms of indifference
analysis attempted to translate gains or losses into a numeri-
cal monetary measure. This procedure was justifiably criti-
cized. However, aside from the criticism, certain applications
have been made by those who saw merit in the restated con-
cept, and to complete our previous discussion, several of
these will be given.
5. Tax Yield to the Government . In the third application
(Diagram 26) it was seen the individual fared better by the
imposition of an income tax as compared with a commodity tax
of the same amount. Let us now look at this from the opposite
point of view and see how the government is affected by the
imposition of these taxes. It is at once obvious that the
government loses by the imposition of an Income tax as com-
pared to a commodity tax of the same amount, but governments
:
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are Interested in monetary measures of losses and gains, so
that it becomes necessary to measure in terms of money the
additional loss to the government by the imposition of dif-
ferent taxes of equivalent yield. 1
In Diagram 26 the imposition of a commodity tax raises
the price, moving the price line from QR to QS and the point
of equilibrium from A to C. At this point the total amount
paid is CD of which the yield to the government is CK. When
the equivalent yield is taken by means of an income tax, price
remains the same, but total Income is reduced to OH. Indi-
vidual equilibrium moves to point E which is on a higher in-
difference curve than point C. This means that the government
could have obtained an additional yield by substituting an
Income tax for the commodity tax without imposing any extra
burden on the consumer.
Under the commodity tax the individual was at equilibrium
at C on indifference curve I^. If we draw a new line parallel
to the price line HT under the income tax, but tangent to the
indifference curve at the same level of C, 1^, we can then ob-
tain a measure of the additional yield which the government
could have got. We can say now that a commodity tax yielding
CK is the same to the individual as an income tax yielding
QG. The additional tax which the government could have got
1 Joseph, ’’Excess Burden of Indirect Taxation,” ojd. clt . ,
p. 226.
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by imposing an income tax thus is measured by GH. 1
The size of GH depends on the relationship of the two
goods. As was seen previously the only relationship to be
derived from the indifference curves is the presence of or
lack of substitution. In the case of complete lack of sub-
stitution the marginal rate of substitution at a particular
point would be zero. If for example this occurred at C, He
2
would be tangent to the same indifference curve as QC (Dia-
gram 29). Therefore there would be no difference in the
burden to the individual con-
sumer between an income tax or
a commodity tax and hence no
excess loss to the government.
It would seem to follow
from this that where the govern-
ment wants to drain purchasing
O Y power and a commodity tax is
DIAGRAM 29
used, it should be levied on
^In terms of the consumer's surplus discussion, GH is
equivalent to the "price compensating variation," BB-^ in
Diagram 14, Chapter III.
2
C would be the point of complete lack of substitution.
Pareto concluded that the L-shaped curves represented extreme
complementarity. Hicks has shown that the only relationship
to be derived from the indifference curves is that of substi-
tution, therefore I am assuming that at c the L-shape curves
indicate complete lack of substitution. This has not been
sufficiently validated, but I utilize this assumption to
bring out the point of application.
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those commodities which do not readily substitute for money
(and hence other goods); otherwise there is loss to the gov-
ernment to the extent that additional taxes could be collected
without imposing further burden on the consumer. This also
suggests that those commodities should be selected which cus-
tomarily make up a large part of the individual budget. The
very size of the budget devoted to the consumption of a par-
ticular good indicates that the substitution between that good
and money is probably (not necessarily) lower than that of
some other good to which only an insignificant part of the
budget is devoted. On the other hand if the government desires
to ease as far as it can the burden of the consumer, it should
generally resort to income taxes, but when it does use commodi-
ty taxes, it should select those commodities which substitute
for other goods. Then to the extent that the consumer can
substitute other goods he will be better off than if he were
taxed on a good for which there are no close substitutes.
6. The Problem of Index Numbers . The indifference analy-
sis may be applied to the problem of index numbers. This ap-
plication follows directly from the later developments of the
consumer’s surplus concept, but it is not directly dependent
on this concept. It is rather, as Hicks explains, that the
discussion of consumer’s surplus has served as the connecting
link to the theory of index numbers. This, I think, will
*-See above, page 90.
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become apparent as the discussion proceeds.
The problem of index numbers is one phase of General
Welfare Economics. Simply stated the problem is this:
Given two consumption periods, is it possible to establish
that the individual's standard of living has risen or fallen
between the two periods, and is there a measure of the change
in the standard of living? Theoretically we are chiefly in-
terested in the first part of the problem, but we cannot
overlook the measurement factor.
Let us start with two periods, A and B. In period A
the individual consumed q q ' of two commodities at prices
o o
p0p0 ’. In period B the individual consumes quantities
and q^ ' at prices p^ and p^'. Now we have two commodities
of which different quantities are consumed in different
periods. Indifference curves can be arranged between the
different commodities, but in order to make any progress we
must make the same assumption which we made in the discussion
of consumer's surplus, namely, that tastes remain unchanged
in each period. ^ In order to make comparisons it is necessary
to use one system of indifference curves; otherwise changes
in the standard of living are meaningless.
Given constant tastes, then the quantities and prices
allow us to establish the consumer's income and equilibrium
position. In Diagram 30, q Q is consumed at price pQ and qQ
'
1See above, page 86.
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at price p Q '. Consumer's income is then determined by line
p 0pQ
' and his equilibrium position is established at A. Simi-
larly in the second period p^pg ' represents consumer's income
with the equilibrium position at B. It is at once obvious
that position B is on a higher indifference curve than A and
that therefore the individual has a higher standard of living
in B
.
But is there a measure of this change in standard? Re-
ferring back to Chapter III, Diagram 14, we see that the
changes in the two periods are tantamount, under the assump-
tion of constant taste, to changes in price. The measure of
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the gain from the change in price is represented by the price
compensating variation BB^ • Similarly in the present diagram
BB_^ is the price compensating variation, but it measures the
change in the standard of living between the two periods.
It compares the position of equilibrium on the same level of
indifference as A but at the prices existing during B. Thus
if BBj_ were taken away during B, the consumer would move to
the best possible previous position open to him which is at
C, on the same level of indifference as A.
1
BB is thus the
1
measure of the gain as the result of moving from A to B in
terms of q 1 . Knowing the price of q 1 in B this can be con-
verted into a monetary measure. It should be noted however
that BB^ is not equivalent to Marshall’s area under the de-
mand curve. This confusion was straightened out by Henderson
as we saw in our discussion of consumer's surplus. But it is
a measure of the gain as a result of the change in price, and
it therefore permits us to measure the change in the standard
of living.
Other measures of the change in standard of living have
been developed which also evolve on measurements from the
consumer's surplus diagram. Most of these are mathematical
measures; therefore I will present them without their
•^J. R. Hicks, "Consumer's Surplus and Index Numbers,"
Review of Economic Studies, Summer, 1942, p. 127. Compare
Hicks i diagram with Diagram 14 in Chapter III.
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mathematical background. Two well-known measures are the
Laspeyre variation and the Faasche variation. The Laspeyre
variation is the measure of the change in income which would
enable the same quantity of goods to be purchased (the quan-
tity in the first period) after prices have changed. This is
measured by AA^ in Diagram 30 or AAg in the consumer’s surplus
diagram. The Paasche variation, on the other hand, is the
measure of the change in income which allows the second set
of goods to be purchased under the prices existing in the
first period. This is indicated by BBg . Still a third meas-
ure is what Hicks calls the equivalent variation. It measures
the change in income which if it took place on the basis of
the prices in A, would have the same effect on the level of
satisfaction as is produced by the change in prices from A
to B. This is measured by AAg. All these measures can be
expressed mathematically and also can be quantitatively com-
pared.'1' For our purpose however, it is sufficient to show
that they exist and can be represented geometrically on the
indifference map.
The above are a few of the important applications of
the indifference analysis. They do not by any stretch of
the imagination exhaust all the possibilities, but they give
^For mathematical discussion see ibid . , 129-137. See
also R. Frisch, "Problem of Index lumbers," Econometr lea ,
1936, pp. 1-38.
.':rx
o I . .
'
.
•
. ;
••
'
•U -t -- IG ... ..
.
180
us an adequate idea as to how some practical value may he
derived from the indifference analysis. From a theoretical
point of view those applications which stand on the customary
indifference technique are to my mind the more substantial.
Those which depend on the consumer's surplus concept, while
valuable perhaps from a descriptive point of view, contain
a theoretical weakness which cannot be overcome. To this
extent then they should be accepted with limitation. Moreover
the same result can be obtained without the numerical measure
of gain. It would seem wise therefore to concentrate on the
direct use and eliminate the doubtful one. As explained pre-
viously this is, in the main, the method I have followed.
I.
CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION
In the preceding pages we have spent much time examining
the development and use of indifference curves in demand analy-
sis. There remains now the question of evaluation, evaluation
of the technique as a tool, and evaluation of the theory in
which the tool has been used. As was seen in the development,
it is inevitable that both go hand in hand.
The theory of consumer demand is but one phase of the more
inclusive theory of value. It has been important to us because
it was in this phase that the indifference analysis was intro-
duced as a technique which held promise to make a progressive
contribution theoretically and descriptively. Whether or not
it has added anything useful in these respects is the main prob-
lem of evaluation. The criteria for judgment of this problem
lie in the consistency of the theory in which the technique
has been used and in the ability of the theory to illustrate
the truth, that is, to conform to reality. So far as the logic
of the theory is concerned no difficulty presents itself. If
we take the theory of Hicks as the latest and most generally
accepted constructive theory of consumer demand (which utilizes
the indifference device), then there is no problem about the
181
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logic of his theory. For that matter there was no question
about the logic of Pareto or Fisher on whom Hicks built. The
work of each of these in itself was entirely consistent. It
was merely that they were lacking in their ability to conform
to reality. Additional limitations, new concepts, etc., were
needed to illustrate the truth. These were largely supplied
by Hicks so that in final analysis the problem reduces to an
evaluation of the ability of Hicks ' theory to explain what
actually takes place in society.
Economists are very familiar with the difficulties inherent
in the social laboratory as opposed to the physical laboratory.
It is because of these difficulties that they have been obliged
to devote so much of their time to theory. The problem of
verification of theory still remains one of the greatest stum-
bling blocks in the science; indeed it is because of this that
theory rather than law occupies so great a portion of the sub-
ject matter. But this is not an absolute obstacle. It is
still possible to build better and better theories, to reason
from assumptions which more nearly correspond to reality and
which hold greater promise for verification. This was par-
ticularly apparent in the development of the Indifference analy-
sis out of the utility theory. Utility as an assumption pre-
sented a fairly reasonable foundation, but as we saw. It was
later proved to be incapable of verification. Ihe history of
indifference analysis, if it has done nothing more, has pointed
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this out, and as a result there is today general unanimity
that the assumption of utility as a measurable magnitude does
not conform to actual fact.
It is fitting now to raise the same doubts about Hicksian
theory as were raised about Marshallian utility theory. Can
the assumptions of this theory be verified to the extent that
the results of the logic built on them reasonably portray the
truth? The assumptions with which we must be concerned are
those which Hicks developed to take the place of the doubtful
concepts in utility theory, in particular those connected with
the principle of the marginal rate of substitution.
It will be remembered from the early discussion that the
principle of marginal rate of substitution was developed to
avoid the arbitrariness of marginal utility. The marginal rate
of substitution of X for Y was defined as the quantity of Y
which would just compensate the consumer for the loss of the
marginal unit of X. In Marshallian terminology, if Y is money,
then the marginal rate of substitution of X for Y is equal to
the price.'1' But Marshall assumed the marginal utility of money
to be constant. Hicks makes no such assumption; so that ac-
tually the marginal rate of substitution of X In terms of money
p
Is independent of price. Income effects can enter and the
^Hicks, Value and Capital
,
op . clt .
,
p. 20.
2Above page 49; also footnote on page 147.
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advantage of the new theory was precisely the fact that it
treated these effects.
In view of the criteria of evaluation which have been
set up a logical question presents itself. If the marginal
rate of substitution is not equal to price, then what is it
and how can it be verified? It appears to me that there is
no satisfactory answer. The marginal rate of substitution is
a concept similar to the utility concept. Logically it does
not contain the objectionable measurement feature of the utili-
ty concept, but aside from this if an individual's marginal
rate of substitution between X and Y is to vary, apart from
the price of X in terms of Y, then the concept still retains
an introspective aspect. It is true that this aspect is not
a measurable one, but nevertheless it remains mental and as
such defies any possible verification. This I think is par-
ticularly well brought out in Hicks' definitions of related
goods. They are framed in terms of the effect of a change in
the marginal rate of substitution of X for money on the mar-
ginal rate of substitution of Y for money. If the price of
Y is given as constant, then the condition of relatedness will
affect the marginal rate of substitution of Y for money so
that the marginal rate of substitution of Y money "is kept
equal to the price of Y." 1 This certainly infers that the
^Hicks, ojd. cit .
,
p. 46.
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marginal rate of substitution is a concept apart from price
and since it is something which evidently exists within the
individual, it must be purely introspective.
Hicks considers the principle of diminishing marginal
rate of substitution as "a positive change in the foundation
1
of the theory. In a certain sense it is, for it permits the
establishment of continuous indifference curves convex to the
origin on the basis of a new concept. But the change is not
2
as radical as his language would infer. In comparing his
theory with that of Pareto or Fisher it is very evident that
there are close similarities, even though the latter utilizes
the principle of marginal utility. In essence, even with the
new principle, Hicks’ results are merely a transformation of
the utility concept into other language. It is true that in
the process of transformation certain objectionable features
of the old language have been removed, and other new and bene-
ficial features have been added, but this hardly makes the
change positive. For the new results, while admittedly better
than the previous ones, still defy objective verification.
The theory is still in the realm of mental speculation. As
such it cannot be empirically coincided with human behavior
and therefore defies objective refutation. Now it may very
^Ibid.
,
p. 21.
2See on this point 0. Morgenstern, "Professor Hicks on
Value and Capital," Journal of Political Economy , June, 1941,
p. 366.
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well be that all demand theory, by its very nature, must be
limited to this realm. Indeed under the present state of
knowledge, this appears to be so, and if it is, the problem
of demand will always remain as theory and never pass into the
sphere of law. In this sense assumptions such as Hicks makes
are necessary and, within limits, useful. But it is not incon-
ceivable that some new social or psychological technique will
be developed which will do away with these assumptions. An
advance of this sort would then be considered a change in basic
foundation. Until this appears, however, economists must make
use of devices similar to those used by Hicks. It is only
through such devices that the total understanding of economic
phenomena will be increased. The greater the understanding,
the greater will be the probability that eventually theory
will become law.
In the light of this, then, Hicksian theory can serve a
definite purpose. But in the same light, the utility analysis
is also technically meaningful. This, therefore, precludes
the complete abandonment of the utility analysis. It attacks
essentially the same problems as does indifference theory.
Its language is not as logically precise nor does it go as
deep into particular phases, but it does possess an unparal-
leled simplicity which permits description of unexcelled
clarity. As long as the points of superiority and inferiority
of both theories are recognized they can be used parallel to
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each other. Indeed this is borne out by the fact that while
an increasing number of authors are using indifference analy-
sis, they are not dropping the utility approach. Some are
using one to check the results of the other. Others are using
the indifference analysis to clarify particular points for
which it is better suited. At any rate both have become tools
of the economist and are accepted as such.
Since this is the situation, it is advisable to clearly
separate the two theories in the important aspects. As has
been pointed out previously, the chief differences lie in the
original assumptions. The assumption of utility infers a
measurement. The assumption of a preference field merely
indicates levels of equal preference which are superior to
one another. The exact extent of superiority is entirely un-
necessary, for the theory can be built without any reference
to this measure. But this is all basic. Beyond this there
is the question of income effects. The underlying assumption
of the utility theory is the constant marginal utility of
money. It was this which prevented Marshall from coming to
the income effect and it is this which sharply differentiates
the two, particularly in a descriptive sense. However one
may wish to stress the importance of the income effect, common
sense tells us that it does exist, and to the extent that the
indifference analysis treats this effect, it is superior to
the utility theory. In his text Hicks makes quite a bit of
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the Income effect, yet he is very careful to portray it in
its proper relative position. This he does by translating
Marshall into his own language. He shows how Marshall’s con-
stant utility of money is equivalent in his own terminology
to the case where the income effect is swamped by the substi-
tution effect. This usually occurs where changes are small
and income effects are unreliable, and as these conditions
prevail in the vast majority of cases Marshall’s assumption
is generally valid. It is for this reason that Marshall was
able to establish an unequivocal theory of demand. But there
are cases where this assumption does not fully conform to fact.
It is here that indifference analysis fits the bill, for it
treats those cases for which the utility theory is not adapta-
ble and thereby presents a more accurate picture.
The doctrine of constant marginal utility of money has
given rise to a great amount of discussion, much of it very
unnecessary.^ This is very true with respect to the concept
of consumer's surplus. As we saw In our discussion a great
deal of confusion was created by a lack of understanding as
^Samuelson is particular to refer to the doctrine as
the constancy of marginal utility of income. He points out
that Hicks misunderstood Marshall's use of the word money,
and that therefore even in Marshall's work the marginal utili-
ty of money is not intended to be constant with respect to
everything. But Marshall definitely considered changes in
the marginal utility of income as of the "second order of
smallness" and therefore did not even approach income effects.
See P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1947 J, pp. 189-194.
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to just what Marshall meant. This misunderstanding was fos-
tered even further by Kicks’ restatement of the concept. For
Hicks the establishment of indifference curves allowed the re-
statement on what he considered more realistic grounds. In
his pure consumer theory the constant marginal utility of
money led to the investigation of income effects, which were
completely lacking in Marshall's theory. Hicks felt that this
also carried over to the concept of consumer’s surplus, extend-
ing it beyond the case where indifference curves are merely
parallel to each other. To the extent that income effects were
lacking this was probably true, but it did nothing to revita-
lize the concept itself, for as was pointed out, there were
defects in the concept, aside from the lack of income effects.
Even after Hicks' restatement it is generally realized that
nothing is to be gained from the concept. It would seem wise
therefore to exclude it completely and avoid unnecessary dis-
cussion.
As for the theory of related goods here too much confusion
still remains, particularly with the problem of complementarity.
There is no question that the theory of Hicks is a definite
improvement over that of the utility school, but there still
remain many vital questions for which there is no clear-cut
explanation. This leaves us with a theory which is not par-
ticularly useful. The reason for this may lie in the defini-
tions of complementarity. Samuelson has pointed out that Hicks
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gives two or more distinct and inconsistent definitions.
The mathematical one (which we did not go into) can he applied
to the case where there are only two goods, but the verbal
does not apply to this case. Indeed the results of the verbal
definition point out the necessity for the third good in order
that the concept make any sense. This is clearly an inconsis-
tency which has not and should be cleared up. But even on the
basis of the verbal definition some of the old problems still
remain. It is still possible for any two goods to be both
complementary and substitutable at the same time. The relation-
ship between the two concepts and the limits of each are still
confused. The question of degree is still ambiguous. Generally
speaking the theory is still in rough form and leaves much to
be desired.
But apart from this, the main theory of consumer demand
which is based on the use of the indifference technique, is
theoretically useful. Some of the applications have been exam-
ined above. No doubt many more will be developed. The work
of Hicks is by far not the final answer, but even in its present
form it presents a tool which lends itself to the problem of
theoretical analysis. As such it deserves a place as a part
of the economist's equipment.
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ABSTRACT
Indifference analysis is essentially an outgrowth of
Marshallian utility analysis. In its early development it
sought objectivity, but at the same time it still clung to
the utility concept, for this was so firmly embedded in early
thought that it was difficult to do away with it. However,
the utility concept contained many inherent defects. Though
based on a purely psychological magnitude and though theoret-
ically precise, it defied practical measurement. A descrip-
tive theory was built upon it, but it was impossible to verify
that theory inasmuch as utility, as such, was purely subjective
and afforded no tangible standard of measurement which could
serve as a guide. With the development of the indifference
system, part of this objection was overcome.
This was apparent, not so much in the work of Edgeworth,
but particularly so in that of Fisher and Pareto. They both
began with the utility concept. By utilizing the three dimen-
sional device in a manner similar to that of Auspitz and Lieben,
early predecessors, they established a utility surface. But
they then did away with the third dimension, and there remained
a series of curves in two dimensions which indicated constant
levels of utility. These curves were assumed in the form of
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an indifference system or map, and served as the starting
point for a new theory.
The new tool presented a distinct advantage, for it ap-
parently permitted demand theory to he ob jectivized. It was
no longer necessary to have a cardinal measure of utility
showing by how much one good was preferred to another. All
that was needed was an assumed preference field indicating
that one combination of two goods was preferred to another,
more, or less, but not by how much. This disposed of the need
for a standard of measurement since the strictly quantitative
implications of the earlier theories were no longer present.
Thus both Fisher and Pareto claimed complete objectivity. To
a great extent they were justified in their claims, but not
fully so, for as was pointed out by Hicks, utility still en-
tered through the back door.
Current indifference theory as developed by Hicks proposes
to do away completely to any reference to utility. Hicks
examined previous theory, and systematically disposed of those
concepts tainted in any manner by utility. In place of mar-
ginal utility he established the new principle of the marginal
rate of substitution. In place of diminishing marginal utility
he substituted the principle of diminishing marginal rate of
substitution. The latter principle he considered a basic
change in the very foundation of demand theory. His results
are for the most part theoretically objective. The measurement
' V '
)ST'.^tO'! ¥ i OO I
'
,
C
.
*
1: .•
•
'
.
- . • . .
.V
195
objection of the utility concept has been overcome, and. in
the process it has become possible to describe income effects.
These were known to have existed previously but had never been
treated. The income effect is the effect on consumer expendi-
ture of a fall of price, which reacts like an increase in in-
come. This is distinguished from the substitution effect, of
a fall in price, which allows the additional increment to be
spent in purchasing increased quantities of the good whose
price has fallen. To the extent that Hicksian theory explains
income effects without any reference to utility, it is superior.
It not only goes further than utility theory, but it does so
without any dependence on a measurable magnitude
.
Hicks considered his new principles a positive change in
the foundation of the theory. In a certain theoretical sense
they are, for they dispose of previous weak points. But one
cannot help notice the parallels between the work of Pareto and
Hicks. It is very evident that the new theory is merely a
translation of the former work into the language of the new
principles. Additional features have been added. The results
are definitely better. But basically the theories remain the
same and what is most important is that they are both still
within the subjective sphere.
Hicks hoped to have overcome this, but by setting up the
concept of the marginal rate of substitution, as an independent
entity, varying apart from price, he establishes a ratio which
. -II :
.• i ‘V:i. : •
,
M
194
exists solely in the individual mind. To be sure the problem
of measurement is not involved, for how this ratio varies quan-
titatively is of little interest. But the very fact that it
is a mental phenomenon deprives it of objective verification.
This is particularly apparent from his definitions of related
goods which are indirectly dependent on indifference analysis.
Here the conditions of relatedness depend on the variations of
marginal rates of substitution between two goods and money.
These marginal rates of substitution are not equal to price.
They are established by assumption only, and, while theoreti-
cally helpful, defy any verification. This means, of course,
that the results can never be established empirically and that
theory can never become law, if any such law exists. It may
well be that all demand theory must remain within this subjec-
tive sphere. If this is so then it is wise to recognize its
limitations
.
In view of this Marshallian utility analysis attains a
new value. If the measurement defect and the method by which
the indifference analysis overcomes this, are both taken into
consideration, it is possible to use the utility analysis with
advantage. It certainly Is less complicated, and attains a
degree of clarity in explanation which is not inherent in the
indifference analysis. Yet there are many problems for which
it is not suitable, specifically those which deal with Income
effects. It would seem wise therefore, rather than to accept
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one as superior to another, to adopt both as tools and wherever
possible to use one to check the other. This opinion seems to
be borne out in actual practice, for this procedure is being
followed more and more in current economic work. The indiffer-
ence technique is becoming more familiar and more widely ac-
cepted, and at the same time utility analysis is losing none
of its acceptance. Both are being used as parallels to each
other
.
The problem of related goods has been intricately bound
up with the development of indifference theory. The very idea
of levels of indifference between different combinations of
goods suggested treatment of substitution and complementarity.
At first this was done on the utility basis. Since the indif-
ference map treated the level of utility of two goods together
it was natural to ask how the utility of one was affected by
changes in the utility of the other. Thus we find treatments
by Fisher and Pareto, differing in many respects, but essen-
tially the same. The peculiar part of both these treatments
is that while both claimed objectivity in the central develop-
ment of demand theory and in a limited sense attained it, what-
ever objectivity was attained was completely destroyed in the
theory of related goods.
The main difficulty has been in the establishment of the
exact nature of substitution and complementarity, and their
relationship to each other. There is something in the concepts
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which has eluded all who have treated it. The problem of com-
plementarity in particular has presented great difficulty.
And to a lesser degree this situation still prevails in current
theory. The work of Hicks is an improvement over that of
Pareto. Hicks performed a valuable service in showing how
money entered, and how indifference theory is only indirectly
helpful in the problem of related goods. But Hicks' theory
is far from the final answer. His concept of money is vague.
Many of the problems inherent in Pareto still remain in the
work of Hicks, particularly the problem of degree. The exact
nature of the concept has not adequately been explained and
generally speaking the theory is still very rough and of little
value. But this is entirely apart from the theory of consumer
demand. The latter does have value in itself and should be
considered separately.
Indifference theory can and does stand alone as an eco-
nomic tool.
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